Engaging with the Divine : A Cognitive Analysis of an Early Christian Apotropaic Papyrus by Korsvoll, Nils Hallvard
  
Engaging with the Divine  
 
A Cognitive Analysis of an Early Christian 
Apotropaic Papyrus  
 
Nils Hallvard Korsvoll 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
The Religious Roots of Europe 
Faculty of Theology 
 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO  
 
August 2011 
 
 
 
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
Engaging with the Divine 
A Cognitive Analysis of an Early Christian Papyrus 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Hugo Lundhaug 
 
 
The Religious Roots of Europe 
Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo 
 
 
IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Nils Hallvard Korsvoll 
2011 
Engaging with the Divine. A Cognitive Analysis of an Early Christian Apotropaic Papyrus. 
Nils Hallvard Korsvoll 
http://www.duo.uio.no/ 
Print: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo 
V 
 
Preface 
 
This thesis completes two years in the new master‟s programme The Religious Roots of 
Europe (RRE), launched by the Faculty of Theology here in Oslo together with its 
corresponding faculties in Aarhus, Bergen, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Lund. Being part of 
this programme‟s first graduating class has been enlightening, challenging, encouraging, but 
most of all a privilege. I hope my work here meets with programme‟s aim to combine 
multidisciplinary approaches with rigorous historical study.  
A key help and guide this past year has been my supervisor Hugo Lundhaug. His expertise in 
cognitive theory and Egypt in Late Antiquity, his insightful comments and suggestions and 
his availability throughout the process have all been essential to driving this project forward.  
I then want to thank my colleagues and friends Anna-Liisa Tolonen and Mattias Brand for 
reading through my work and providing helpful feedback. 
Also, there is Kristine, Birte, Torkil and Marianne, who, through coffee, conversation and 
company, made the process of writing this thesis infinitively more enjoyable. 
Finally, a big thanks to the whole of RRE for two amazing years. Our coordinator here in 
Oslo, Stig Frøyshov, the professors and instructors that have followed us through the 
programme and especially my wonderful, inspiring and simply lovely fellow students.  
 
VI 
 
 
VII 
 
List of Content 
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 
2 P.Oslo. I V:         The Papyrus and Its Contents ............................................................ 3 
2.1 The Text ....................................................................................................................... 3 
2.1.1 „ΦΜΓ‟ .................................................................................................................. 6 
2.1.2 „Ὡξ Ὡξ θσξ θσξ‟ ................................................................................................ 7 
2.1.3 „Ἰαώ, Σαβαώζ, Ἀδσλαί, Ἐισέ‟ ............................................................................ 7 
2.1.4 „Σαιακάλ Ταξρ[εη]‟ .............................................................................................. 8 
2.1.5 „δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε‟ ............................................................................ 9 
2.1.6 „ηηε΄‟.................................................................................................................... 10 
2.1.7 „δηαθύιαμνλ / ἀπὸ παληὸο θαθνῦ / βαζθνούλεο‟ ............................................... 10 
2.1.8 „δήγκαηνο ζθνξπίνπ θαί ὄθεσο δηὰ ηὸ ὄλνκα ηνῦ ὑςίζηνπ ζενῦ‟ ..................... 11 
2.1.9 „λαηαο κειη δ΄ μπξνπξν αααααα βατλρσσσρ καξηηη ηηη ι ελαγ θνξε‟ ................. 12 
2.1.10 „Φύιαμνλ, θύξηε, πἱὲ ηνῦ Γαπῒδ θαηὰ ζάξθα…‟ ................................................ 13 
2.1.11 „α†σ     Α†Ω   ΙΦΘΥΣ‟ .................................................................................. 15 
2.2 Background and Context ........................................................................................... 16 
2.2.1 Voces Magicae ................................................................................................... 16 
2.2.2 Divine Names ..................................................................................................... 17 
2.2.3 Vowel-strings ..................................................................................................... 19 
2.2.4 Liturgical Influence ............................................................................................ 19 
2.2.5 The Wider Doctrinal Context ............................................................................. 20 
2.2.6 Summarising Remarks: Christian, Non-Christian or Both? ............................... 22 
3 Magic:       Definition, Debate and Discourse ............................................................... 25 
3.1 Substantive Definitions.............................................................................................. 25 
3.2 Magic as Discourse .................................................................................................... 27 
3.3 Magic as Ritual .......................................................................................................... 28 
4 Methodology:       Exploring Human Cognition .......................................................... 31 
4.1.1 Some Basic Premises ......................................................................................... 32 
4.2 Approach ................................................................................................................... 35 
4.2.1 Lawson and McCauley and Structural Linguistics ............................................ 37 
4.2.2 Blending Theory and Its Use in Ritual Studies .................................................. 39 
5 Lawson and McCauley’s   Theory of Religious Ritual ............................................... 41 
VIII 
 
5.1 The Theory ................................................................................................................ 41 
5.1.1 „Action Representation Systems‟ ....................................................................... 42 
5.1.2 Ritual as an ARS ................................................................................................ 43 
5.2 Its Application to P.Oslo I V ..................................................................................... 47 
5.2.1 δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε ............................................................................. 49 
5.2.2 „I Ask/Order/Appeal to you, Lord‟ .................................................................... 52 
5.3 Summarising Observations and Remarks .................................................................. 57 
6 Conceptual Blending in P.Oslo. I V .............................................................................. 59 
6.1 Blending Theory ........................................................................................................ 59 
6.2 Blending Theory and Ritual ...................................................................................... 62 
6.3 Blending in P.Oslo. I V ............................................................................................. 67 
6.3.1 „δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε‟ as a Blend ........................................................ 67 
6.3.2 „I Ask/Order/Appeal to you Lord‟ as a Blend .................................................... 70 
6.4 Summarising Observations and Remarks .................................................................. 73 
7 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 78 
7.1 Concluding Summary and Observations ................................................................... 78 
7.1.1 Observations and Comments on the Cognitive Theories Used .......................... 80 
7.2 Possible Contexts ....................................................................................................... 81 
7.2.1 Cognitive Theories of Religious Transmission .................................................. 82 
7.2.2 Ritual Traditions and Early Christianity in Egypt .............................................. 84 
7.3 Suggestions for Further Research .............................................................................. 87 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 89 
Appendix 1 .............................................................................................................................. 97 
Appendix 2 .............................................................................................................................. 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IX 
 
List of Figures 
Figure A: Photo of P.Oslo. I V ................................................................................................ 4 
Figure B: Lawson and McCauley’s Basic Model of an Action Representation System .. 42 
Figure C: An Example of CPS-agent Implication in Religious Ritual .............................. 44 
Figure D: The First ARS of P.Oslo. I V, lines 1-6 ............................................................... 49 
Figure E: The Second ARS of P.Oslo. I V, lines 7-10.......................................................... 53 
Figure F: The Eucharistic Elements as a Blend .................................................................. 60 
Figure G: Ritual as a Blend ................................................................................................... 63 
Figure H: The Catholic Eucharist as a Ritual Blend .......................................................... 65 
Figure I: δέννω ζε, Σκορπίε Ἀρηεμίζιε as a Blend. ............................................................. 68 
Figure J: ‘I Ask/Order/Appeal to you Christ’ as a Blend .................................................. 71 
Figure K: The Enabling Acts of P.Oslo. I V ........................................................................ 74 
Figure L: P.Oslo. I V as a Blend ........................................................................................... 75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 Introduction     
“Offenbar liegt hier der Fall vor, dass eine altbewährte heidnische Beschwörungsformel durch 
einen christlichen Zusatz erweitert worden ist” (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 23). P.Oslo. I V 
contains ten lines including „magical‟ invocations, known and unknown voces magicae, 
Hebrew divine names, a phrase expressing fairly detailed Christian doctrine and a doxology. 
It has been dated to the fourth- or fifth centuries (please see Appendix 1 for a photograph and 
transcription). The papyrus is not only remarkable for its “Mischung von Heidnischen und 
Christlichem” (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 23), but it is also important as an example of the 
vibrant and eclectic ritual practices in and around the Mediterranean basin in Late Antiquity 
(Smith 2003, 30-33). Allowing, then, both a glimpse into the era‟s extensive ritual tradition 
and an impression of how early Christianity interacted with it, I have chosen P.Oslo. I V as a 
case study for my thesis, where I want to explore various ways and means of engaging with 
the divine in Late Antiquity. Rituals “are often viewed by the participants as evidence for 
religious assumptions, notably as the apparent confirmation of ontological assumptions” 
(Boyer 1994, 186), and I therefore propose to gain better understanding not just of the 
papyrus itself, but also of the worldview(s) that lay behind it, by analysing P.Oslo. I V.  
  
Eitrem already published P.Oslo. I V in 1921 together with A. Fridrichsen, and the two 
present an enlightening introduction to the text, the times and the various religious and 
cultural traditions that are included there. However, while noting the presence of different and 
unexpected ritual elements, they do not explore the workings of the papyrus beyond 
classifying it as a continuation of „popular paganism‟ as „popular Christianity‟ (Eitrem and 
Fridrichsen 1921, 27). I wish to gain further understanding of how the ritual text works and 
what worldview(s) would accommodate such a papyrus. Therefore, I propose to employ the 
recent developments in ritual studies using cognitive theory. Cognitive studies, the 
investigation of how thoughts are formed, maintained and used, have for the last couple of 
decades become an important analytical tool in almost all fields within the Humanities. Not 
surprisingly, an approach that promises insights into the very workings of the human mind 
has met with an enthusiastic reception by some, if an equally adamant rejection by others. 
Basically, cognitive ritual theories propose to examine representations of religious 
phenomena, in their culturally dependent manifestations, according to basic principles of 
human cognition (Uro 2009, 230). They thus propose to circumvent difficult 
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phenomenological questions, like defining what „culture‟ or „religion‟ is. Rather, “[s]neaking 
up on symbolic-cultural systems by way of an analysis of their cognitive representations 
offers the advantage of studying minds rather than the systems themselves. Minds, in 
comparison to socio-cultural entities, are relatively accessible” (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 
183). Intrigued by these promises, I propose to take these cognitive scholars at their words 
and engage their theories in a new exploration of P.Oslo. I V, with a view to access the 
structural logic of the ritual text and the „symbolic-cultural system‟ it worked within.  
 
First, however, I will introduce P.Oslo. I V further in chapter 2, building on Eitrem and 
Fridrichsen‟s article, but supplementing this with other research that has been done on this 
genre of papyri and ritual practice in Late Antiquity since 1921. I will first go through the text 
in detail, identifying and explaining the various ritual elements, and then proceed to discuss 
some key elements that arise in the presentation. Then, chapter 3 will present the major 
academic trends these past hundred years concerning the study of ritual, or „magic,‟ in Late 
Antiquity. This will provide further context for P.Oslo. I V, as well as background 
information for the theoretical apparatus to be introduced in chapter 4. In this chapter, I 
introduce cognitive theory and its application to religious and ritual studies, as well as give a 
brief outline of the two theories that I will build my main analysis on. Chapter 5, then, uses 
Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley‟s structural theory from Rethinking Religion (1990), 
and it opens with a more detailed introduction to the theory before I employ it to analyse 
P.Oslo. I V. In chapter 6 I will similarly first detail Jesper Sørensen‟s exploration of ritual 
structure through blending theory (2007), before I apply his observations to P.Oslo. I V. 
Finally, in chapter 7 I summarise my findings and provide some thoughts as to what 
worldview(s) are reflected in the ritual text, and also give some suggestions as to what 
person(s) and contexts generated such a papyrus. In view of my analysis, comments on the 
cognitive theories will also be offered, alongside some notes on potential routes of expanding 
and improving both cognitive ritual studies and the study of ritual practice in Late Antiquity. 
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2 P.Oslo. I V:        
 The Papyrus and Its Contents 
Eitrem acquired the papyrus for the University of Oslo during one of his travels in Egypt, and 
it was first published by him in an article in 1921. He bought it from an antiques dealer 
operating from the Fayyum, but beyond this there is unfortunately little information as to its 
archaeological context. The papyrus is relatively small, 10cm by 16cm, and bears traces of 
being folded several times (Wessely 1974, 422). Eitrem praises it as “einen sehr erwünschten 
Zuwachs zu den christlichen Amuletten und Zauberformeln” (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 3). 
In this first publication of the papyrus Eitrem dates it to the fourth century, based on the style 
of Uncial writing and the type of signs at the end of the ritual text, citing contemporary 
research saying the Α†Ω and the ΙΦΘΥΣ gains common usage in the fourth century (Eitrem 
and Fridrichsen 1921, 3). However, comments on the publication pointed to parallels with 
later papyri, as well as the chronological uncertainties linked to early Christian symbols, 
arguing that the papyrus could well be from the fifth or even sixth century (Peterson 1923, 
135). The criticism must have been noted by Eitrem, who in his new publication of the 
papyrus as part of the Papyri Osloenses dates it to the fourth or fifth century (Eitrem and 
Amundsen 1925, 21), and this dating has since been generally accepted. I will begin my 
investigation by simply going through the text on the papyrus and pointing out the different 
elements that are put into play here. Also, even though this papyrus is remarkably well 
preserved and the writing unusually regular and comprehensible, there are still some words 
that are difficult to decipher. Their possible readings will be listed here. Then, in order to more 
fully appreciate the various elements in the text, an exploration of their general tradition and 
context will follow.  
2.1 The Text 
After Eitrem, the papyrus has been published several times (Preisendanz 2001, 210-211, 
Wessely 1974, 422-423, Aland 1976, 428 and Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 49-50). A high-
resolution photograph, along with a translation and bibliography, is available at the Oslo 
Papyrus Electronic System (OPES: http://opes.uio.no), or through the Advanced Papyrological 
Information System (APIS: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/projects/digital/apis/). I will 
include the photograph here, but there is also a larger version in Appendix 1. 
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Figure A: Photo of P.Oslo. I V 
 
(Photograph from http://ub-fmserver.uio.no/viewRecord.php?recid=44) 
As one may see here, the text has only minor lacunae and is written in a regular and clear, if 
not exactly beautiful, hand. Still, for convenience, I will include the transcript from Karl 
Preisendanz‟ Papyri Graecae Magicae (PGM), the second edition, here: 
 
ΦΜΓ. 
Ὡξ Ὡξ θσξ θσξ, Ἰαώ, Σαβαώζ, Ἀδσλαί, Ἐισέ, Σαιακάλ Ταξρ[εη] 
δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε ηηε΄, δηαθύιαμνλ ηὸλ νἶθνλ ηνῦηνλ 
κεηὰ ηῶλ ἐλνηθνύλησλ ἀπὸ παληὸο θαθνῦ, ἀπὸ βαζθνζύλεο 
πάζεο ἀεξίλσλ πλεπκάησλ θαὶ ἀλζξσπίλνπ ὀθζαι[κνῦ 
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θαὶ πόλνπ δεηλνῦ [θαὶ] δήγκαηνο ζθνξπίνπ θαί ὄθεσο δηὰ ηὸ  
ὄλνκα ηνῦ ὑςίζηνπ ζενῦ λαηαο κειη δ΄ μπξνπξν αααααα 
βατλρσσσρ καξηηη ηηη ι ελαγ θνξε. Φύιαμνλ, θύξηε, πἱὲ ηνῦ 
Γαπῒδ θαηὰ ζάξθα, ὁ ηερζείο ἐθ ηῆο ἁγίαο παξζέλνπ 
Μαξίαο, ἅγηε, ὕςηζηε ζεέ, ἐμ ἁγίνπ πλεύκαηνο. Γόμα ζνη, 
νὐξάληε βαζηιεῦ. ἀκήλ.  α†σ    Α†Ω   ΙΦΘΥΣ 
(Preisendanz 2001, 210-211) 
The translation, being the most recent published translation of the text into English, is based 
on the Preisendanz transcription and is by Marvin Meyer: 
1 CH M G.  
2 Hor Hor Phor Phor, Yao Sabaoth Adonai, Eloe, Salaman,   Tarchei 
3 I bind you, artemisian scorpion, 315 times. Preserve this house 
4 With its occupants from all evil, from all bewitchment of spirits of the 
air and human (evil) eye 
5 And terrible pain [and] sting of scorpion and snake, through the 
6 Name of the highest god, Naias Meli, 7 (times) (?), XUROURO 
AAAAAA 
7 BAINCHOOOCH MARIII III L ENAG KORE. Be on guard, O Lord, 
son of 
8 David according to the flesh, the one born of the holy virgin  
9 Mary, O holy one, highest god, from the holy spirit. Glory to you, 
10 O heavenly king. Amen. (signs) 
(Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 49-50) 
The transcript varies slightly from the reading Eitrem presents (1921, 3), which for instance 
Charles Wessely relies on (1974, 422). I will point out these in the detailed discussion on the 
text and its elements. For now, even though it may be needless to say, I should mention that 
the word-separation, punctuation and accents in the transcription are not in the original text on 
the papyrus, which is written conventionally in scriptio continua. The  is a tau-rho figure, a 
so-called staurogram. The only form of reading aid in the original are diaereses, or „¨‟, which 
are used in Ϊασ (l. 2), υςηζηνπ (l. 6), βατλρσσσρ (l. 7) and πτε (l. 7). Although, apparently not 
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very consistently since for instance πςηζηε (l. 9) does not have a diaeresis. The translation is 
quite uncontroversial, as a comparison with the other translations in Appendix 1 will show.  
2.1.1 ‘ΦΜΓ’ 
The three-letter heading of the ritual text is a well-attested formula in early Christianity. 
Although its use does not seem to become widespread until the fourth century, at least not in 
Egypt (Choat 2006, 115), from then until the seventh century it occurs in a variety of 
contexts. ΦΜΓ occurs in letters and public documents, typically at the head like in P.Oslo. I 
V, in epitaphs, on amphorae and tiles (Llewelyn 1997, 156-157). Jan-Olof Tjäder argues that 
ΦΜΓ is even older, tying it to the Latin inscriptions VDN that are found in Rome from as early 
as the third century. He reads these as Virgine Dominus Natus, and since Greek is the original 
language of the church Tjäder infers that the formula must have come from Greek originally, 
hence the first use of ΦΜΓ must predate the Latin inscriptions from the third century (1970, 
168). Either way, by the time of P.Oslo. I V sources indicate that the formula is well 
established and used in a variety of contexts. S. R. Llewelyn notes that ΦΜΓ mostly is linked 
to requests for divine help (1997, 156), ascribing it a primarily apotropaic function (1997, 
166). This, a stock apotropaic formula, seems a very likely function, considering both its 
place in P. Oslo I V, and furthermore its use at the head of letters (Sarischouli 1995, 120) and 
lists of property (Sarischouli 1995, 155). Tjäder, on the other hand, thinks ΦΜΓ must 
originally have been a secret „catchword‟ for Christians, although it may very well have 
developed into something else, like an apotropaic formula, later (1970, 169). 
 
Although the function of ΦΜΓ is generally agreed upon, its meaning is contested. Most 
translations consider it an abbreviation of Φξηζηὸλ Μαξία γελλᾷ, „Mary gives birth to Christ,‟ 
although several other options, like Φξηζηὸο Μηραὴι Γαβξηὴι („Christ Michael Gabriel‟) or 
ρεηξφο κνπ γξαθή („written by my hand‟), have been suggested (Tjäder 1970, 148). Eitrem 
subscribed to the first translation, referring to several sources from the fourth and fifth 
centuries where the formula has been found spelled out (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 8). 
While such an appeal to the incarnation of Christ may fit well with an apotropaic function, 
Malcolm Choat points out that the implied christological stance is akin to an “encoded 
doctrinal formulation” (2006, 115). This is part of why G. H. R. Horsley argues for a different 
meaning. He finds it unlikely that such a doctrinal expression should gain a wide recognition 
in the dogmatically fluid situation of early Christianity (Horsley 1982, 179). As to the sources 
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where Φξηζηὸλ Μαξία γελλᾷ is spelled out, Horsley points out that these documents are 
relatively late and may be subsequent attempts to expand on a stock formula whose explicit 
meaning was unknown (1982, 178). Developing Horsley‟s argument, Llewelyn remarks on 
the grammatical awkwardness of the phrase, using present tense and having Christ as the 
object, not the subject, of the phrase (1997, 158). He, instead, favours a numerical reading of 
ΦΜΓ (600+40+3=643), which is the same value as the summation of ζεὸο βνεζφο, „God 
Helper‟, and hence symbolic of this (Llewelyn 1997). On his side, Horsley refuses to argue 
definitively for any solution, but ponders whether, with its widespread use in documents, the 
profane ρεηξφο κνπ γξαθή is the original meaning (1982, 180). 
2.1.2  ‘Ὡξ Ὡξ θσξ θσξ’ 
This is a fairly common vox magica, or string of obscure, ritual utterances, and it is found to 
open many ritual texts (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 8). An identical use is found in P.Oxy. 
VIII 1152, P.Oxy. VII 1060 and P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3, ritual texts that also have many other 
parallels with P.Oslo. I V. For these papyri, which will be frequently referenced throughout 
this chapter, please see Appendix 2. Eitrem suggests that this is a play on the name of the 
Egyptian deity Horus (1921, 9), and Meyer supports this understanding of Ὡξ Ὡξ θσξ θσξ, 
saying they may be “permutations and verbal transformations based upon BOR and PHOR, 
and PHOR (or P-Hor) (...) taken as the name of the Egyptian god Horus” (Meyer, Smith and 
Kelsey 1994, 43). Other scholars maintain that voces magicae like Ὡξ Ὡξ θσξ θσξ are 
“traditional forms of assonance and alliteration, creative wordplay such as one finds in 
children‟s word-games, and, presumably, actual ecstatic glossolalia” (Frankfurter 1994, 199). 
A further introduction to voces magicae will come in section 2.2.1.  
2.1.3  ‘Ἰαώ, Σαβαώζ, Ἀδσλαί, Ἐισέ’ 
These are Greek versions names for the Hebrew God. Ἰαψ is the Tetragrammaton, Σαβαψζ 
means „Lord of Hosts‟, Ἀδσλαί is ‟our Lords‟ and Ἐισέ is the generic word for „God‟ in 
Hebrew. In Late Antiquity Judaism was reputed for its ancient wisdom and magical powers, 
so such strings of Hebrew divine names are common in ritual texts and on amulets from the 
time, and not only within Jewish or Christian contexts (Wessely 1974, 423). P.Oxy. VIII 
1152, P.Oxy. VII 1060 and P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3 also have strings of Hebrew divine names in 
their opening line, as can be seen in Appendix 2. It is debated to what an extent the use of 
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these names in ritual texts represent a genuine Jewish influence, but most scholars consider 
these Hebrew divine names to have been stock divine powers in ritual texts in Late Antiquity 
(Swartz 2006, 699). This is indicated not only by their use in polytheistic contexts, but also by 
how the Hebrew divine names frequently are used as roots to form new voces magicae 
following principles and conventions from Greek ritual jargon (Bohak 2003, 71).  
2.1.4 ‘Σαιακάλ Ταξρ[εη]’ 
Here, the reading of the papyrus is perhaps the most uncertain. Reading Σαιακάλ is easy, but 
then follows what may be an iota or a tau, then a gap, then a rho, with what may be a 
diaeresis over it, then a chi and finally an oblique line running down and to the left. This last 
is typically a sign of abbreviation (Gonis 2009, 172), and it appears from the papyrus that the 
writer here did indeed run out of space on the first line. The question is what word was 
abbreviated. The above solution is Preisendanz‟ reading, which he gathers from looking at 
P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3, where the corresponding sections read Σαιακa Ταξρεη, Σαιακaλ Ταξρρεη 
and Σαιακα ξζαρη, respectively (Preisendanz 2001, 154-155). Bernhard P. Grenfell and 
Arthur S. Hunt also support reading Ταξρεη based on the parallels in these three papyri. They 
also propose that Σαιακάλ Ταξρ[εη] may be one word, not two, but they have no suggestion as 
to the meaning of such a composite word (Grenfell and Hunt 1924, 274).  
 
In Eitrem‟s first publication, he reads the section as Σαιακaλ Ι ξρ. He is not completely 
convinced of this, but suggests that the iota is short for Jesus, and that the abbreviation sign 
accompanies a reversed chi-rho for Christ (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 4). Evidence from 
other papyri and amulets show that the reversal or scrambling of names was a fairly common 
ritual practice, also within Christianity (Bonner 1950, 12). Moreover, Eitrem points to P.Oxy. 
VIII 1152 where the opening line of divine names is ended by Ἰεζνῦ Φξηζηέ (Preisendanz 
2001, 214), which then has the same position in the text as the suggested Ι ξρ in P.Oslo. I V. 
Friedrich Preisigke supports drawing this parallel, although he reads the abbreviation as 
Ἰ[εζν]ῦ Φ[ξη]ο[ηέ], seeing the rho as an upsilon with an inexperienced abbreviation mark 
(1974, 69). All the same, Eitrem follows the former reading in his second publication of 
P.Oslo. I V and transcribes it as Σαιακάλ Ταξρη (Eitrem and Amundsen 1925, 21). Then, there 
is Wessely who reads the section as Σαιακαλη ἀξρο, taking ἀξρο as an abbreviation of 
ἀξράγγειε, „archangel‟, while admitting his suggestion is supposition (1974, 422-423). 
Finally, in his review, Erik Peterson instead looks to P.Oxy. VII 1060, where ηαρχ ηαρχ, 
9 
 
„quick quick‟, again a common exhortation to the powers addressed in ritual texts, is a 
potential parallel to this obscure word(s) (1923, 135). 
 
As to the meaning of the first word, Σαιακάλ or Σαιακαλη, scholars agree with Eitrem‟s 
understanding that it is a corrupted version, or „Nebenform,‟ of Σνινκψλ, Solomon, reputed in 
Late Antiquity for his magical powers (1921, 10). It is the following, abbreviated word that is 
problematic. Mostly, abbreviation is used for common words, so that they are still intelligible 
to readers (Gonis 2009, 171). However, I have already found three possible words from the 
parallel papyri in Appendix 2. Ταξρεη, in its various forms, occurs in the most sources. 
However, its meaning is not known. Most scholars follow Preisendanz‟ description of it as a 
„Zauberwort‟ (2001, 210-211), being then one of several common, unidentifiable powers that 
ritual texts call upon. Appealing Jesus Christ, as suggest by the second reading, is of course 
always an option in a Christian ritual text. Still, there is always the risk of the Christian 
content elsewhere in the text causing scholars to see Christian elements where they are not. 
After all, there is from quite early on a well-established tradition of Christian abbreviations of 
Jesus Christ, the so-called nomina sacra (Hurtado 2006, 97), and this is not one of them. 
Moreover, nomina sacra are seldom found in ritual texts, here words like θχξηνο and ζεφο are 
typically spelled out in full (Hurtado 2006, 98). Lastly, reading it as ηαρχ ηαρχ is of course 
possible, but this means reading what appears a quite distinct rho as an alpha. Whereas the 
downward stroke may be the back of an alpha and not the stem of the rho, this is very unlike 
any of the other alphas on the papyrus. 
2.1.5 ‘δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε’ 
This phrase is also used in P.Oxy. VII 1060 and P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3. “δέλλσ, ligo, offert la 
forme récente du verbe δέσ; l‟idée est celle-ci: le demon doit etre lié pour qu‟on fasse usage 
dans la magie” (Wessely 1974, 423). This version of δέσ, then, signifies that the speaker 
binds the demon to do his or her bidding, which is common in ritual in Late Antiquity. Many 
of the ritual texts in the Greek magical papyri are directed at taking control over „supernatural 
assistants,‟ who are identified by name in the manner of a deity (Ciraolo 1995, 280). Eitrem 
has some thoughts on the background for Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε, noting that scorpions are potent 
figures in ritual and religiosity in Late Antiquity. He also points to the goddess Artemis‟ role 
as protector of wild animals and her potential identification with the dark Hecate (Eitrem and 
Fridrichsen 1921, 12-13), but these links become more speculative. Wessely is content with 
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explaining the Artemisian demon as a mystical name, in keeping with the era‟s ritual tradition 
(1974, 423).  
2.1.6 ‘ηηε΄’ 
In the first publication Eitrem reads this as ηTε and proposes it an abbreviation for „Tartarian‟, 
being an epitaph to the Artemisian scorpion (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 4). However, all 
later publications read the letters as ηηε with a line over them. Such a superlinear stroke is 
typically used in ancient Greek when the letters signify numerals. This is mostly done in 
documents, but Christians early took to using numerals in literary texts, instead of the 
traditional convention of spelling out the numbers (Millard 2000, 70). The value of ηηε is 315 
(300+10+5), and when the parallel between P.Oslo. I V and P.Oxy. XVI 2061 was 
discovered, where the number is spelled out as ηξηαθφζηα δεθάπεληε, Eitrem, Preisendanz and 
Wessely all read it as the number 315. In their translations, Eitrem (Eitrem and Amundsen 
1925, 21) and Preisendanz (2001, 210-211) both understand this to mean that the demon is 
bound 315 times. Ritual repetition is found not only in P.Oslo. I V, but also, in various forms, 
in P.Oxy. VII 1060, P.Rain. 3 and P.Oxy. XVI 2061, and ritual theory holds it as a strong sign 
setting ritual activity aside from regular activity (Smith 1992, 111). Wessely, in his 
publication, suggests it is a mystical, numerical epitaph of the demon (1974, 423). Finally, a 
superlinear stroke may also indicate an abbreviation (Gonis 2009, 171), and, perhaps unaware 
of the parallel in P.Oxy. XVI 2061, both Preisigke (1974, 69) and Ulrich Wilcken (1924, 113) 
suggest that ηηε΄ stands for ηη(κηψηαη)ε, ‟the most honoured.‟ Whether this is meant to refer 
back to the Artemisian scorpion, or forward as the subject of δηαθχιαμνλ, they do not address.  
2.1.7 ‘δηαθύιαμνλ / ἀπὸ παληὸο θαθνῦ / βαζθνούλεο’ 
The following lines in the ritual text are quite straightforward, I only have some remarks on 
the words that are used. Γηαθχιαμνλ, ‟protect‟ strengthened with the preposition δηα-, is 
typical in ritual contexts, found both in the Great Magical Papyrus of Paris and on several 
amulets (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 6), as well as in Psalm 90, which is often cited in ritual 
texts and amulets (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 25). Also the phrase ἀπὸ παληὸο θαθνῦ, ‟from 
all evil,‟ is a phrase frequently found in amulets (Bonner 1950, 46). Choat notes that the term 
Βαζθνοχλεο, ‟witchcraft,‟ while popular in non-Christian papyri, was long thought to have 
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been avoided by Christians due to its pagan associations, but he finds it in several Christian 
documents from Late Antiquity (2006, 98-99).  
2.1.8 ‘δήγκαηνο ζθνξπίνπ θαί ὄθεσο δηὰ ηὸ ὄλνκα ηνῦ ὑςίζηνπ 
ζενῦ’ 
Snakes and scorpions frequently brought up in ritual contexts as symbols of dark forces, 
throughout Egypt‟s history (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 11). For instance, the demon being 
pierced on the generic horse-rider amulets from early Christianity is often snake-like (Bonner 
1950, 209). P.Oslo. I V asking for protection against the bites of scorpions and snakes, 
δήγκαηνο ζθνξπίνπ θαί ὄθεσο, then, is also very common in the pan-Mediterranean ritual 
tradition. δηὰ ηὸ ὄλνκα may refer to reverence for God‟s name found in Christian Scripture 
(Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 24), or also to the healing and consecrative powers of Christ‟s 
name in early Christian traditions (Weltin 1960, 83). Or, it may be an expression of the 
general ritual emphasis on divine names in Late Antiquity (Graf 1991, 190). While ηνῦ 
ὑςίζηνπ ζενῦ in line 6 could refer to the Christian God, it was also much used in non-
Christian monotheistic traditions (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 23). Choat finds that by the 
fourth century, most references to ηνῦ ὑςίζηνπ ζενῦ are indeed Christian, but cautions that the 
phrase does still persist in non-Christian ritual texts and some inscriptions (2006, 106-107).  
 
It is not obvious from the text to what verb the phrase δηὰ ηὸ ὄλνκα... refers. Meyer and 
Wessely translate it as belonging to δηαθχιαμνλ in line 3, but it may also belong to the earlier 
δέλλσ or point forward to θχιαμνλ in line 7. This is obscured by the unintelligible words or 
phrases in lines 6 and 7, typically taken to be different voces magicae for lack of a better 
interpretation. If the phrase belongs to δηαθχιαμνλ, the Artemisian scorpion is expected to 
work „through the name of the highest god,‟ which has implications for who both this 
Artemisian scorpion and also the highest god were seen to be. In the second case, the appeal 
to the name of the highest god simply strengthens the user(s)‟ ritual binding of the Artemisian 
scorpion. Finally, in the third case this phrase refers to the following appeal to θχξηε for 
protection. In this case, it would function as the opening of a second section of the ritual text, 
with the unidentified voces magicae in lines 6 and 7 as introductory powerful names like the 
Ἰαψ Σαβαψζ...–phrase in line 1. Unfortunately, there are no reading aids in the text to help 
decide between the options, and this section is furthermore not paralleled in any of the papyri 
Appendix 2 which could have given a clue about how to read it.  
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2.1.9 ‘λαηαο κειη δ΄ μπξνπξν αααααα βατλρσσσρ καξηηη ηηη ι ελαγ 
θνξε’ 
As it is difficult to identify separate words in this section, it has been interpreted as another 
instance of voces magicae. Meyer suggests that a reading could be λαηαο κειη, ‟sweet Naiad,‟ 
and that the δ is a numeral, 7 (Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 360). As such, it could be a 
sevenfold appeal to a naiad, as a ritual force. The use of δ in ritual texts to amplify the 
elements with the significant number seven is known from other sources (Faraone and 
Kotansky 1988, 260). I have not found a parallel or precedent for μπξνπξν. It appears to be a 
ritual play on assonance, as described by Frankfurter (1994, 199), but I cannot suggest any 
meaning beyond this. Strings of vowels, like αααααα and potentially ηηηηηη in the next line, are 
also common in ritual texts and amulets (Faraone and Kotansky 1988, 265). Frankfurter 
argues that the Greek vowels developed a special role in „magic‟ in Late Antiquity, eventually 
being powerful in their own right (1994, 200), and Patricia Cox Miller looks to 
neopythagorean authors with the conclusion that “the vowels of the alphabet designate that 
point at which the human and divine worlds intersect” (1986, 484). The significance and 
implications of the ritual use of vowels will be discussed further in section 2.2.3. 
 
βατλρσσσρ is, finally, a common name in ritual texts. Although used in various ways, it is 
thought to be “the name of one of the Triple-powered gods: often part of the ρπρ-βαρπρ 
formula (…) usually a proper name, either of a god or of the magician himself (…) and 
commonly explained as Egyptian in origin („Souls of darkness‟)” (Jackson 1989, 70). Its 
potency is underlined by the sum of the letters when read as numerals, which is the magically 
significant 3663 (2+1+10+50+600+800+800+800+600) (Wessely 1974, 423). The name is 
sometimes linked to Balsames, another divine name that often occurs together with Ἰαψ 
Σαβαψζ (Bousset 1979, 224). The words following βατλρσσσρ are again difficult to identify. 
Preisendanz, as seen, here reads καξηηη ηηη ι, while Eitrem originally saw the rho as an iota 
since the loop of the rho has disappeared. However, the stroke more resembles the stem of a 
rho then an iota. Then, there is a lacuna, with traces of iotas, and following this what has 
been read as the second stroke of a lambda. The iotas are understood as another vowel-string 
(Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 14), but the rest is unidentified. Gideon Bohak, in his 
discussion of voces magicae, describes the practice in rituals from Late Antiquity of 
constructing Hebrew angel names by simply adding –el to the end of any word (2003, 72). 
This could be the case here, Mariel, with a string of iotas included in it. For the remaining 
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eight letters, the first four are difficult, but the last four are generally read as θνξε, although 
its context here is unclear. Several goddesses are referred to as θόξε, „girl,‟ in ritual texts 
(Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 15), especially the daughter of Demeter often had this 
appellation (Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 360). However, there is no thematic indication or 
support for why Persephone should be included in this ritual text. 
2.1.10 ‘Φύιαμνλ, θύξηε, πἱὲ ηνῦ Δαπῒδ θαηὰ ζάξθα…’ 
The last three lines of P.Oslo. I V are clear and intelligible. Here begins the more explicitly 
Christian section of the text, and the shift appears so distinct that A. Fridrichsen thinks the last 
section must be copied from early liturgy (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 28). It is unclear 
whether θχιαμνλ here is meant to be transitive, with an implied reference back to the house 
and all its occupants, or whether it is a more abstract appeal to the Lord. θπιάζζσ has a wide 
range of commonly used nuances and may here have either of the two meanings. Meyer‟s 
translation above reads it more abstractly, „be on guard,‟ while Wessely translates it as more 
transitive with “Gardez” (1974, 422-423). Whatever form, the appeal is address to θχξηε, 
whom the subsequent lines identify as Christ. Christ being the πἱὲ ηνῦ Γαπῒδ θαηὰ ζάξθα, ‟son 
of David according to the flesh,‟ is found in Romans 1:3, and the phrase is also found on other 
amulets (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 15). Using fragments from Scripture in amulets was 
quite common, with certain sections, like Psalm 90 or the Our Father, being especially 
popular (La‟da and Papathomas 2004, 94).  
 
The verb ηερζείο, from ηίθησ, means bear, beget, bring forth (Lampe 1961). As a description 
of Christ‟s conception and birth, it appears in Matthew 2:2 in the mouths of the three Magi, 
hence it does have New Testament precedent, yet it seems the word did not figure as a loaded 
term in the christological debates of the fourth and fifth centuries. According to Lampe‟s 
entry on it, it occurs in a range of Christian works from the fourth century onwards (Lampe 
1961). Moving on, Mary‟s virginity, ηῆο ἁγίαο παξζέλνπ Μαξίαο, is a common topic in 
Christianity, early as contemporary, but Fridrichsen points out that addressing Mary as ἁγίαο 
occurs relatively late (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 30). Still, although the title becomes more 
common in the fifth century (Graef 1964, 105), both Athanasius of Alexandria (c. 295 – 373) 
and the historian Socrates (b. 380) cite a creed from the „Dedication Council‟ that includes 
“ηῆζ ἁγίαο παξζέλνπ” (Kelly 1972, 272). 
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That Christ was born ἐθ ηῆο [ἁγίαο] παξζέλνπ Μαξίαο (...) ἐμ ἁγίνπ πλεχκαηνο is included in, if 
not using the exact same words as in P.Oslo. I V, the expanded version of the Nicene Creed, 
which was attributed to the Council of Constantinople of 381 and made the common creed at 
the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (Kelly 1972, 296-297). Even the anti-Chalcedonian 
communities, which were dominant in Egypt, rallied around this creed. They only objected to 
the Chalcedonian interpretations of it (Grillmeier 1996, 72). Hence, from the fourth century 
onwards, it is very likely this phrase had a prominent part in official church liturgy and may 
therefore reflect influences from this on the text of P.Oslo. I V. Moreover, later texts on 
church doctrine and heretics refer to this phrase from the Nicene Creed on the incarnation as 
one of the keys to Orthodoxy (Kelly 1972, 334), indicating that the phrase retained both its 
doctrinal and its popular relevance in the following centuries, even as the christological 
debates were calming down.   
 
Still, Christ‟s birth „from the Virgin Mary and the Holy Spirit‟ is referred to in several texts 
already by Origen (c. 185 – 254), J. N. D. Kelly assuming he is citing an article of faith then 
in use in Alexandria (1972, 93). Variations on this are very much a part of the debates leading 
up to the Council of Constantinople in 381 (Kelly 1972, 293-297), although there here are 
several variations that omit the Holy Spirit. Still, this shows that the content of lines 8-9 in 
P.Oslo. I V occurs as early as the third century and was common enough to be part of debates 
on the Christian creed already by the middle of the fourth century. Finally, in line 8, there is 
ἅγηε, ὕςηζηε ζεέ which need not be a Christian appellation, as seen in section 2.1.8. The phrase 
appears to be an address back to θχξηε in line 7. Fridrichsen ponders whether its insertion 
here, in line 9, is the writer simply employing a stock, ritual element, or whether it means to 
emphasise Christ‟s divinity in a christological context, but he does not conclude on this 
(Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 30).  
 
Notably, it seems the entire section is addressed to Christ. Eitrem points out that none of the 
conventional doxological epitaphs for God the Creator are present (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 
1921, 15), and even though appellations like θχξηε (l. 7) and νὐξάληε βαζηιεῦ (l. 10) typically 
brings God the Father into mind, there is evidence for an extensive use of these also in 
reference to Christ. In Clement of Alexandria‟s (c. 150 – c. 215) The Instructor there is a 
hymn to Christ where he is addressed as βαζηιεχο (Hurtado 2003, 610), and Wessely notes 
instances in papyri containing fragments of liturgies or prayers where Christ is called both 
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θχξηε and βαζηιεχο (1974, 424-450). In one of the creeds that came out of the „Dedication 
Council‟ at Ephesus in 341 Christ is called “βαζηιέα ἐθ βαζηιέσο” (Kelly 1972, 268-269), so 
this epitaph must have had a general appeal by the fourth century. Larry W. Hurtado argues 
that Christ from very early on in Christianity assumed a leading role in devotional practice, 
that in fact in “some forms of early „popular‟ Christianity, Jesus almost seems to have 
eclipsed „the Father‟” (2003, 3). And, with the strong traditions for healing and miracles 
linked to Christ in early Christianity (Aune 1980, 1523), a focus on Christ in a ritual text like 
P. Oslo. I V seems reasonable.  
2.1.11 ‘α†σ     Α†Ω   ΙΦΘΥΣ’ 
The text closes with an ἀκήλ and various signs, presumably to make the ritual text more 
efficacious (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 15). In Late Antiquity, symbols took on an 
important role in rituals, sometimes even being addressed as powerful agents in and of 
themselves (Frankfurter 1994, 210). The symbols used at the end here are, like the ΦΜΓ at the 
beginning, quite standard. The Α Ω is from Revelations 1:8, 21:6 and 22:13, referring again to 
Christ, and the symbol is quickly taken up by the Christian tradition, for instance by Clement 
of Alexandria (Forstner 1977, 34). In the excavations of the Roman catacombs, Α Ω has been 
found in contexts as early as the second- or third century. Initially as a symbol on its own, but 
by the fourth century in combination with other Christian symbols (Forstner 1977, 35), such 
as the cross with which it is found here.  
 
The staurogram, , the ligature of ΤΡ, is first found in manuscripts as part of the word 
STAUROS, „cross,‟ as an abbreviation of –TAURO-. Hurtado argues that this ligature with 
time also came to be appreciated as a visual reminder of the crucified Christ, with the tau as 
cross and the loop of the rho as a human head (2006, 147). The staurogram as an independent 
symbol occurs first in the fourth century, when it is found both in manuscripts and on amulets, 
which is also the century when the cross is taken up as an important Christian topic both in art 
and literature (Dinkler-von Schubert 1995, 35-37). Precedence for seeing the cross as a 
Christian symbol referring to Christ is found in the Pauline epistles (Dinkler-von Schubert 
1995, 29), and many have noted its, and the staurogram’s in particular, extensive use in ritual 
contexts (Black 1970, 325). Having a cross between Α and  Ω, as seen here in P.Oslo. I V, is 
also found a variety of ritual contexts (Forstner 1977, 35). Finally, there is the fish, or ΙΦΘΥΣ. 
This famously stands for „Jesus Christ, Son of God, Saviour,‟ but it is uncertain whether the 
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symbol came from the phrase or vice versa (Cross 1966, 506). Both as the shape of a fish and 
as an abbreviation, the symbol is found in sources dating back to the second century, but it 
gained more widespread use in the fourth and fifth centuries (Cross 1966, 506). Dorothea 
Forstner notes that the ΙΦΘΥΣ is found is a range of contexts, on tombstones, gems and 
amulets and at doors, and she argues that this, combined with a number of instances where 
letters are missing or shuffled, shows that it was significant as a symbol in itself and not 
necessarily by the meaning of the phrase it stands for (1977, 43). Common to all these 
symbols at the end of P.Oslo. I V, then, is that they all refer to Christ and that they have been 
used in ritual contexts from quite early on.  
2.2 Background and Context 
Until now, I have gone through the text of P.Oslo. I V word by word, element by element, to 
provide some basic information as to what it is, what it means and where it comes from. 
Several important ritual traditions in Late Antiquity came up in the discussion, and the 
following section is to further introduce the most important of these. First, more information 
on voces magicae, on the ritual use of divine names and on the significance and ritual use of 
vowel-strings will be presented. Then, I will discuss early Christian liturgy, its formats and 
potential links to the P.Oslo. I V, followed by observations on the doctrinal climate of the 
times in its potential reflection in P.Oslo. I V. 
2.2.1 Voces Magicae 
So-called voces magicae have a long history in the rituals of the ancient Mediterranean. 
Sometimes referred to as Ephesia grammata, “mythic letters allegedly incised on the famous 
cult statue of Artemis of Ephesus,” they were used in apotropaic rituals and copied onto 
amulets, most likely without the ancient writers knowing their meaning (Kotansky 1991, 
111). “Their use in the Greek magical papyri certainly suggests their use in incantation and 
chant, but the earliest reference to Ephesia grammata describes them as carried in „sewn 
pouches,‟ implying that they held power in written form” (Frankfurter 1994, 195). In his 
commentary on a later collection of Coptic ritual texts owned by the University of Michigan, 
Paul Mirecki observes that the recipes were meant to be recited or “copied onto papyrus 
amulets” (1994, 453). Now, whether spoken or written, the origins and meanings of most 
voces magicae are clouded in mystery. In the sources themselves, some ritual experts say the 
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words they are using are Hebrew, Aramaic or Egyptian, but then others “claim that some 
words are written in „baboonish‟ or in „bird-glyphics‟” (Bohak 2003, 78). Some modern 
scholars will search for the origins of a vox magica in ancient Egyptian (Thissen 1991) or 
Near Eastern languages (Graf 1991, 191), and occasionally they find a likely root, while other 
scholars suggest “the author simply let his own imagination run riot in an orgy of (…) 
glossolalia, for the names are impervious to analysis along any lines whatever” (Jackson 
1989, 69). Bohak further notes that even if some voces magicae may have had an original 
meaning, this is likely to have been lost as they were misspelled and reinvented as stock ritual 
elements (2003, 79).  
 
Also the function of voces magicae is not quite clear. As some exotic spirits and divinities can 
be identified in these phrases, the general idea has been that they represent divine powers of 
some sort, that the ritual text then calls upon (Graf 1991, 192). Roy Kotansky supports this 
opinion, holding that voces magicae must be understood as apotropaic names “in the widest 
sense of the word” (1991, 116) and Fritz Graf contends that “it forms part of the invocatio as 
another name of the divinity invoked” (1991, 191). An interesting point here is introduced by 
Graf‟s reference to PGM VII.756-94 and PGM VII.668-85, which both end in voces magicae 
followed by an instruction to „add the usual‟ (1991, 203-205). This instruction could on the 
one hand mean that voces magicae indeed are random inventions the writer came up with on 
the spot. On the other hand, however, there is a degree of consistency and repetition in voces 
magicae throughout the ritual sources from Late Antiquity, strongly suggesting that the writer 
will not have been at complete liberty. Several voces occur with regularity across centuries, 
like Salamaxa and Abrasax (Bonner 1950, 49), and they may be part of a conventional 
combination with other divine names, for instance how Abrasax is often found in connection 
with Iaô (Bonner 1950, 29). Also, they are sometimes part of a longer assonance formula, like 
βατλρσσσρ in the ρπρ-βαρπρ formula (Jackson 1989, 70). It appears more likely, then, that 
voces magicae form a strong tradition within pan-Mediterranean ritual practice, rather than 
improvised nonsense. Or, at the very least, that these improvisations followed certain 
traditions and conventions. 
2.2.2 Divine Names 
As the voces magicae, there are also other divine names in P.Oslo. I V that appeal to divine 
powers, such as Ἰαψ, Σαβαψζ, etc. The plethora of such names are considered to be partially 
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due to the tradition of God‟s name being ineffable and only partially revealed, known both 
from Mediterranean polytheistic religions, but also from Jewish, Christian and later Muslim 
tradition (Bovon 2001, 268). Also, the use of Hebrew names for God, as in line 1 here, was a 
widespread ritual practice to claim ritual power from the ancient and exotic Jewish religion 
(Bohak 2003, 71). Howard M. Jackson observes the extensive practice of, to create this exotic 
effect, making common Greek or Latin words appear Semitic by adding endings such as –oth 
or –el (Jackson 1989, 77). The idea of the powerful name was also seized upon by early 
Christianity, for instance in the Apocalypse of John where apotropaic and protective uses of 
God‟s name occur (Aune 1980, 1555). Later, church fathers like Origen and Athanasius of 
Alexandria write about the efficacy of Christ‟s name, and the invocation of names, typically 
the Trinitarian formula, soon became linked to sacraments like baptism and the Eucharist 
(Weltin 1960, 80-83). Hence, even if the deities called upon in P.Oslo. I V originate and were 
used outside of Christianity, their use and importance within a „popular‟ Christian setting is 
not improbable, since a tradition for powerful divine names also existed within authoritative 
Christianity.  
 
Of further interest regarding divine names is Graf‟s observation that “[i]t is not peculiar to 
magical prayers that the invocation contains a long list of epicleses and conflates scores of 
divinities and that the pars epica is rather short” (1991, 190). Also in his search for Jewish 
influence in ritual text from Late Antiquity, Bohak concludes that although divine names were 
commonly appropriated, there are almost no instances where passages or elements from 
Jewish liturgy are adopted (2003, 73). Also many of the examples in Wessely‟s survey of 
Christian amulets refer extensively to Christ, Mary and angels (1974, 399-423), showing that 
also in several Christian ritual texts there is an emphasis on including powerful agents. These 
observations are important for my investigation, as they indicate a determining principle in 
the at first perplexing combination of religio-cultural elements in the many ritual texts from 
Late Antiquity. They indicate that this genre of ritual primarily takes up and employs Jewish 
and Christian divine powers out of context, and that this therefore rarely means an inclusion 
of Jewish or Christian practice or doctrine. Hence, the presence and use of divine names in 
P.Oslo I V shows that also its user(s) will have ascribed to the common ritual practice of 
focusing on powerful agents, a pan-Mediterranean tradition that importantly also manifests 
itself in the works of early Christian writers when they extol the awesome properties of 
Christ‟s name (Weltin 1960, 80-83). 
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2.2.3 Vowel-strings 
It is perhaps difficult to specify the development of the ritual importance of the Greek vowels, 
typically shown as strings of vowels and often of a significant amount and rendered in a 
special formation (Faraone and Kotansky, 1988). Patricia Cox Miller has drawn on 
neopythagorean texts to understand the ritual importance of vowels, and according to her 
study they were appreciated as imperfect, human attempts at recording or mimicking the 
divine language of the cosmos or deities (1986, 482). She further remarks that many ancient 
writers linked the order and sequence of the alphabet with the cosmic order (1986, 495). 
Frankfurter notes how the ritual use of vowels seems to have increased with the regularisation 
of the alphabet, which facilitated a fixture of speech that allowed for a heightened vocality in 
ritual texts, transcending language (1994, 202). Proper rendition was always of prime 
importance in both Greek and Egyptian ritual traditions, and as vowels allowed the sacred 
names to be pronounced with increased precision vowels became increasingly important in 
the pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition (Frankfurter 1994, 203). In the Greek magical papyri, 
vowels then also appear free from words, often in strings, like in P.Oslo. I V, or in special 
formations (Frankfurter 1994, 199). They here also occur in strings or formations in groups of 
ritually significant amounts, such as three or seven (Faraone and Kotansky 1988, 262). Not 
only a part of Orphic ritual practice and Pythagorean philosophy, these ideas are also found in 
some early Christian writers, like Clement of Alexandria, presenting vowels as divine, 
cosmological expressions (Frankfurter 1994, 201). 
2.2.4 Liturgical Influence 
From line 7 onwards, P.Oslo. I V includes references to the New Testament and implies 
certain doctrinal positions. Fridrichsen suggests that this section must be borrowed from 
public liturgy, and substantiates his claim by quoting Justin Martyr‟s (c. 103 – c. 165) 
Dialogue, where he describes how christological formulae are used for „magical‟ purposes 
(Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 28). Remembering how lines 7-10 are addressed to Christ, 
Fridrichsen continues by arguing that baptismal rites, as early as the second century, included 
a form of christological doxology (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 28). Presumably he here 
refers to the Apostolic Tradition, where the eucharistic rite following the baptism has a 
thanksgiving which partly addresses Christ (Jasper and Cuming 1980, 22). These early 
doxologies, then, agrees with the emphasis on Christ in P.Oslo. I V. In addition, Gregory Dix 
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proposes that the original thanksgiving in the Anaphora of Addai and Mari was addressed to 
Christ, and not the Father (2005, 185). Hurtado has already pointed to how Christ was a very 
strong figure in early worship, and Geoffrey Wainwright supports this in holding that Christ is 
likely to have been central to the earliest liturgies (1980, 47). According to these observations, 
then, the focus and topics in the latter section of P.Oslo. I V may very well have come from 
public liturgy. 
 
There are, however, no direct parallels in the surviving liturgies from Egypt in the fourth and 
fifth centuries. In what manuscript sources there are, the doxologies are typically addressed 
either to the Father or to the Trinity (Johnson 1995, 14). When indeed Christ is mentioned, it 
is in relation to the Father, for instance as „the only-begotten‟ (Jasper and Cuming 1980, 38-
62), and not in and of himself like in P.Oslo. I V. Another possibility is of course that the 
lines were taken from popular hymns. Hurtado argues that hymnody will have been one of the 
central aspects of early Christian worship, and one where Christ was especially dominant 
(2003, 609). But again very little of this material has survived and does not really offer any 
concrete parallels (Wainwright 1980, 53-54). Still, as I pointed out in section 2.1.10, several 
literary sources place phrases and terms akin to those in lines 7-10 of P.Oslo. I V as parts of 
early creeds. Not only may ἐθ ηῆο [ἁγίαο] παξζέλνπ Μαξίαο (...) ἐμ ἁγίνπ πλεχκαηνο have been 
used in an article of faith in Alexandria in the third century (Kelly 1972, 93), the phrase, in 
various forms, continues to appear in the different creeds circulating in the fourth century, not 
to mention in the final Nicene Creed that was settled at Chalcedon in 451 (Kelly 1972, 293-
297). This, to me, outweighs the absence of any parallel in the few and fragmented liturgical 
manuscripts from fourth and fifth century Egypt, and leads me to believe that the Christian 
phrases in P.Oslo. I V may very well derive from public liturgical practices, at least in 
inspiration and topicality if not in verbatim.   
2.2.5 The Wider Doctrinal Context 
I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that Eitrem and Fridrichsen‟s fourth or fifth 
century dating of P.Oslo. I V is primarily based on the script, and how dating papyri from 
orthography is notoriously vague and disputed (Hurtado 2003, 16). Now, there is some 
evidence whose contextual relevance to P.Oslo. I V seems beyond dispute: The parallel ritual 
texts provided in Appendix 2, especially P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3, P.Oxy. VII 1060 and P.Oxy. 
VIII 1152. Notably, these are all dated later than P.Oslo. I V, most to the sixth century. Would 
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it then not seem more likely that P.Oslo. I V also comes from the fifth or sixth centuries, as its 
parallels does? Possibly, but again this is difficult to assert. Importantly, there are no more 
specific details on the dating of these parallels in Appendix 2 than there is on the dating of 
P.Oslo. I V. This indicates that Preisendanz (2001) and Grenfell and Hunt (1910, 1911 and 
1924) base their dating on the same uncertain criteria of orthography as Eitrem and 
Fridrichsen do. Hence, linking P.Oslo. I V to these papyri does not really provide a stronger 
argument for a date of provenance.  
 
If it is difficult to date P.Oslo. I V from script and parallels, maybe it is possible to 
contextualise it according to the doctrinal stances its Christian content suggests? By the fourth 
or fifth centuries Christianity had developed more elaborate doctrines that carried 
consequences as to the form and expression of one‟s faith, and arguments about Christ, first 
regarding his relation to the Father and later concerning his nature, repeatedly drove the 
Christian world to traumatic and divisive conflict. Although the theological debates were 
generally conducted in the upper echelons of society, accounts do suggest that the 
controversies also found resonance among the common folk (Grillmeier 1996, 37). Susan K. 
Roll, in her investigation into the origins of the Christmas celebration, proposes that its 
ascendancy in the fourth century is at least partially linked to the christological developments, 
being almost an „incarnation feast‟ in support of the Nicene Creed (1995, 219). Similarly, 
examining Coptic hymnody from the fifth century, Aloys Grillmeier notes the permeation of 
anti-Chalcedonian doctrinal formulations in the daily life of the Coptic church (1996, 253). 
As the questions of doctrine thus appear to have influenced ritual developments in several 
other areas of Christian devotion, can traces of them be found also in P.Oslo. I V? 
 
Following θχξηε in line 7 is „son of David according to the flesh,‟ from Paul‟s letter to the 
Romans 1:3. While this initially is a reflection of Christianity‟s heritage from the Old 
Testament, this debate was largely settled by the Council of Nicaea in 325 (Kelly 1960, 280). 
Here, the emphasis is more likely to be on Christ as a son θαηὰ ζάξθα, and Christ‟s 
incarnation is also the key concern in ὁ ηερζείο ἐθ ηῆο ἁγίαο παξζέλνπ Μαξίαο, ἅγηε, ὕςηζηε 
ζεέ, ἐμ ἁγίνπ πλεχκαηνο. Here, one must also remember the ΦΜΓ at the head of the papyrus, 
which section 2.1.1 showed is generally believed to mean „Mary gives birth to Christ.‟ In 
section 2.1.10 I mentioned how the formula of Christ‟s incarnation through the Virgin and the 
Holy Spirit occurs as early as the third century, but the topic and phrase gained much wider 
22 
 
currency with the christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries. Christ‟s 
incarnation is an important question in Egypt both in the teachings of heretics like 
Apollinarius in the 370s (Kelly 1960, 291) and church authorities like the patriarch Cyril of 
Alexandria (c. 376 – 444). He came to establish orthodox doctrine on this question, in his 
answer to Nestorius‟ (c. 386 – c. 451) refusal to call Mary Theotokos. Cyril holds that Christ, 
the Logos, is eternal, and in the incarnation became embodied in one unified nature, and that 
Mary therefore is Theotokos (Kelly 1960, 319-322). By the parallels between Cyril of 
Alexandria‟s contributions to the debate, and their adoption as proper doctrine at the Council 
of Ephesus in 431 (Graef 1960, 105), it is tempting to place P.Oslo. I V within the context of 
this debate. Also P.Oslo. I V‟s equation of Christ with God the Father, implied by „heavenly 
king‟ in line 10, is more appropriate with the consolidation Mary as Theotokos.  
 
However, even if Cyril‟s christology was accepted at Ephesus, the question remained 
prominent and disputed, and it took a key role again in the conflicts and controversies 
preceding and following the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (Grillmeier 1996, 72). In a 
catechism ascribed to Shenoute (348-451/466), which Grillmeier takes as an expression of 
„popular‟ Egyptian Christianity at the middle of the fifth century (1996, 180), Shenoute still 
feels he must defend Mary‟s status as holy virgin and Theotokos (1996, 194). Also a fraction 
of a later anaphora, ascribed to Severus of Antioch (465-518), found in the Great 
Euchologion of the White Monastery, includes that Christ assumed flesh “by the Holy Spirit 
in the holy theotokos Mary” (qtd in Grillmeier 1996, 250). Hence, it appears that this question 
remained current in Egypt also after the fourth century, and P.Oslo. I V may then just as well 
have originated from this period of consolidation and spread of Egyptian Christianity. Based 
on this, and also the later dating, however uncertain, of the parallel papyri in Appendix 2, I 
believe a later date, sometime in the fifth century, is more likely than Eitrem and 
Fridrichsen‟s original dating to the fourth. Yet, this is still a tentative conclusion and it would 
be problematic to claim any specific contextual situation based on it. 
2.2.6 Summarising Remarks: Christian, Non-Christian or Both? 
With this information, should P.Oslo. I V be considered as a two-part text where a Christian 
section (l. 7-10) is added onto a more generic ritual text (l. 1-7), like Eitrem and Fridrichsen 
hypothesise (1921, 23)? On the one hand, the first section makes no explicit Christian 
references, with the notable exception of ΦΜΓ at the head of the papyrus. Instead, it employs 
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a wide range of ritual elements known from the general, pan-Mediterranean ritual traditions of 
Late Antiquity, like voces magicae, divine names and vowel-strings. Moreover, P.Oxy. XVI 
2061-63 are almost exact parallels to P.Oslo. I V, only without the „Christian‟ section and 
thereby further suggest that lines 7-10 are an expansion of an established, non-Christian ritual 
tradition. Yet, at the beginning of P.Oxy. XVI 2063 there are four crosses. Granted, Forstner 
notes that crosses are used as ritual symbols also in non-Christian contexts (1977, 38), so they 
need not signify a Christian expression. Still, there is also P.Oxy. VIII 1152, which has a 
similar, simple ritual form and includes explicit Christian references. Also other ritual texts, 
like P.Oxy. VI 924 and P.Rain. 3 (please see Appendix 2), have both strong Christian 
references and an extensive use of non-Christian ritual elements. All in all, then, it seems that 
a clear distinction according to what is Christian and non-Christian is not possible in this 
genre of ritual texts.   
 
Of course, P.Oslo. I V may be an example of a firmly established ritual tradition that 
continued to be in use, both Christian and non-Christian, into the sixth century. For those who 
found it relevant, Christ and his angels were called upon, while for others powers like Ἰαψ 
and Βατλρσσσρ were more relevant. In such a case, the second part can be considered an 
addition, but then not an unusual or alien addition since such elaborations on ritual appear to 
have been well established in Late Antiquity. In a fluid ritual tradition, what one may read as 
Ταξρεη another may read as Ἰεζνῦ Φξηζηέ. In their presentation of early Christian Greek and 
Coptic papyri, Meyer, Smith and Kelsey hold that “they demonstrate that Christianity can 
take the form of a folk religion with a syncretistic interest in making use of ritual power for all 
sorts of practical purposes” (1994, 7). Also Frankfurter, from observations on early Christian 
Egypt, argues that local or domestic Christianity easily appropriated and developed earlier, 
non-Christian ritual practices (1998). This being a very likely, but also somewhat perplexing, 
conclusion, I will use cognitive ritual theories to explore precisely how such a combination of 
traditions and elements work. 
 
Also, there is another interesting observation to note. Examining the prayers and ritual texts 
grouped as Christian by Preisendanz, they seem to divide themselves into two „genres.‟ There 
is one genre that typically calls upon holy names and uses symbols (for example P.Rain. 3 or 
P.Oxy. VIII 1152, please see Appendix 2), while the other has more elaborate formulae, often 
supported by narrative and citations (for example P.Oxy. VIII 1151 or P.719 SIP, please see 
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Appendix 2). This division into two genres is not so much according to theology or doctrine, 
but rather according to ritual format. While the first calls on powers, the second seeks to 
effectuate their request by significant stories parallel to the situation or the desired result, so-
called historiolae (Frankfurter 1995). P.Oslo. I V clearly tends towards the former, even if it 
may also contain inspiration from the latter genre. Perhaps, then, the key here is ritual 
structure rather than religious belonging? Ritual structure being what Lawson and McCauley, 
and to great extent also Sørensen, address, also this question will be taken up in my analysis. 
 
25 
 
3 Magic:      
 Definition, Debate and Discourse 
First, however, I will attempt an overview of debates and developments in the study of 
„magic,‟ from its beginnings in nineteenth-century anthropology to the more varied 
approaches that are part of the discussion on Late Antiquity today. Although not exhaustive, 
the chapter aims to present the major formative contributions to the debate, which are mainly 
found in anthropology, history and religious studies.  
3.1 Substantive Definitions 
I will begin with James Frazer, who initiated the modern academic study of „magic‟ with his 
The Golden Bough: A Study on Magic and Religion in 1890. Here, he defines „magic‟ in 
opposition to religion, in that a magician constrains, coerces and forces the divine, while a 
religious person prays, supplicates and adores the divine (Graf 1991, 188). Frazer further 
holds that societies progress from primitive magic, through organised religion and ending in a 
scientific society, presenting a positivist conception of religious development (Betz 1991, 
245). He adopted most of his understanding of magic as „pre-scientific‟ from a contemporary 
anthropologist, Edward Tylor, who saw „magic‟ as a flawed understanding of cause and 
effect, centred on the principle of analogy: “[F]irst, that like produces like, or that an effect 
resembles its cause; and second, that things which have once been in contact with each other 
continue to act on each other at a distance” (Tylor, qtd in Collins 2008, 14). Together, Frazer 
and Tylor represent the first anthropological inquiries into the nature of „magic,‟ inquiries that 
have later been discredited by many scholars as expressions of nineteenth-century universalist 
positivism and racist ideas of evolution (Janowitz 2001, 4).  
 
Indeed, it did not take long before their ideas were modified. First was French philosopher 
and ethnographer Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, who in his How Natives Think from 1910 maintains 
that societies are not irrational: A „magical‟ explanation of a phenomenon is also causal, and 
thereby rational, only the explanation has a different footing than scientific knowledge 
(Collins 2008, 7). This assertion is supported by the famous study of the Azande by Edward 
E. Evans-Pritchard, first published as Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande in 
1937, who observed that the „magic‟ of the Azande was culturally specific, and that „magical‟ 
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explanations worked alongside scientific causal explanations (Collins 2008, 13). 
Simultaneously with Lévy-Bruhl, another understanding of „magic‟ developed with Émile 
Durkheim and further developed by Marcel Mauss, one that accommodated the cultural 
specificity of „magic.‟ They, somewhat simplistically put, argue that „magic‟ should be 
defined as an activity of an individual to attain individual goals while religion is communal 
and aims at the collective good (Thomassen 1999, 56), hereby introducing a social criteria for 
the understanding of „magic.‟ Referring to Roman sources, Peter Brown and Ramsay 
MacMullen in the 1970s and 1980s linked these ideas to Antiquity by arguing „magic‟ was 
not so much about illicit activities, but rather about social divisions founded on principles of 
propriety and social order (Phillips 1991, 269-270). Also David E. Aune, in his oft-cited 
article on early Christian „magic,‟ defines it as socially deviant religious activity (1980, 1516). 
 
These, and other, contributions did certainly add nuance to the definitions first presented by 
Frazer and Tylor. Still, they maintain Frazer‟s dualist opposition of „magic‟ to 
religion/science, the traditional understanding of „magic‟ that is being increasingly criticised 
as subjective and prejudiced. In this dualist conception religion/science quickly becomes the 
category for one‟s own belief/culture, while „magic‟ is the category for everything else. 
Randall Styers writes that “definitions of magic formulated over the past few centuries 
contributed to the construction of ideas about modernity by acting as a foil for the 
conceptualisation of distinctly modern concepts such as science, religion, and rationality” (qtd 
in Stratton 2007, 4). Yet, the separation of „magic‟ and religion/science still holds much 
currency in non-academic understandings of „magic,‟ and there are also a number of 
contemporary scholars that wish to hold on to it as an interpretative tool. William J. Goode 
first launched this idea, suggesting that „magic‟ and religion be treated as two ends of a 
continuum (Schäfer 1997, 20), while Jens Braarvig holds that dichotomies are an entrenched 
element of academic epistemological tools and therefore necessary also in the study of 
„magic‟ (1999, 27). Answering the charge of subjectivity, Henk S. Versnel in his seminal 
article from 1990 asserts that all knowledge contains an etic imposition, and continues that 
„magic‟ then is best identified “as it is generally perceived by the „common sense‟ in our 
culture (…) instrumentality, manipulativity, mechanicalness, non-personality, coercion, 
concrete and generally individual goals, and so on (…) when enough of these features are 
present in a given phenomenon it is magic” (Versnel, qtd in Harari 2005, 111).  
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Elements from these dualist and positivist concepts and categorisations also form part of the 
theoretical foundations for many of the cognitive approaches to ritual (Czachesz 2010, 2). For 
instance, Sørensen derives several of his principles for ritual efficacy from Frazer‟s work 
(2007, 95). Other scholars working on the cognitive science of religion tend to rely heavily 
ideas on evolution, often taking it as an “analogy for cultural transmission” (Uro 2010, 3). 
Many, including Sørensen, argue that „magic‟ must be accepted as a viable academic 
category, since it “identifies a genuine recurrent pattern of thought and behaviour” 
(Pyysiäinen 2004, 96). However, most add to this that it does not mean that „magic‟ is entirely 
separate from religion, but rather that it is a special aspect of religion (Pyysiäinen 2004, 111), 
Sørensen even adding that „magical agency‟ is part of why religious rituals are appreciated as 
efficacious (2007, 5). Hence, they do not maintain the dualist idea of „magic‟ versus religion. 
3.2 Magic as Discourse 
In an attempt to then avoid giving a substantive definition of „magic,‟ which has been the 
basic aim, but also the basic problem, for the anthropological and sociological studies referred 
to above, several scholars of Late Antiquity have turned to discourse analysis. Not only is this 
an emic approach honouring the historian‟s call ad fontes, many have also recently questioned 
“the usefulness of applying theories of magic, which were derived from the observation of 
small-scale tribes, [to ancient magical texts] which were produced in a cosmopolitan urban 
setting” (Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 4). Daniel Ogden (2008), Gideon Bohak (2008), 
Kimberly Stratton (2007), Matthew Dickie (2001), Ann Jeffers (1996) and Susan R. Garrett 
(1989) are a few of those who have analysed magic in Late Antiquity as a part of social 
discourse, holding that its role in discourse is the only aspect of ancient magic accessible to 
current scholars. While not giving a substantive opinion on what „magic‟ in Late Antiquity 
was, discourse analysis offers access at least to what role „magic‟ played in peoples lives 
(Ogden 2008, 2). Interestingly, most conclude that „magic‟ is a means of „Othering‟ in ancient 
discourse, much like it has in the modernist theories of „magic‟ presented in section 3.1.  
 
The studies all agree that throughout the ancient source material „magic‟ is never used self-
referentially, but is always ascribed to another group or person, and often in a highly 
polemical fashion (Janowitz 2001, 1). In the Greek literature four words are used when 
referring to a magician; κάγνο, γφεο, ἐπσδφο and θαξκαθεὺο (Dickie 2001, 13). Unfortunately, 
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the terms appear to be used interchangeably, thereby making it difficult to draw any 
conclusions from their etymology and context (Dickie 2001, 15). Still, κάγνο, the Greek word 
for Persian priests, does illustrate the tendency in ancient literature to see „magic‟ as 
something foreign. Another prevalent feature in Greco-Roman literature is the female 
magician, especially the „hag-witch‟ that has prevailed in popular culture as the stereotype for 
a witch until today. In Late Antiquity, then women, like foreigners, were marginalized group 
and a potential „Other‟ (Ogden 2008, 45).  
 
Placing „magic‟ at the fringes of society continues even into Christian times, with church 
fathers such as John Chrysostom warning against old women and Jews who heal (Dickie 
2001, 305). Many scholars, then, argue that „magic‟ is an ancient tool of „Othering,‟ saying 
that „my miracle is your magic.‟ Yuval Harari observers this in all the Mediterranean religious 
traditions (2005, 105). For instance, in ancient Jewish conceptions of „magic‟ “it is not the 
nature of the action itself, but the conformity of the action (or actor) to, or deviation from, the 
values of Israelite society (...) that determines whether it is characterized as magical” (Ricks 
1995, 131). Also in Christianity, “[b]eginning with this account of Simon from the Acts of the 
Apostles, magic functions (...) as the discourse of alterity par excellence” (Stratton 2007, 107). 
But, of course, P.Oslo. I V, together with many other Greek papyri, challenges precisely this 
conception, as it seemingly freely includes deities and elements from a range of religious 
traditions. Hence, while the literary sources from the time describe a quite polemical 
discourse concerning „magic,‟ here I will have to follow other theoretical approaches to 
further understand the papyrus. 
3.3 Magic as Ritual 
Another trend in the study of „magic‟ is to approach and define it as ritual. “For any culture I 
am familiar with, we can trade places between the corpus of materials conventionally labelled 
„magical‟ and corpora designated by other generic terms (e.g., healing, divining, execrative) 
with no cognitive loss” (Smith 1995, 16). Also Marvin Meyer, Richard Smith and Neal 
Kelsey maintain that ”the more closely these texts are read, the harder it is to maintain any 
distinction between piety and sorcery” (1994, 2). As a part of this effort to excise the field of 
old prejudice and presumptions, Fritz Graf compares prayers in the Greek magical papyri to 
non-magical prayers and finds nothing principally different (1991, 194). As another example, 
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there are many who have pointed to “intriguing points of resemblance between the miracle 
accounts in the canonical Gospels and ancient magical traditions” (Garrett 1989, 19). 
However, linking „magic‟ to ritual studies also opens the subject to the extensive theoretical 
developments within ritual studies these past decades. For instance, there is the functionalist 
branch that has developed from Durkheim and Mauss‟ sociological approach and seeks to 
interpret ritual through its social function (Uro 2009, 225). The classical themes explored with 
a functionalist approach are social cohesion and shared experience, but ritual theory has also 
gone further, for example with Susan Stewart looking at the reasons for and consequences of 
miniaturisation of ritual (Smith 1995, 27) or Jonathan Z. Smith‟s exploration of sacred space 
in Late Antiquity (1995, 22). 
 
Then, there are symbolist approaches to ritual. Fundamental to these is Bronislaw 
Malinowski‟s study of the Trobriand Islanders from 1915, the first study of ritual and magic 
based on original fieldwork. Malinowski reads their ritual system as communicative acts: “He 
thought that it was the product of social institutionalisation of types of spontaneous body and 
tongue response to strong outbreaks of feeling or desire (…) to externalise the emotions of the 
one who acts towards the object of his action” (Harari 2005, 101-102). In current scholarship, 
the idea of ritual as communication has developed along two lines. The one emphasises 
cultural semiotics and concerns itself with the interpretation of ritual symbols, while the other, 
building on linguistic theory, searches for the universal „grammar‟ of ritual (Uro 2009, 228). 
On the one hand, then, there are scholars who explore „magic‟ as symbolic acts, like Michael 
D. Swartz who writes „magic‟ is “a form of semiotic exchange – that is, a mutual conveyance 
of codes” (2005, 235) and Naomi Janowitz: “Rituals are highly structured uses of signs that 
have complex relationships with the contexts of use. That is, the can „do things‟ to the world 
around them based on socially conceived models of efficacy” (Janowitz 2002, xviii).  
 
On the other hand, examples of investigations seeking a universal structure in magic include 
anthropologist Stanley Tambiah, who asserts that “[m]agic does not aim at causal reasoning at 
all; its key element is a claim to power. (…) On this view magic may appear Other but is in 
fact familiar, being at bottom persuasive re-definition” (qtd in Gordon 1999, 239), and Marcel 
Sigrist who places a very instrumental emphasis on his understanding of magic: ”Instead of 
going out into the world and creating the tool to change things [like the scientist], he [the 
magician] does the opposite. With the specialized tool, or power he is endowed with, he 
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reduces and reads the world according to his specific skill, and is therefore also able to obtain 
results” (Sigrist 2005, 307). Thus, they see „magic‟ as human behaviour following a universal 
structure, even though the structure is employed using culturally determined and defined 
elements. Cognitive studies have a similar approach to religion and ritual, wishing to study 
how the phenomena are appreciated by the human mind. “[C]ognitive scholars are interested 
in cross-culturally recurrent patterns in religious thought and practice seeking to explain these 
regularities in terms of the architecture of the human mind” (Uro 2009, 230). Building models 
from these recurrent patterns, cognitive theories then offer an interpretative framework for 
assessing the various cultural phenomena and religious elements that occur in P.Oslo. I V.  
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4 Methodology:      
 Exploring Human Cognition 
Since Thomas E. Lawson and Robert N. McCauley‟s Rethinking Religion (1990), cognitive 
theories have been a growing part of the study of religious ritual (Uro 2010, 2). As a part of 
this flourish, cognitive studies have also been introduced into the study of „magic‟/ritual, for 
instance by Illka Pyysiäinen‟s Magic, Miracles and Religion (2004), Harvey Whitehouse‟s 
Modes of Religiosity (2004a) and Jesper Sørensen‟s A Cognitive Theory of Magic (2007), 
together with Lawson and McCauley‟s own work (1990/2002). Whitehouse and Luther H. 
Martin in 2004 edited a compilation of essays exploring the impact of cognitive studies on 
history of religion (Whitehouse and Martin 2004), while a symposium held at the Helsinki 
Collegium for Advanced Studies in August-September 2005 addressed various aspects of 
religious life in Late Antiquity through cognitive theories (Luomanen et al, 2007). Taking part 
in these larger discussions, Martin (2003/04 and 2007), Kimmo Ketola (2007), István 
Czachesz (2010) and Risto Uro (2010) examine specifically „magical‟/ritual practices in Late 
Antiquity, as I propose to do by analysing P.Oslo. I V. Still, the growing number of cognitive 
approaches to religious phenomena and ritual is of course not in itself a guarantee for its 
quality and use.  
 
Another recurrent critique of cognitive approaches is that while they purport to describe 
physiological processes, most have little evidence from neuroscience or psychological 
experiments, relying instead on analogies to linguistics and anthropological data (Engberg-
Pedersen 2007, 304). The answers to this charge tend to fall into two groups, one pointing to 
some experiments being done but admitting the need for further research (Whitehouse 2004a, 
41), while others emphasise “that models are only heuristic tools that have no ontological 
reality. They only help find new questions and frameworks which may – or may not – prove 
to be helpful in understanding” (Luomanen, Pyysiäinen and Uro 2007, 19). Now, there is a 
growing amount of empirical research, both neurological (Pearson 2002, 87-91 and Czachesz 
2007, 77-78) and in the form of psychological experiments (Whitehouse 2004a, 40, Mithen 
1996, 14 and Boyer 2001, 87), which works towards confirming different aspects of these 
cognitive theories. Still, I find the answer of the second group the more appealing, at least 
until more empirical support can be found for the neurological case. As heuristic models for 
cognition, cognitive approaches need not claim empirical knowledge about the physiological 
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construction and functioning of the brain, but use psychological and anthropological data to 
build interpretative models for how cognition can be seen to work. The theories, then, admit 
to not providing substantive knowledge, but hold that “[a]cknowledging the universal 
underlying mechanics of thought may, however, enable us to analyse the intellectual products 
and patterns of thought of peoples and cultures far removed from our own with an adequate 
degree of methodological clarity” (Lundhaug 2010, 64). 
 
Such a prospect is appealing, as cultural investigations and assessment of historical material 
are notoriously difficult because of scholars‟ removal in time and space from the subject 
matter. Cultural-semiotic approaches argue for contextual analysis, but this is difficult when 
the contextual information from the period is rather fragmented. For instance, when Janowitz 
examines „magic‟ in Late Antiquity, she turns to neoplatonic thoughts on theurgy and ritual 
efficacy to explain the ritual traditions of Late Antiquity (2002). As theurgics are the only 
surviving developed theory of ritual efficacy from Late Antiquity, this is valid approach and a 
good study. Yet, there is no guarantee that all forms of ritual in the period was conceived of 
according to this particular philosophical tradition. Instead, cognitive theories promise to 
circumvent this problem by taking the human mind itself as its interpretative key. This 
position does not discount the role and importance of cultural and religious context, but 
merely acknowledges that it in this case is difficult to reach and may therefore be fruitfully 
approached by studying their manifestation in cognitive representation. “Even if the structures 
in question are substantially social in origin, it does not follow that participants in ritual 
systems will not have some organized system of cognitive representations of the ritual acts in 
question” (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 81). Concerning P.Oslo. I V, I have already shown in 
chapter 2 how complex it is. This is why I would like to attempt a cognitive analysis of it, and 
see whether this can lead to a further understanding both of the papyrus itself and also the 
context it worked within. 
4.1.1 Some Basic Premises 
However, before going into further detail and presenting the specific theories I will use, I 
should first present a few premises for how I will proceed in my analysis. Section 4.1.1.a 
introduces a general point concerning cognitive studies of religion, while I in sections 4.1.1.b 
and 4.1.1.c present certain more specific observations on how a ritual text like P.Oslo. I V 
should be understood and approached.  
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4.1.1.a The Mind Treats Religious Phenomena Like Other Phenomena 
A fundamental assumption for the use of cognitive theory in the study of religion is that the 
human mind processes religious phenomena the same way it processes other, „profane,‟ 
phenomena: “I argue that belief in gods comes about through the same mental process as any 
other beliefs, using the same tools” (Barrett 2004, 21). For this point see also McCauley and 
Lawson 1990/2002, Boyer 1994/2001, Fauconnier and Turner 2002, Atran 2002, Pyysiäinen 
2004/2009 and Tremlin 2006. They argue that the religious or ritual nature of an event or 
phenomenon is not determined by the cognitive framework that assesses it, but rather by the 
inputs to the framework (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 87). This assertion is based on 
references to various studies on human cognition and psychology that point towards “the 
existence of a general mental operation” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 37). Justin Barrett 
details how the mind forms beliefs in the same way it takes in any form of information and 
forms knowledge from this, in an interplay between reflective and nonreflective cognitive 
processes, and cites several cognitive and anthropological studies for support (2004, 16-19). 
This premise has yet to become a consensus in the study of religion, with other scholars 
arguing that religious phenomena are dealt with in special cognitive processes (Polkinghorne 
2001, 2400 and Pearson 2002, 96-97). However, it allows cognitive students of religion to 
employ the results of cognitive studies of other phenomena, providing both a wide array of 
methodological tools and instructive parallels. 
4.1.1.b Speech-Act Theory 
Another basic premise for my study comes from speech-act theory. Speech-act theory was 
launched by J. L. Austin in a series of lectures in 1955, and, while Austin was not directly 
concerned with ritual, this theoretical field is increasingly being adopted by ritual scholars 
(Lawson and McCauley 1990, 51). Austin challenged the view that language is only 
representational, a manner of communicating occurrences in „real life‟ by using words as 
symbols for these, by pointing to several common instances where utterances do not describe 
but are „performative.‟ For instance, when a priest declares someone husband and wife he 
does not describe them as such, he makes them as such (Austin 1971, 6). Austin continues in 
his lectures to explore and classify various forms of performative language, and further 
specifies performative speech-acts as „illocutionary acts‟, writing that they “act in saying 
something” (1971, 99). John R. Searle develops the theory in further exploring the nature and 
workings of illocutionary acts, and holds that speech-acts are linguistic behaviour governed 
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by formal rules (1969, 198), and an analogy can be made here to the formal rules established 
by religious tradition (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 57). Building on this analogy, scholars 
conceive of ritual utterances as “special kinds of speech-acts, believed to establish or create a 
desired state of affairs” (Sørensen 2007, 68). Hence, the theory offers an understanding of 
ritual utterances beyond their referential function, providing an analytical means for 
appreciating how things like prayers or spells are thought effective. In P.Oslo. I V‟s case, I 
should add that even if „utterance‟ typically brings vocal action to mind, “also acts of writing 
are included” (Verschueren 1980, 3). Lawson and McCauley also assert that “[a]fter all, 
written language is neither less observable nor less linguistic than speech. Although it is 
derivative in fact, there is no principled distinction at stake here” (1990, 71).  
 
I will, then, analyse the text on P.Oslo I V as a speech-act, a ritual utterance. As such, it is not 
simply the written record of or the idealised representation of a ritual act, but a ritual act in 
and of itself. I noted in section 2.2.1 that Late Antiquity had an established tradition for ritual 
texts that were powerful in and of themselves, although Frankfurter, in discussing the 
conceptual consequences of performing „magic‟ in writing, does not venture upon a more 
elaborate explanation of this (1994). Further support for interpreting the text as a ritual 
utterance is in the fact that the papyrus contains no description of any ritual act(s) to be 
performed alongside it. While physical, nonverbal acts may have accompanied the use of this 
ritual text, the papyrus itself contains only the speech-act. Then, there is Smith‟s argument 
that ritual texts in Late Antiquity are displaced and miniaturised rituals, being parts of the turn 
towards more private religious expression (1995, 26). All this, then, points towards treating 
P.Oslo. I V as a ritual utterance, and I will do so in my analysis. 
4.1.1.c The Location of the Cognitive Processes 
The subject of cognitive studies is, simply, the processes of human cognition. However, as I 
use these theories on ritual representation, am I addressing the cognitive processes of the 
author/ritual expert of the ritual, or in the reader/participant?  From the theories themselves, 
there is no clear answer. Hugo Lundhaug points out that Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner 
never specify exactly with whom the cognitive processes they describe occur (2007, 39), and 
continues by quoting Tim Rohrer‟s assertion that “what counts as a blending space from the 
author‟s perspective should be regarded as an input space from the perspective of the reader 
(qtd in 2007, 40).  
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Although P.Oslo. I V certainly was composed and written down by someone, it is impossible 
to know whether it was written and/or blessed by a priest or ritual expert, or if it was simply 
written out by anyone able to do so, as Kim Haines-Eitzen suggests was the case with 
religious texts in Late Antiquity (2000, 7). Was it constructed on the spot from memory, or 
was it copied out of a collection of ritual texts, like Hans-Dieter Betz proposes was the use of 
the Greek magical papyri (1992, xlvi), or perhaps both? The parallel papyri in Appendix 2 
and discussed in chapter 3 certainly suggests that P.Oslo. I V was part of a textual tradition, 
but the nature of its transmission and formation is still unknown, both in general and in this 
specific case. Only one thing is reasonably certain, by the mere existence of P.Oslo. I V, and 
that is that it most probably had one or more users, which may be treated as the 
readers/participants in cognitive analysis. Hence, as the thesis progresses, it is the cognitive 
representations on the part of the ritual‟s participants that will be studied, and in this case the 
participants of the ritual are the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V.  
4.2 Approach 
Cognitive studies of religion tend to either work towards creating empirically verifiable 
theories or attempt to apply them (Pyysiäinen 2009, viii). The most extensive of these two 
directions is the theoretical branch. Here, the work is mostly centered on cognitive 
representation and appreciation of gods or supernatural beings (Boyer 1994/2001, Atran 2002, 
Barrett 2004, Pyysiäinen 2004/2009 and Tremlin 2006), religious transmission (Whitehouse 
2000/2004a, McCauley and Lawson 2002) and, the subject that I will address here, the 
intuitive structure of religious ritual (Lawson and McCauley 1990, Sweetser 2000 and 
Sørensen 2007). These ritual theories posit that the cognitive representation of ritual has an 
intuitive structure that determines how rituals are appreciated and then in turn how they are 
formed. Following these theories, I hope to explore further for instance how the user(s) of 
P.Oslo. I V may „bind‟ the „Artemisian scorpion‟ (l. 3), and how this can occur on the very 
same papyrus where Christ is called upon. Wishing to analyse the intuitive structure and 
workings of the ritual text, I will employ first Lawson and McCauley‟s structural approach 
(1990) and then Sørensen‟s development of blending theory in relation to ritual (2007).  
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There is, by now, also a fair number of studies that apply cognitive theory to specific cultures 
or religions. Whitehouse (2000) and Emma Cohen (2007) use cognitive theories in 
anthropological studies, while Steven J. Mithen (1996) and James L. Pearson (2002) use them 
in the study of pre-historical religion. Martin (2007) and Uro (2007) both use Whitehouse‟s 
modal theory of religious transmission to explore early Christian ritual, while others have 
applied Lawson and McCauley‟s structural theory to religions in Late Antiquity (Martin 
2003/04, Gragg 2004, Ketola 2007 and Uro 2010). Lundhaug (2007/2010) and Vernon K. 
Robbins (2007) use blending theory to analyse early Christian texts, and Czachesz even 
combines several of the theoretical approaches, including Sørensen‟s work, when he seeks to 
explain early Christian miracles (2010). However, common to all these studies is that they in 
their analysis address either a corpus of texts or an entire ritual and/or religious tradition. The 
only other historical application of cognitive ritual theory to a specific case that I have found 
is Theodore Vial‟s (2004a) analysis of a conflict in the Reformed Church in Zurich between 
1864 and 1868 on how to baptise. Yet, while being a case study, in other respects this is of 
course quite distant in topic and time frame from what I will do here. Hence, this thesis is 
something of a new project. Not only do I address a specific case study, I also analyse an 
original example of ritual practice in Late Antiquity, as opposed to literary renditions where 
one would need to include considerations on authorial intent and manuscript transmission.  
 
I noted in section 3.1 how many cognitive scholars argue for rehabilitating „magic‟ as an 
analytical category, and how Frazerian observations and categories are still used in several 
cognitive approaches to ritual, despite the extensive criticism both positions have undergone. 
However, these scholars also assert that there is no dualist separation between religion and 
„magic,‟ rather that „magic‟ is a part, to varying extents, of religion, and especially religious 
ritual (Sørensen 2007, 5). This modification that „magic‟ is no opposite to religion, but rather 
a part of it, seems to me to open their position to the arguments I presented in section 3.3, 
namely that „magic‟ has no substantive difference from ritual practice and should therefore be 
treated and studied as such. Therefore, especially since this study is more concerned with 
applying the theory than a theoretical discussion, I propose to still employ these cognitive 
ritual theories, while disagreeing with their rehabilitation of „magic‟ as an analytical category 
and approaching „magic‟ in general, and P.Oslo. I V in particular, as ritual.  
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Finally, a recurring challenge for several historical studies using cognitive theory is 
exemplified by, but not exclusive to, Ketola‟s study (2007). While he builds a strong 
theoretical framework for the cognitive aspects his study, the historical material he applies 
this to he finds in one or two standard histories of Second Temple Judaism, without engaging 
in any form of source criticism or notable appreciation for the nature of historical research. He 
admits from the outset that history is not his field (Ketola 2007, 96), but this 
acknowledgement does not solve the problem. I wish to avoid such a pitfall in my study by 
opening with a philological exploration of P.Oslo. I V in chapter 2, and consistently referring 
to this chapter as I apply the cognitive theories in chapters 5 and 6. 
4.2.1 Lawson and McCauley and Structural Linguistics 
Chapter 2 has already traced the possible meanings and implications of the elements in 
P.Oslo. I V according to extant philological research. But, how do the elements function in 
the ritual text and what worldview and ontological assumptions do they suggest? What roles, 
specifically, do the Artemisian scorpion and Christ have in the ritual, and what type of 
interaction between humans, the user(s), and such supernatural beings does P.Oslo. I V allow? 
Lawson and McCauley presents cognitive criteria for assessing the various deities and 
elements included in P.Oslo. I V, and I will use these to break the ritual text down into its 
functional parts and provide observations on the nature and tradition of the ritual. As a part of 
this discussion, I will also touch upon the main points from the cognitive research on 
gods/supernatural beings, which I referred to earlier in this chapter.  
 
Lawson and McCauley propose to “specify a set of universal principles of religious ritual for 
assessing the products of this [the religious ritual] action representation system” (Lawson and 
McCauley 1990, 84). Remembering the premise explained in section 4.1.1.a, their theory rests 
on the basic analogy of seeing the cognitive representation of an action as the formulation of a 
sentence. Just like a sentence consists of 1) a subject and 2) a verb, and potentially 3) an 
object, an action consists, or is cognitively represented as consisting, of 1) an agent, 2) an 
action and potentially 3) an object of this action (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 92). These are 
the basic structural entities of what Lawson and McCauley call an „action representation 
system,‟ ARS, a model for how human cognition intuitively represents an action. As ritual is a 
religious action, this applies also to it (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 57). From this simple 
analogy, Lawson and McCauley borrow theories of cognitive representation from structural 
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linguistics to map the cognitive representation of ritual. They admit to extensive criticism of 
such a „cross-discipline‟ application from linguistics by the likes of Dan Sperber and Noam 
Chomsky, but hold that the two phenomena nevertheless share enough traits to justify their 
attempt to use linguistic theory to develop models for representing ritual action (Lawson and 
McCauley 1990, 75). I will use such a model, then, to analyse the ritual utterance(s) in P.Oslo. 
I V. Thus, I will not only be able to explore the role and function of the ritual powers in 
P.Oslo. I V, but also further examine the meaning and implications of the ritual terms δέλλσ 
and (δηα-)θπιάζζσ. 
 
For rituals, Lawson and McCauley posit that the ARS is always tripartite, having an agent, 
action and object. Hence, a ritual act is different from prayer, which they take to include only 
an agent and an action (1990, 125). They distinguish the two saying that ritual brings about 
change, whereas prayer have no such certainty and thus no direct object/result (McCauley and 
Lawson 2002, 15). To me, this smacks of the Frazerian definitions I presented in section 3.1, 
and I find it problematic. However, this point will arise when dealing with the more Christian 
lines in P.Oslo. I V, so I will save a thorough discussion of the relation between ritual and 
prayer for my analysis of these lines in section 5.2.2.  
 
Moving on, Lawson and McCauley also point to ARS constraints beyond structure. Noam 
Chomsky‟s famous example for this, the sentence „curious green ideas sleep furiously,‟ is 
linguistically correct, but still nonsensical (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 105). Like a 
sentence, an ARS is intuitively judged, and hence constrained, by the „available conceptual 
schemes‟ (ACS) (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 89). As the content of Chomsky‟s sentence 
violates the ACS of the English language, where ideas do not sleep nor is sleep ever furious, 
so also will human cognition reject as false any ARSs that go against its ACS. For instance, if 
a man is seen to walk on water, this is a false ARS according to the ACS related to human 
behaviour, and the event will either be rejected as false or explained through another ACS, in 
this case a religious one. When it comes to rituals, these are religious actions and will 
therefore also be judged according to religious ACS (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 84). 
Hence, by examining what action constraints are at play in the ritual actions in P.Oslo. I V 
through Lawson and McCauley‟s ARS-model, I hope to infer the relevant ACS. Thus, I hope 
to learn about the worldview and ontological assumptions of the user(s). 
39 
 
4.2.2 Blending Theory and Its Use in Ritual Studies 
In their introduction to the Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies, Petri Luomanen, Illka 
Pyysiäinen and Risto Uro propose that conceptual blending is an apt tool for bridging 
cognitive theory with practical case studies (2007, 15). And indeed, whereas Lawson and 
McCauley‟s theory is adept at identifying the role and function that cognitive processes 
ascribe to the various elements in P.Oslo. I V, it leaves something to be desired as to the 
interaction between these elements. For this, I will turn to the theory of conceptual integration 
developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, which they call „conceptual blending‟ or 
„blending theory,‟ and Sørensen‟s later application of their theoretical work to „magic‟ rituals.  
 
Building on George Lakoff and Mark Johnson‟s „conceptual metaphor theory,‟ Fauconnier 
and Turner argue that the processes by which the mind forms ideas or concepts can be 
modelled in much the same way as Lakoff and Johnson model metaphors. Basically, 
“[c]onceptual metaphors are employed as powerful cognitive tools enabling the readers or 
listeners to think about abstract (...) concepts in terms of more concrete and familiar concepts 
and imagery” (Lundhaug 2010, 27). This eases cognition and frees up cognitive capacity. For 
instance, dealing with the passing of time through the movement of a clock‟s hands over its 
dial is much simpler than dealing with time as the abstract notion it really is (Hutchins 2005, 
1571). “Conceptual integration, which we also call conceptual blending, is another basic 
mental operation, highly imaginative but crucial to even the simplest kinds of thought” 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 18). Thinking of death as a form of sleep is a common example 
of an abstract and unexperienced phenomenon being conceptualised through a familiar 
phenomenon (Lundhaug 2010, 26). Conceptual blending, then, is a process where two 
established „mental spaces,‟ or ideas/concepts, are joined, and through the dynamics of this 
process they emerge as a new mental space or idea/concept, a „blended space‟ (Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002, 43).  
 
Fauconnier and Turner first introduced the theory in 1993, and they have later been 
“heartened to discover that, coming from another angle and with very different kinds of data, 
several „creativity theorists‟ were insisting on the existence of a general mental operation (...) 
whose result is to bring together elements of different domains” (2002, 37). Not only 
employed by the historical studies of religious texts mentioned in section 4.2, blending theory 
has also become an important tool in the fields of cognitive linguistics and literary theory 
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(Lundhaug 2010, 29-30, note 34). Criticising the use of blending theory in historical studies, 
Czachesz argues that “it is often difficult to anchor the ‟blends‟ in empirical evidence” (2010, 
3). Other scholars express a general scepticism towards the theory, maintaining that blending 
theory is too general, too ambitious and lacks empirical support (Coulson and Oakley 2000, 
192-193). Now, there are supporting results from some experimental research in neuroscience 
and psychology (Grady 2000, 336-339), but most importantly the majority of applications of 
blending theory do not claim to directly describe the neurological processes involved in 
cognition, but rather to present an explanatory model of these (Gibbs Jr. 2000, 349). To repeat 
Luomanen, Pyysiäinen and Uro‟s assertion, the “models are only heuristic tools” (2007, 19). 
 
The first attempt at exploring ritual structure using blending theory is by Eve Sweetser. She 
conceptualises ritual through speech-act theory and then explores the ritual utterances as 
conceptual blends (2000). Sweetser argues that rituals are non-linguistic performative 
utterances; just like a minister weds a couple by declaring them husband and wife, some ritual 
experts inflict pain by acting upon a wax doll (2000, 306). Just like the declaration of 
marriage, the harming of the doll is performative. The process of how actions in one space 
(the doll) may cause changes in another space (the victim), she continues, is best modelled as 
a conceptual blend, as it shows how different spaces are joined together, forming a blended 
space. The blended space, then, is performative, and this performativity makes the ritual 
efficacious (Sweetser 2000, 310). For my study, however, I will use Sørensen‟s introduction 
to „magic‟ from 2007. While sharing the fundamental aspects of his approach with Sweetser, 
his work proceeds further than she is able to in her article. Sørensen relates this basic process 
of joining different spaces to principles of ritual efficacy he collects from anthropological 
observations, and proceeds to detail how these principles guide the interaction between the 
spaces (Sørensen 2007, 44). Analysing, then, P.Oslo. I V as a conceptual integration network, 
with Sørensen‟s observations on special ritual network interaction, I shall be able to explore 
more closely how the elements in the ritual text combine and how this combination is 
appreciated as efficacious by the user(s).  
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5 Lawson and McCauley’s  
 Theory of Religious Ritual 
P.Oslo. I V certainly indicates a society were emerging Christianity lived alongside and 
functioned with traditional, non-Christian practices and ideas. In this chapter, I will employ 
Lawson and McCauley‟s theory of ritual structure to try to reach beyond the confusing 
diversity of P.Oslo. I V and see more specifically what purpose the various elements are 
serving in the ritual text, and by what criteria they are found appropriate for it. Chapter 4 
already briefly introduced Lawson and McCauley‟s application of cognitive theory to the 
study of religious ritual, which aims to explore the “participants‟ religious ritual competence, 
i.e., a theory of their tacit knowledge about their religious ritual systems” (McCauley and 
Lawson 2002, ix). This means exploring people‟s intuitive learning from living and 
participating in ritual tradition, and not their appraisal according to theological criteria 
(Lawson and McCauley 1990, 3). For Lawson and McCauley‟s full argument and theory, 
their own works Rethinking Ritual and Bringing Ritual to Mind are certainly the most 
complete and instructive. Nevertheless, a minor elaboration on their theory must be 
undertaken here before it can be applied to P.Oslo I V, together with the aforementioned 
introduction of cognitive studies dealing with gods and supernatural beings. 
5.1 The Theory 
I mentioned in chapter 4 that Lawson and McCauley‟s theory is derived from structural 
linguistics and how the basic analogy for this comparison is seeing a (ritual) action as a 
sentence (1990, 84). I also outlined how these structural principles are constrained by the 
„available conceptual system,‟ the ACS, in which the (ritual) action takes place and is judged 
according to. For instance, „a man lifts a ton of rock,‟ while possible according to the 
structural principles of agent, action and object, it is an inappropriate action as it contradicts 
common experience about human strength. If a phenomenon is completely unconnected with 
an individual‟s representation of reality, the ACS, it will be rejected (Pyysiäinen 2004, 85). 
These principles Lawson and McCauley combine in an „action representation system,‟ ARS, 
to model how an action is intuitively appreciated. Their theory is often criticised for over-
simplifying difficult and complex topics like „culture‟ and „ritual‟ (Jablonski 1998, 272), and 
for an opportunistic and poorly founded borrowing from linguistic structural theory 
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(Proudfoot 1992, 133). In response, McCauley and Lawson admit that their theory is 
somewhat „informal,‟ but maintain that it, “like any scientific theory, will gain credibility to 
the extent that it is able to stand up to independent texts with materials it was not originally 
designed to explain” (2002, 5). My analysis here will be such a test. 
5.1.1 ‘Action Representation Systems’ 
To illustrate how these principles work together in an ARS, Lawson and McCauley create a 
graphic model whose main features will be rendered here (please see figure B). It shows how 
the ACS provide input to the ARS and how this then together forms the cognitive 
representation of an action. Constraints to the ARS are included as „quality‟ and „property.‟ 
Figure B: Lawson and McCauley’s Basic Model of an Action Representation System 
 
(Lawson and McCauley 1990, 93) 
Returning to the example of the man and his rock, the man must conform to the ACS criteria 
for an agent, for instance being a human and not a chair, and he must have the necessary 
properties for the action, like two strong arms. The action complex must involve contact 
between the man and the rock, and „lifting‟ implies, as a property, a direction from low to 
high. Finally, the rock must have the quality of being hard and compact, but in this case it is 
its property of weighing a ton that makes the ARS inappropriate. Yet, an ARS may include 
several „enabling‟ ARSs that represent foregoing actions which make the ARS intuitively 
acceptable. Here, the ARS can be made appropriate through adding the quality „using a crane‟ 
to the action complex. This includes earlier action(s) to the ARS, where a mechanical crane is 
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built and made available to the man so that he may lift the heavy rock. Lawson and McCauley 
call this „action conditioning,‟ the detailing the enabling properties of preceding actions and 
events (1990, 98).  
5.1.2 Ritual as an ARS 
Now that the basic outline of how humans cognitively represent an action in an ARS has been 
presented, next is to apply this model to ritual action. In their application, Lawson and 
McCauley posit two premises that especially define ritual action. 1) “Participants perform 
rituals in order to bring about changes in the religious world” (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 
125). This point is related to the discussion on ritual versus prayer that I mentioned in section 
4.2.1, and which I will return to in section 5.2.2. 2) The input to the ARS is primarily 
provided by religious conceptual scheme(s), albeit, Lawson and McCauley add, its assessment 
is strengthened if it also complies with logical constraints from other conceptual schemes 
(1990, 89). Essential to religious conceptual schemes, then, are „culturally postulated 
superhuman agents,‟ CPS-agents (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 87). For P.Oslo. I V, obvious 
CPS-agents are the divine names and voces magicae that the text calls upon, but most 
importantly the Artemisian scorpion and Christ. These are agents that the ritual text ascribes 
superhuman qualities, and whom I in chapter 2, although to a varying extent, established in 
the cultural or religious traditions of Late Antiquity. More will come on CPS-agents in section 
5.1.2.a. Returning to Lawson and McCauley‟s theory, they then posit CPS-agents as the 
ultimate explanatory cause for religious systems or ACSs. Consequently, the key criterion for 
the appropriateness of a ritual is the implication, somewhere in the ARS, of a CPS-agent 
(Lawson and McCauley 1990, 112).  
 
McCauley and Lawson note that their premise that belief in CPS-agents are the defining 
feature of a religious conceptual system has been controversial (2002, 8). Czachesz, for 
instance, points to various ancient „spells‟ that do not have a reference to supernatural agents 
(Czachesz 2010, 11). However, most cognitive scholars also argue for this premise (Martin 
2003/04, Whitehouse 2004a, Tremlin 2006, Pyysiäinen 2009). Indeed, as I mentioned in 
chapter 4, a large part of cognitive studies of religion are centred precisely around gods or 
supernatural beings, since these are taken to be the defining feature of religion as a cultural 
conceptual system (Mithen 1996, Atran 2002, Boyer 2001, Barrett 2004, Tremlin 2006 and 
Pyysiäinen 2009). Interesting as a discussion on this question would have been, I have not the 
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space for it here. Moreover, it is also not as pressing, since P.Oslo. I V clearly does include 
CPS-agents, like the Artemisian scorpion and Christ. Thus, it is ritual type that agrees with 
Lawson and McCauley‟s premise, regardless of this premise‟s universal truth value.  
 
Now, to implicate a CPS-agent in an ARS will often require several earlier, „enabling‟ rituals. 
Far from all rituals involve the direct participation of a CPS-agent, but implicates the CPS-
agent via the ritual expert or a sacred item. An example is perhaps the best way to illustrate 
this, and also the other aspects of Lawson and McCauley‟s structural theory. For this, a 
dismissal in a Lutheran service will be analysed, with apologies for the lack of theological 
detail and subtlety (please see figure C).  
Figure C: An Example of CPS-agent Implication in Religious Ritual 
 
Here, the action complex of the ARS is the blessing, while the minister is the agent and the 
congregation the object. 1) By blessing the congregation, the minister changes their state in 
the religious world to being blessed. 2) Then, according the religious conceptual scheme, in 
this case Lutheran, the ARS is judged appropriate through two preceding action conditioning 
rituals; a) the minister is ordained by the Church, b) who in turn is instituted by Jesus Christ, 
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the CPS-agent. Thus complying with the two premises for ritual action, the blessing is an 
intuitively acceptable ARS. 
 
The model also shows certain ACS constraints, featured in the places for „property‟ and 
„quality.‟ For instance, the action of saying the blessing does require the formal form of a 
liturgical formula, and should in most cases be accompanied with the sign of the cross. These 
are aspects of the action complex that are required for it to be judged appropriate by the ACS-
criteria. I will not go through and explain all the properties and qualities of a Lutheran 
dismissal, but to further illustrate this point they are included in the model in figure C.  These 
ACS-constraints on the ARS hint at the ontological assumptions of the ritual participants. 
Identifying the constraints for P.Oslo. I V will help indicate the user(s)‟ worldview and 
ontological assumptions as to ritual efficacy. 
 
Moving on, Lawson and McCauley, by applying their theory to a range of rituals know from 
anthropological studies, for instance a Vedic Agnyadhana ritual, Catholics blessing 
themselves using holy water and a Zulu ingestion of a love potion (1990, 104-121), argue that 
they can also deduce certain universal, structural principles that indicate the centrality of a 
ritual within its religious tradition. 1) The „principle of superhuman agency‟ states that when 
the CPS-agent is implicated as or with the agent in the ARS, the ritual in question will be 
more central to the religious tradition than if the CPS-agent is implicated as or with the action 
complex or the object in the ARS (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 125). 2) The „principle of 
superhuman immediacy‟ holds that “the fewer enabling actions to which appeal must be made 
in order to implicate a superhuman agent, the more fundamental [central] the ritual is to the 
religious system in question” (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 125).  
 
Now, „centrality,‟ according to Lawson and McCauley, is the participant(s)‟ intuitive 
assessment of a ritual in its religious ACS, and it is typically related to the degree of CPS-
agent involvement in a ritual and how constitutive it is the religious conceptual scheme (1990, 
126-127). Admittedly, a participant‟s intuitive appreciation of a ritual is a quite vague notion, 
but Lawson and McCauley demonstrate their principles through various examples, for 
instance that “the parishioner‟s blessing is less important to the Catholic system than is Jesus‟ 
institution of the church” (1990, 126). In the latter case, the superhuman agent is both 1) 
active and 2) more closely implicated in the ritual, and is therefore appreciated as more 
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„central‟ and constitutive to the Catholic conceptual scheme. There is even some empirical 
support for this claim, from an experiment on a group of Christian believers that suggests the 
„principle of supernatural agency‟ does affect their intuitive appreciation of ritual efficacy 
(Whitehouse 2004a, 39).  
5.1.2.a ‘Culturally Postulated Superhuman Agents’ 
As Lawson and McCauley see CPS-agents as the defining feature of religion and 
consequently ritual, I want to here briefly present the basic observations that cognitive studies 
of religion are making about gods or supernatural beings. This field of study typically follows 
an evolutionary approach to cognitive development, developing its arguments on the growing 
discipline of evolutionary and developmental psychology (Mithen 1996, Atran 2002, Boyer 
2001, Barrett 2004, Tremlin 2006 and Pyysiäinen 2009), and McCauley and Lawson 
frequently refer to their results (2002, 24). The basic argument is that human cognitive tools 
are, through evolution, wired to detect agency (Barrett 2004, 4). Hence, when no „natural‟ 
agency can be found for a seemingly intentional or purposeful occurrence “the most 
straightforward manner is in identifying some ambiguous thing, such as a wispy form, as an 
intentional agent – a ghost or spirit” (Barrett 2004, 33). Moreover, Barrett adds, this inbred 
search for intent even leads people to “overestimate the connection between factors” (Barrett 
2004, 51), linking events and stories together that need not necessarily be linked. This 
tendency will typically enforce religio-cultural ideas, as these provide established explanatory 
patterns of agency and intention into which people may fit their experience (Lundhaug 2007, 
35). An example would be breaking a mirror and then experience a string of misfortunes the 
next day. Czachesz calls this „confirmation bias‟ (2010, 34), and Emily Pronin et al have 
conducted an empirical study that observes such confirmation bias (2006). 
 
However, Boyer points out that there appears to be certain criteria for what makes some 
supernatural agents, or other religious phenomena for that matter, more appealing and 
acceptable to human cognition than others (2001, 148). Stewart Guthrie argues that to the 
human mind a human is the standard agent and uses this to explain what he calls an 
„anthropomorphic‟ bent in human religiosity (Tremlin 2006, 100), and Boyer points to 
psychological research in support of this (2001, 89). Boyer deduces another criteria for 
successful supernatural agents, namely that they should be „minimally counterintuitive 
concepts,‟ MCIs. These he describes as meeting “most of the assumptions that describers and 
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categorizers generate – thus being easy to understand, remember, and believe – but as 
violating just enough of these assumptions to be attention demanding” (Barrett 2004, 22). For 
instance, the Christian God is popularly conceived of as an older man, a wise father-figure, 
but then violating these conceptual structures by being, for instance, omnipresent. Finally, to 
be successful, MCIs also need to have inferential potential, they must be relevant for people‟s 
lives (Whitehouse 2004a, 54). Barrett, in an argument echoed by Boyer (2001, 202) and 
Tremlin (2006, 111), holds that supernatural agents typically have access to privileged 
information, being either all-knowing, all-seeing or something to that effect, by which they 
“hold the potential to be both powerful allies and dangerous enemies” to humans, for whom 
the collection and used of strategic information has become an evolutionary niche (2004, 49). 
These are, then, cognitive criteria for CPS-agents, and I will have to see, in my analysis, to 
what extent and in what way(s) the Artemisian scorpion, Christ and the other CPS-agents in 
P.Oslo. I V comply with these criteria. 
5.2 Its Application to P.Oslo I V 
There are three main verbs, or „action complexes‟ to use Lawson and McCauley‟s 
terminology, in P.Oslo. I V, and consequently three ARSs to explore: 1) δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε 
Ἀξηεκίζηε, „I bind you, Artemisian scorpion,‟ 2) δηαθχιαμνλ ηὸλ νἶθνλ ηνῦηνλ..., „protect this 
house...,‟ and 3) θχιαμνλ, θχξηε, „be on guard, Lord.‟ (Concerning this last ARS, it was noted 
in section 2.1.10 that the verb may be transitive or intransitive, but from its context here it 
seems most likely that it operates with „this house with all its occupants‟ in lines 3-4 as its 
implied object.) However, according to Austin‟s classification of performative speech-acts, 
ARSs 2 and 3 do no qualify as being performative. According to him, typical performative 
speech-acts are in the first person active indicative, like 1) δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε, or at 
least “reducible, or expandible, or analysable into a form with a verb in the first person 
singular present indicative active (grammatical)” (Austin 1971, 61-62). Being imperatives, the 
two other ARSs must be expanded somewhat to be in the first person active indicative, and 
this expansion has consequences for the application of Lawson and McCauley‟s model. 
5.2.0 ‘Illocutionary Acts’ and ‘Propositional Acts’ 
Austin writes that imperatives automatically imply an „operative‟ word like „I 
order/demand/appeal.‟ For instance, in saying „be quiet!‟, there is an implicit „I ask/order you 
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to be quiet‟ (Austin 1971, 59). Thus, the imperative acquires illocutionary force through the 
implied operative word „ask/order.‟ It is, then, this operative „ask/order‟ that is performative 
and may in certain contexts be a ritual act, not the imperative. „Be quiet‟ is what Searle terms 
a „propositional act;‟ the action that the illocutionary act proposes to achieve (1969, 29). It is 
“a proposition bearing upon a future act of the hearer” (Recanati 2007, 49). Hence, what I 
suggested is two separate ARSs here, numbers 1 and 2, are in fact the illocutionary and 
propositional acts of one performative utterance: „I bind [illocutionary act] you, Artemisian 
scorpion (…) (to) protect [propositional act] this house…‟ Finally, number 3, θχιαμνλ, θχξηε, 
is also a propositional act, and therefore not a complete performative utterance. However, 
following Austin‟s assertion that there is an implicit operative verb to every imperative, I will 
analyse the performative speech-act that is implied by the imperative θχιαμνλ. Thus, the 
second performative utterance in P.Oslo. I V is something like; „I ask/order/appeal to 
[illocutionary act] you, Lord, to protect [propositional act]...,‟ and I will proceed to analyse 
this as an ARS as well. The delineation between these two distinct performative utterances, 
notably, agrees with Eitrem and Fridrichsen‟s identification of a pagan and a Christian section 
in P.Oslo. I V (please see section 2.2.6).  
 
However, having established the two illocutionary acts of P.Oslo. I V, I need to also place the 
two propositional acts; 2) δηαθχιαμνλ ηὸλ νἶθνλ ηνῦηνλ..., and 3) θχιαμνλ. As Lawson and 
McCauley‟s theory explores ritual acts, these non-performative propositional acts cannot be 
analysed in their own ARS-models. Rather, they must be included in the ARS-models of the 
two illocutionary acts. I have already quoted Francois Recanati on propositional acts, saying 
that these bear “upon a future act of the hearer” (2007, 49). The hearers here, of course, are 
the objects of the illocutionary acts, the Artemisian scorpion and the Lord. Hence, the 
propositional acts in P.Oslo. I V are the proposed future acts of the Artemisian scorpion and 
the Lord, in response to the ritual. Consequently, for the illocutionary ARS to be intuitively 
acceptable, the Artemisian scorpion and the Lord must be considered capable, by the user(s) 
of the ritual text, of performing these proposed acts. If the Lord is unable to protect the house 
and its inhabitants, then calling upon him to do so would be futile. Hence, the propositional 
acts reflect an intuitive object property in the respective ARSs, namely that the object is able 
to perform this act. Thus, the propositional acts have already established one common object 
property for both the ARSs in P.Oslo. I V. 
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5.2.1 δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε 
Starting with the first performative ARS, its basic structure is quite simple (please see figure 
D). There is the agent („I‟), the action complex („bind‟) and the object („Artemisian 
scorpion‟). The agent is referred to by the first person singular form of δέλλσ. As mentioned 
in section 4.1.1.c, the initial agent could have been a priest or ritual expert, but from the 
information available the ritual agent must be considered the user(s) of the ritual text.  
Figure D: The First ARS of P.Oslo. I V, lines 1-6 
 
 
Yet, what property must the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V have to qualify as the ritual agent? As 
presented in the model, the key requirement for someone to qualify as the user(s) of the 
papyrus is their association with the papyrus. It has been noted in the opening of chapter 3 
that P.Oslo. I V bears traces of being folded, which could mean that it was carried around by 
its user or that it was tucked away somewhere special. Both practices are well known from the 
Mediterranean since the Roman Imperial period, especially among Jews and Christians 
(Ogden 2008, 131). The papyrus may, of course, have been taken out to be read when it was 
felt needed, but, as I mentioned in section 2.2.1, such papyri were also thought to be powerful 
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simply by their presence/existence (Frankfurter 1994, 195). It is difficult to know whether the 
permanence given to a performative utterance by writing it down signified some sort of 
continual repetition or permanent expression. Alternatively, it could have functioned as a 
substitute for the original ritual expert, potentially the writer of P.Oslo. I V, which Sørensen 
suggests is one of the purposes of ritual (2007, 183). Either way, the one fairly certain thing 
here is that possession of or association with the papyrus identifies its user(s), qualifying the 
possessor(s) as the ritual text‟s „I.‟  
 
Another quality of the ritual agent may be signalled by the divine names and voces magicae in 
line 2. Several scholars argue that the purpose of voces magicae is to signal the divine 
knowledge of the ritual expert (Graf 1991, 192). Hence, the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V could be 
further qualified by their knowledge of the divine names and voces magicae in line 2, which is 
demonstrated by the listing of these divine names and voces magicae in the ritual text. I have 
suggested this possibility as an enabling act in stippled lines in figure D, but the figure also 
shows that I consider it more likely that the voces magicae and divine names are linked to the 
action complex. My reason for this is the propositional act, the imperative to protect the house 
and all its occupants. As the utterance is geared towards this goal, it seems more likely that 
the enabling acts are also linked to the action complex „bind,‟ as this drives the utterance 
towards the propositional act. However, I realise that this observation is not conclusive, and 
that the divine names and voces magicae may in fact take on both these roles in the intuitive 
appreciation of P.Oslo. I V, simultaneously qualifying the agent and the action complex.    
 
Moving on, then, to the action complex, this is δέλλσ, „I bind.‟ „To bind‟ is a common ritual 
term in Late Antiquity for taking control of spirits and demons, which developed from the 
classical term for binding, δέσ (Wessely 1974, 423). In P.Oslo. I V, the preceding and 
following mentions of and/or calling upon divine names, voces magicae, and the probable 
ritual repetition 315 times, are introduced to lend authority to and hence enable the action 
complex. According to the user(s) intuition about ritual action, then, he/she/they may bind the 
Artemisian scorpion by virtue of calling upon these powers. This enabling act is represented 
in the model in figure D by a second ARS, and its position discussed in the previous 
paragraph. As the model shows, the CPS-agents are here implicated through the presence of 
their names, by them being called upon. The implicit agent quality, then, is that the deities are 
powerful, and the action quality is the presence of their names, while the action property is 
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their being mentioned and/or known. Bovon has already noted how pan-Mediterranean ritual 
traditions in Late Antiquity set great store by the ritual power of divine names (2001, 268), 
and chapter 2 also concludes that P.Oslo. I V appears to be of a ritual „genre‟ where the 
extensive mention of deities and spirits is a defining trait.  
 
At last, there is the object of the ARS, the Artemisian scorpion. According to the 
propositional act, as established in section 5.2.0, the Artemisian scorpion is an intuitively 
appropriate object because of its power to deal with the threats listed in lines 4-5. This power 
may been seen to either 1) be a natural quality of the Artemisian scorpion as a CPS-agent, or 
to 2) be transferred to it from „the highest god‟ in line 6. The uncertainty here originates with 
the ambiguity of the δηὰ ηὸ ὄλνκα...-phrase starting at the end of line 5, which I pointed out in 
section 2.1.8. 1) If it refers to δέλλσ, then „the name of the highest god‟ is simply another 
powerful agent conditioning the action complex, as it is seen in brackets in figure D. 2) Yet, if 
it refers to δηαθχιαμνλ it instead conditions the object of the ritual, the Artemisian scorpion. 
Hence, the Artemisian scorpion may have been considered a sufficiently powerful CPS-agent 
in its own right to follow up on the ritual, or it may have been a minor CPS-agent whose 
power is conditioned here by „the highest god,‟ a possibility I have indicated on the right hand 
side of figure D in stippled lines. I established in section 2.1.5 that very little is known about 
this Artemisian scorpion, and also the „highest god,‟ the former being obscure and the latter 
generic. It is therefore difficult to know which of the two possibilities are correct. 
 
While gaining a further appreciation for how the ritual utterance functions, there is not an 
abundant amount of new information here on the worldview and ontological assumptions of 
the user(s). The dominating feature seems to be the use and transfer of power. Various ritual 
tools are employed to attract or assume power, which in turn is used to dominate others. This 
theme extends to the elaborate hierarchy presented in this ARS, with the Artemisian scorpion 
being controlled, potentially also empowered, by other, more powerful CPS-agents. I 
mentioned in section 5.1.2.a how cognitively successful supernatural beings often have 
human-like traits, and this divine hierarchy will have mirrored the user(s)‟ experience of 
human social hierarchies. Furthermore, within this human-like hierarchy, the Artemisian 
scorpion, with a name that hints at savagery and beasts, may well be considered something of 
an MCI, even if Artemis is frequently associated with animals in ancient sources (Eitrem and 
Fridrichsen 1921, 12). Finally, the very existence of this papyrus shows that the divine 
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hierarchy also includes, or is at least accessible to, humans, as they may call upon and 
manipulate these powers through ritual. Hence, as both powerful and accessible, the CPS-
agents have great inferential potential for the user(s).  
 
Such hierarchy and supernatural plurality, according to Lawson and McCauley, indicates a 
fluid ritual system: “Rituals which involve relatively unimportant gods or mere substitutes for 
gods (of higher status) are far more likely to undergo variation and more likely to be co-opted 
by the culture at large” (1990, 135). This squares well enough with what is known of the pan-
Mediterranean ritual tradition in Late Antiquity, but may Lawson and McCauley‟s principles 
of superhuman agency and of superhuman immediacy say anything more about P.Oslo. I V? 
In this ARS, the CPS-agents are passive, even though they are implicated both in the action 
complex and the object. Following the principle of superhuman agency, then, the ritual should 
not have been very central to the religious tradition. When it comes to the principle of 
superhuman immediacy, the analysis relies on the property and nature of the Artemisian 
scorpion, which I was unable to establish earlier. 1) If the Artemisian scorpion is an 
independently powerful CPS-agent, the ARS must be considered rather central to the religious 
tradition since the CPS-agent is implicated immediately as the ritual object. If this is correct, 
then it contradicts the above observation following the principle of superhuman agency, 
which holds that the ARS is not central. 2) However, if the Artemisian scorpion is 
conditioned by „the highest god,‟ the principle of superhuman immediacy agrees that this 
ARS is not central to the religious tradition. This ambiguous analysis, combined with the fact 
that CPS-agents here are implicated in more than one place in the ARS, both as object and in 
the action complex, perhaps shows that Lawson and McCauley‟s criterion of a CPS-agent as 
the ultimate explanatory cause for a ritual ARS (1990, 124) requires some revision. 
5.2.2  ‘I Ask/Order/Appeal to you, Lord’ 
Then, there is the second performative ARS, which is not uttered explicitly, but which is 
implied in the imperative θχιαμνλ. Before starting the analysis, however, there is the question 
of where the first performative ARS ends and this one begins. The uncertain reading of lines 6 
and 7 makes it impossible to establish a dividing line between the two. Section 2.1.8 
explained the ambivalence regarding the position of δηὰ ηὸ ὄλνκα in lines 5-6, how it may 
refer back to the first ARS or instead open the second one. The latter case would include all 
the voces magicae of lines 6-7 as action conditioning to this ARS, which would give it a form 
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similar to the first ARS, opening with an appeal to divine powers. This is also the case if δηὰ 
ηὸ ὄλνκα... refers back to the first ARS, as the phrase then finishes the first ARS, while the 
voces magicae in lines 6-7 open the second ARS. If the second ARS opens by such a string of 
voces magicae and divine names, this also parallels the first ARS opening with Ὡξ Ὡξ θσξ 
θσξ, Ἰαψ, Σαβαψζ...’ Of course, seeing such a parallel form to the two ARSs is appealing, 
and quite possible, but it must be remembered that it is a current interpretation and academic 
study is prone to find system and order where there may not be any. Hence, I will present the 
voces magicae in lines 6-7 and/or δηὰ ηὸ ὄλνκα in brackets in the model, and not consider 
their position there certain.  
 
Beginning the analysis, then, the ritual agent is the same for this ARS as for the previous one; 
the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V. Again, they are qualified as ritual agents by possession of or 
association with the papyrus. Also concerning the ARS object, this ARS mirrors the previous 
one in that the object is a CPS-agent. The ritual‟s object is θχξηε, but the description following 
in lines 7-9 identifies him as Christ.  
Figure E: The Second ARS of P.Oslo. I V, lines 7-10 
 
If I then apply the cognitive criteria for a successful CPS-agent from section 5.1.2.a, it is 
quickly clear that Christ qualifies on all counts. By his very incarnation, Christ conforms to 
any intuitive notions that agents should be human-like. Moreover, the christological details in 
54 
 
lines 8-9 on his heritage make him an MCI par excellence, being both man and god, born but 
not conceived in the flesh. Finally, Christ‟s inferential potential is also, like the Artemisian 
scorpion, demonstrated by his accessibility through this ritual text and his apotropaic power. 
Hence, so far this ARS parallels the previous one, with the user(s) as ritual agent and Christ as 
the CPS-agent ritual object. The only distinction is that there is no hint of a potential enabling 
hierarchy of CPS-agents, like there is with the Artemisian scorpion and the „highest god‟ in 
the first ARS. Here there is only Christ. 
 
However, there is a further difference in that Christ is given an explicit object property, in 
addition to the implied object property of having power to protect which he shares with the 
Artemisian scorpion. The descriptions of his heritage, πἱὲ ηνῦ Γαπῒδ (...) ἐμ ἁγίνπ πλεχκαηνο, 
are of course what identify him as Christ, but they can also have been appreciated as object 
properties that qualify him as an intuitively acceptable object to the ARS. Now, these 
properties are almost precisely the phrases discussed previously in section 2.2.5 as doctrinal 
indications related to christology. While I concluded there that these descriptions are too 
general to place within a certain school of thought or doctrinal position, they are still precise 
enough to suggest a more than superficial influence from the church. Hence, it seems Christ is 
not included in this ARS merely as a powerful CPS-agent, which many scholars argue is the 
case when Christian or Jewish deities appear in ritual texts in Late Antiquity (Betz 1991, 
254). Rather, Christ‟s participation here appears to be judged appropriate according to these 
teachings from official church doctrine, which shows that these were part of the user(s) ACS.  
 
In fact, these doctrinal indications could also be interpreted as a demonstration of the user(s) 
orthodoxy. However, placing the rules and assessments of doctrine in Lawson and 
McCauley‟s model is difficult. According to their theory, doctrine should constrain the ARS 
as a part of the ACS (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 89). But what the phrases here are meant 
as an explicit demonstration of true faith on the part of the user(s)? This ambiguity concerning 
the display of doctrine is problematic. Granted, Lawson and McCauley underline that they are 
not analysing ritual according to theological criteria (1990, 77), and Vial argues that in a 
competence-approach, as this is, “ritual is judged primarily in terms of orthopraxy, not 
orthodoxy” (2004a, 11). Nevertheless, in the factious fourth or fifth century Christian Egypt, 
it is likely that the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V will have had some appreciation of doctrine as a 
concept and the conflicts related to it. The display of orthodoxy in P.Oslo. I V, then, could 
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just as well be an agent quality, not an object quality. Hence, I here face a problem similar to 
the question of the enabling act in the first ARS, having a quality but no clear idea of where it 
should go in the ARS. It could work in either position, or it could have served both purposes. 
While Lawson and McCauley‟s premise of CPS-agency being the ultimate explanatory cause 
for ritual efficacy is helpful in outlining a basic ritual structure, it appears its ability to 
appreciate and place displays of correct faith and doctrine is more limited. 
 
A final difference with the first ARS concerns the action complex. As I discussed in section 
5.2.0, its existence, and also its form, is implied from θχιαμνλ. Yet, an imperative may 
represent everything from requests to strict commands. In the section heading here, and also 
in figure E, I use „ask/order/appeal to,‟ but it may just as well have included „beg,‟ „implore,‟ 
„pray‟ or „request.‟ The only hints about how this imperative should be understood come from 
contrasting it to the imperative in the first ARS. There, the sense of command is underlined by 
having δέλλσ as the operative word and by θχιαμνλ being strengthened by δηα-. Here, with no 
strict operative word nor a typical ritual prefix, the imperative appears less commanding. 
Having a less coercive language, and expressing distinctly Christian doctrines, should this 
ARS then be considered a prayer? Kimberly Bowes notes that authorities like Tertullian, 
Hippolutys and Origen promoted prayer as the basic form of private ritual (2005, 193), and its 
permeation of Christian society makes it a likely influential practice for other rituals. 
Moreover, private prayer is thought to have been inspired by and developed from liturgical 
practices (Stewart 2008, 744), and I have already described P.Oslo. I V‟s strong parallels to 
liturgy in section 2.2.4. More specifically, the ARS, and the entire ritual text, ends with Γφμα 
ζνη, νὐξάληε βαζηιεῦ, and doxologies, which are common in the New Testament letters and in 
liturgy, were also “a standard feature of individual prayer” (Stewart 2008, 755). Agnes 
Cunningham further notes how a theology of praying in memory of Christ developed (1985, 
31), a mnemonic attitude that may be reflected in πἱὲ ηνῦ Γαπῒδ (...) ἐμ ἁγίνπ πλεχκαηνο, and 
Wessely‟s compilation of early Christian liturgical and prayer papyri (1974, 424-450) also 
suggests that the narrative of Christ‟s life permeated this genre. In addition, his collection also 
shows how prayers often included symbols (Wessely 1974, 439-441) like those found at the 
end of P.Oslo. I V. 
 
Here, Lawson and McCauley substantive distinction between prayer and ritual, which I 
mentioned in section 4.2.1, makes itself felt. Lawson and McCauley consider prayer different 
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from ritual and therefore not a suitable subject for their theory. Yet, prayer can mean many 
things, also in the early Christian tradition (Severus 1972, 1254). While the likes of John 
Chrysostom, Cassiodorus and John Damascene define prayer as „petition‟ (Cunningham 1985, 
17), “[b]oth Jesus and Paul taught that prayer is efficacious” (Stewart 2008, 749). To 
distinguish between prayer and ritual, McCauley and Lawson argue that prayer is different 
because it does not directly “bring about some change in the religious world” (2002, 13). 
Returning, then to the comparison of the action complexes in P.Oslo. I V, this criterion in fact 
does point to a difference between the two ARSs. While the illocutionary force of „bind‟ acts 
directly upon the Artemisian scorpion, the implicit illocutionary act in the second ARS is not 
direct. The second ARS certainly works for the same results, as described in the propositional 
acts, as the first, but it does not achieve a direct result in the religious world, like „bind‟ does. 
In fact, this demonstrates one of Austin and Searle‟s further classification of performative 
utterances, creating one group of „perlocutionary acts,‟ which are illocutionary acts that bring 
about “effects on the audience by means of uttering the sentence” (Holdcroft 1994, 350). In 
my discussion, then, this distinction would mean that ritual acts are perlocutionary while 
prayers are illocutionary. And in this case, „bind‟ clearly has perlocutionary force while 
„ask/order/appeal to‟ does not. 
 
However, I would say that the ARS model in figure E shows that the utterances of P.Oslo. I V 
cannot be so easily categorised. It shows how Christ is implicated as a CPS-agent not just as 
the object, but also through the Christian symbols on the papyrus that serve as action 
conditioning. The symbols refer to Christ, and thus call on his power to enable the action 
complex, much like the voces magicae and divine names functioned in the first ARS. Firstly, 
this enabling action creates an ARS structure that essentially parallels that in the first ARS, 
with the CPS-agent implicated both as object and through enabling action conditioning. 
Secondly, the enabling action shows CPS-agency being used to facilitate the appeal or prayer, 
to help catch the attention if you will, of the ARS object in the religious world, indicating 
some sort of direct impact on the religious world. Hence, the action complex appears to have 
features that Lawson and McCauley ascribe to both prayer and ritual. While the illocutionary 
act itself does not have perlocutionary force, its ARS-structure and the enabling actions 
suggest a stronger, more direct link to „the religious world.‟ Finally, the appearance of both 
utterances on the same papyrus, and in a continuous text, shows an undeniable association 
between the two, further suggesting that a categorical distinction between the two utterances 
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is problematic. I already remarked on my misgivings towards introducing a substantive 
definition separating ritual and prayer in section 4.2.1, and for the reasons given here I will 
continue to consider the two performative utterances of a similar genre. Still, the difference 
that one action complex is perlocutionary and the other illocutionary is an important 
observation, and I will take this with me in the further analysis of the ritual text. 
5.3 Summarising Observations and Remarks  
In this chapter I set out to detect any intuitive principles for the cognitive representation of the 
composite and highly varied ritual text of P.Oslo. I V. At first glace, the intuitive structures of 
the two ARSs appear to be almost parallel. Divine powers are called upon, the action complex 
enabled through to appeal to (other) divine powers in the form of voces magicae, divine 
names or ritual symbols, to protect the user(s) of the papyrus. However, upon closer 
inspection it was found that not only does the second ARS, the „Christian one,‟ have 
additional object properties with a distinct doctrinal flavour, also the action complex of this 
ARS is different from the first. While „bind‟ has perlocutionary force, the appeal in the second 
ARS does not bring about a direct change in the religious world and can therefore be 
classified as a prayer. Still, the presence of enabling acts complicates this conclusion, as it 
gives this ARS a similar ritual structure to the first ARS. According to Lawson and 
McCauley‟s principle of superhuman agency, this structure, where the CPS-agency is 
involved with the ritual object and the action complex, indicates that the ritual will not have 
been a central feature of religious tradition. Yet, their principle of superhuman immediacy, as 
both the Artemisian scorpion and Christ are included directly as ritual objects in P.Oslo. I V, 
suggests that the ritual will have been more central to the religious tradition. Concerning this 
point, the potential enabling action to invest the Artemisian scorpion with CPS-agency is 
important, as it would be another distinction between the two ARSs. If the Artemisian 
scorpion is indeed empowered by the „highest god,‟ this suggests, by the principle of 
superhuman immediacy, that the second ARS is more central to its religious tradition than the 
ritual act represented in the first ARS. 
 
In short, P.Oslo. I V still presents a rather confusing combination of different principles and 
ritual actions. In certain respects, the second ARS should not even be considered as a ritual, 
yet in other respects the two ARSs appear remarkably similar. To me, then, P.Oslo. I V 
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appears to be a case where Christ and Christian material has been taken into an established 
ritual practice, known from the other ritual texts in Appendix 2. Yet, importantly, the second 
ARS still follows Christian ontological assumptions. For instance, it has an illocutionary, or 
prayer-like, action complex and in that there is no plurality of deities, which compares well 
with a Christian ACS. Hence, the Christian material, if fitted into a „generic‟ ritual tradition in 
Late Antiquity, is not doctrinally altered and its impact is more significant than simply the 
incorporation of another deity. As such, the situation does not appear altogether too different 
from Fridrichsen‟s assessment of the ritual text eighty years ago, “dass man die heidnischen 
Zauberworte mit einem den christlichen Kreisen entlehnten Element bereichert hätte” (Eitrem 
and Fridrichsen 1921, 23).  
 
Yet, as I have pointed out throughout the analysis, there are certain aspects of the intuitive 
representation of P.Oslo. I V that Lawson and McCauley‟s theory does not seem to capture 
and are therefore left unaddressed. First, both ARSs have CPS-agency implicated both as 
object and in the action complex, providing conflicting results when I try to apply Lawson 
and McCauley‟s principles of superhuman agency and immediacy. Second, the potential use 
and appreciation of doctrine in ritual practice is difficult to address explicitly through the 
ARS-model. Related to this is the question of locating qualifying elements in the model. For 
ARS 1 I observed how the enabling act may qualify either the action complex or the agent, or 
possibly both, while πἱὲ ηνῦ Γαπῒδ (...) ἐμ ἁγίνπ πλεχκαηνο in ARS 2 may be either an object 
quality or, as a signal of orthodoxy, an agent quality. Or, again, both. Such flexibility was 
difficult to include in Lawson and McCauley‟s model. The most important remaining 
question, however, is how P.Oslo. I V can combine both a generic, pan-Mediterranean ritual 
structure with content that is distinctly Christian? How are these two supposedly different 
worldviews made to work together? I hope to shed some light on these questions in the next 
chapter, by applying blending theory to P.Oslo. I V. 
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6 Conceptual Blending in P.Oslo. I V 
As I mentioned, blending theory was initially developed by Fauconnier and Turner and has 
already been employed in various cognitive studies of religion, also to a certain extent in a 
historical perspective. In this chapter, I will first present the basic framework of their theory, 
and then introduce Sørensen‟s application of blending theory to the study of ritual. In turn, his 
conclusions and typologies will be used to analyse P.Oslo. I V, with a view to understand how 
the different elements in the ritual text combine in the human cognition and how all this 
relates to the relevant ACS, or what Sørensen calls „cultural conceptual systems.‟ From 
observing these relations, I hope to address the questions raised on the previous page, and to 
also make other inferences regarding the worldview and ontological assumptions of the 
user(s) of P.Oslo. I V. Finally, blending theory also allows me to, in the end, include both of 
P.Oslo. I V‟s performative utterances in one model, reflecting and assessing the key fact that 
they occur together on one papyrus and in a continuous text. 
6.1 Blending Theory 
In section 4.2.2, I explained a little about the background of Fauconnier and Turner‟s 
blending theory. Its fundamental purpose is to explore how different mental spaces are joined 
to create a new „blended space,‟ through what they call a „conceptual integration network.‟ 
This, Fauconnier and Turner maintain, is a “basic mental operation, highly imaginative but 
crucial even to the simplest kinds of thought” (2002, 18). A basic network consists of two 
input spaces that, through matching and/or counterpart connections, combine to form a new, 
blended space (Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 182). The connections also result in a „generic 
space,‟ which holds the common traits of the two input spaces. All four spaces working 
together, a blend affects the entire network and influences go back and forth between the 
spaces that make up the blend (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 47). Somewhat abstract in 
theory, a conceptual integration network is perhaps best explained through an example.  
 
For studies of religion, the most commonly example for conceptual blending is the Catholic 
Eucharist (please see figure F). Here, the two mental spaces, the two „input spaces,‟ are 1) 
bread and wine and 2) the body and blood of Christ. In the generic space, their common 
properties are established being a) solid and b) fluid and red. The concepts from the input 
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spaces are then projected into the blended space, thereby making the bread and wine the body 
and blood of Christ (Lundhaug 2010, 32). 
Figure F: The Eucharistic Elements as a Blend 
 
(Lundhaug 2010, 418) 
Separately, the content of the two input spaces have nothing to do with each other, but in this 
conceptual integration network they are blended to form the Host. This example is a simple, 
four-space blend, but there may very well be more than two input spaces in a conceptual 
integration network, and there may also be intermediate blends that function as inputs into 
new blends or conceptual integration networks (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 279).  
 
Now, Fauconnier and Turner call the connections between the spaces „vital relations,‟ and list 
fifteen main types: change, identity, time, space, cause-effect, part-whole, representation, role, 
analogy, disanalogy, property, similarity, category, intentionality and uniqueness (2002, 101). 
For instance, the wine and the blood in the Eucharist are linked through similarity, analogy 
and property, being fluid and red. These relations, then, are the foundation for linking the two, 
or more, mental spaces together. As the list shows, some of these vital relations can still be 
quite abstract, or, as the example illustrates, there may be several possible relations at play. In 
addition to being guided by different types of relations, the blending process is constrained by 
certain „optimality principles,‟ conditions under which the blend works most efficiently. 
Fauconnier and Turner argue that these generally push to 1) compress what is diffuse, 2) 
obtain global insight, 3) strengthen vital relations and 4) go from many to one (2002, 312).  
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Thus, optimality principles work towards producing a blend that is easy for human cognition 
to fathom and process. Fauconnier and Turner observe that they commonly result in 
compressing the blend to human scale (2002, 312). As an example, when the Christian God is 
conceptualised as Father or King, he is brought down to a human scale (Lundhaug 2010, 36). 
This 1) compresses what is diffuse and 2) increases insight, as a human figure is easier to 
comprehend and deal with than the abstract nature of an almighty God. However, there is also 
a principle in conceptual integration that opposes compression; the „topology principle.‟ 
„Topology‟ is the existing conceptual frame(s) from the input spaces, and important 
topological features will work to resist change brought on by compression (Fauconnier and 
Turner 2002, 328). The Christian God might be brought down to human scale as Father or 
King, but rarely as chair or fork. The latter options are difficult, since God is very strongly 
identified as an acting and leading agent, which compares well enough with cultural ideas 
concerning kings and fathers, but not so much chairs or forks. Certainly exceptions exist, but 
generally such violations of initial role/identity or category are not acceptable to the topology 
of the concept God. Together, then, the principles of compression and topology create the 
dynamic that guides how a blend‟s conceptual integration. This dynamic between 
compression and topology, and their effect on the vital relations, is part of what I will try to 
find in P.Oslo. I V. 
 
There are different types of conceptual integration networks. In some networks, the input 
spaces share the same conceptual frames, while in others the elements from the one input 
space will be accommodated into the conceptual frame of the other input space (Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002, 120-129). However, conceptual integration may also produce “a relation in 
the blend where there was none in either the inputs or the connections between them” 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 319). In fact, an important feature of blending theory is 
precisely this capacity to map such „emergent structures,‟ a “structure that is not copied from 
the inputs” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 49). For instance, from the blend for the eucharistic 
elements emerges a structure that relates flesh to bread and blood to wine. This relation is not 
part of either input space, but becomes so in the blended space and thence rise as an emergent 
structure. Fauconnier and Turner call these networks „complex blends‟ and maintain that such 
„clashes‟ between input frames can be “highly creative” (2002, 131). The eucharistic blend, 
for example, enables believers to consume the body and blood of Christ, and thus creates a 
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concept that can be further elaborated on. For instance, it may be expanded as an affirmation 
of being part of the Church, or as a unification with Christ, or as absorbing the Holy Spirit. 
“[T]he blend may be elaborated upon in ways that are in principle limitless” (Lundhaug 2010, 
33), which means that such blends have a fair degree of potential for influencing cultural and 
religious development.  
 
Fauconnier and Turner maintain that their theory presents an apparatus for „unpacking‟ 
blends, revealing their inputs and inner workings, much in the same way as Lawson and 
McCauley‟s model helped reveal P.Oslo. I V‟s structure in chapter 5: “Unpacking is often 
facilitated by disintegrations and incongruities in the blended space. (…) at first we recognize 
a space with incongruities and that those incongruities prompt us to take the space as a blend 
and look for its inputs” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 332-333). With P.Oslo. I V, the obvious 
incongruity is the combination of Christian and non-Christian ritual practices in one papyrus. 
However, also the differences and similarities of the two performative utterances that I found 
in chapter 5, making them simultaneously not quite the same but also not quite different, is 
also something of an incongruity, leading me to think that blending must be going on in 
P.Oslo. I V. Czachesz is sceptical towards such applications of blending theory in historical 
studies, saying “the creativity of the interpreter (rather than formal rules) plays an important 
role in establishing the „mental spaces‟ involved in the blend” (2010, 3). Answering this genre 
of criticism, Lundhaug argues that this is a condition that all historical studies suffer, as the 
historical context that could have indicated the forms and rules for the relevant mental spaces 
is generally lost (2010, 55). “Even the most positivistic historians recognize (…) that they will 
never attain certainty about the past” (Martin 2004, 12). In fact, Lundhaug continues, it is 
precisely this situation that makes blending theory a desirable tool for historical study, since it 
compensates for the contextual void by a strong and clear analytical framework (2010, 64).  
6.2 Blending Theory and Ritual 
Commenting on Sweetser‟s application of blending theory to ritual, Fauconnier and Turner 
congratulate themselves that it “suggests that this fundamental and elaborate human activity 
[ritual], unparalleled in the animal world, makes use of the operation of conceptual blending 
as its basic instrument of imaginative invention” (2000, 295). Here, then, I will proceed relate 
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blending theory to the study of ritual, through Sørensen‟s comprehensive study of „magic.‟ 
This will form the methodological foundation for my analysis of P.Oslo. I V in section 6.3.  
 
Like Sweetser, referenced in section 4.2.2, Sørensen‟s basic purpose in using blending theory 
is to explain how rituals are intuitively appreciated as efficacious. How are, to use P.Oslo. I V 
as an example, the words and phrases on this papyrus believed to have any consequence for 
the life and well-being of „this house with all its occupants‟ (l. 3-4)? Similar to how Sweetser 
uses the idea of performativity from speech-act theory, Sørensen explains how such words 
and phrases can have an impact on „the house with all its occupants‟ by modelling ritual as a 
blend. “At a general level, religious and magical rituals involve a blended space consisting of 
elements projected from input spaces themselves created by elements from two general 
domains – „sacred‟ and „profane‟ – and structured by a ritual frame” (Sørensen 2007, 63). 
Figure G: Ritual as a Blend 
 
(Sørensen 2007, 75) 
 
Sørensen proceeds to offer a more specific definition of „sacred‟ and „profane,‟ essentially 
distinguishing between what is intuitively assessed according to supernatural/religious criteria 
and what is appreciated according to normal/natural criteria, the definition of these criteria 
being both cultural and intuitive (2007, 63-64). In Lawson and McCauley‟s terminology, 
these are different ACSs. Moving on, a ritual takes place when the actions from the one 
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domain, the profane, are allowed to influence the other, the sacred domain (Sørensen 2007, 
64). Joining of these two distinctly different domains produces a complex blend, which 
creates a highly creative emergent structure “that is not copied from the inputs” (Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002, 49), namely the ability of the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V to affect CPS-agents 
like the Artemisian scorpion and Christ. So, Sørensen‟s basic explanation of ritual efficacy is 
modelling it as a complex blend, where the emergent structure in the blended space allows the 
elements in the profane space to affect those in the sacred space. 
 
In the generic space, Sørensen places three main types of ritual agency; agent-based agency, 
action-based agency and object-based agency, which he deduces from various anthropological 
studies (2007, 73). As figure G shows, he also includes other types of ritual agency, but these 
three are the major forms of ritual agency (Sørensen 2007, 65). Not derivation of Lawson and 
McCauley‟s tripartite ARS-structure, as the names might lead one to believe, the categories 
are generic types of how supernatural agency is implicated into a ritual. For instance, the 
Artemisian scorpion in P.Oslo. I V, as it is a CPS-agent, brings agent-based agency into the 
ritual, even if it is the object of the ARS.  
 
Now, concerning the relations between the input spaces, Sørensen does not rely on 
Fauconnier and Turner‟s fifteen vital relations. Instead, he again turns to anthropology, more 
specifically to Frazer‟s two types of „magical‟ action; „Contagion,‟ where supernatural agency 
is transferred through contact, and „similarity,‟ where supernatural agency is transferred by, 
well, similarity (Sørensen 2007, 95). These categories, Sørensen continues, have not only 
been Frazer‟s most enduring and useful legacy to anthropology (2007, 95), they have also 
more recently been confirmed by psychological experiments, for instance by Rozin and 
Nemeroff (2007, 95-96). Sørensen introduces the categories into blending theory using 
Charles Sanders Peirce‟s theory of semiotics. Peirce states that a phenomenon, in the form of 
its „sign,‟ is appreciated by the interplay between three properties of the sign; icon, likeness or 
appearance, index, factual connection and symbol, its formal/cultural meaning. Sørensen 
equates the first two to similarity and contagion, respectively, and uses this analogy to explore 
the cognitive processing of ritual (2007, 44). An indexical relation describes what Frazer 
would call contagion, as the relation is founded on some form of contact, while an iconic 
relation is based on similarity.  
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I will pause briefly here to make a theoretical observation. Sørensen makes no attempt to 
relate his Peircian types of connection to Fauconnier and Turner‟s vital relations, but I believe 
there is a possible correlation between the two approaches. An iconic relation includes types 
like analogy, similarity and property, while an indexical relation describes types like identity, 
part-whole, representation and role. From the many examples given by Sørensen it does seem 
that iconic and indexical principles are good ways of; 1) compressing what is diffuse, 2) 
obtaining global insight, 3) strengthening vital relations and 4) going from many to one 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 312). Elsewhere, Fauconnier and Turner argue that many 
blends and compressed relations eventually form part of the „cultural system‟ (2002, 321). 
Concerning ritual, then, could similarity and contagion be culturally cemented compressed 
vital relations, made relevant in a ritual setting? As I mentioned, Sørensen does not suggest 
this, but it would align his and Fauconnier and Turner‟s works on blend connections. 
 
Returning to the main argument, I will present Sørensen‟s interpretation of the Catholic 
Eucharist as an illustration of what I have explained, and also to show how his observations 
expand on the Eucharist-blend in figure F.  
Figure H: The Catholic Eucharist as a Ritual Blend 
 
(Sørensen 2007, 86) 
Agent-based agency is implicated into the blend from „Christ/apostle,‟ who is indexically 
linked to the person performing the ritual by the latter‟s ordination and role, thus forming the 
ritual agent „priest.‟ Also, there is action-based agency here, as the „mythic actions,‟ here the 
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last supper, are iconically linked to the eucharistic actions, thereby forming ritually 
efficacious actions in the ritual space. The generic space, then, mirrors the two input spaces 
by the concepts „agent‟ and „action,‟ two of the three typical generic forms of ascribing ritual 
agency to the blend. All together, the blend produces an „emergent structure‟ where the priest 
acquires superhuman agency and may distribute the body and blood of Christ, thereby acting 
back on the sacred domain. In fact, such an analysis may be precisely the refinement of 
Lawson and McCauley‟s model that was called for in section 5.3, having room for multiple 
types of ritual agency in and ritual and thus allowing a more nuanced appreciation of the 
interaction between the ritual performance and CPS-agency in the „sacred space.‟ 
 
Sørensen proceeds to argue that it is the indexical and/or iconic, and not the symbolic, 
properties that determine what is projected into the blended space and thus guides ritual 
development (2007, 68). For instance, “[s]pells and magical formulas are a certain type of 
speech-act almost devoid of direct reference and communicative effect, equivalent to ritual 
action with its lack of direct instrumental effect” (Sørensen 2007, 87). Of course, the ritual 
emphasis on index and icon does not mean that the individual elements in a ritual do not have 
a strong symbolic meaning in the general culture. In fact, this may be precisely why they are 
included in the ritual. Yet, as part of a ritual, the symbolic meaning of the elements subsides 
and they instead function according their indexical and iconic properties (Sørensen 2007, 
146). As it turns out, that representations of efficacious rituals highlight the iconic and 
indexical properties of the elements used, and decrease their symbolic meaning, is Sørensen‟s 
main conclusion (2007, 178). However, he adds, working against this tendency is the 
human/cultural need to organise and interpret phenomena symbolically, resulting in a 
dynamic process where one tendency emphasises indexical/iconic properties and the other 
symbolic properties (Sørensen 2007, 180). Sørensen sees this dynamic as the driving force in 
religious innovation. First, the emphasis on iconic and indexical features in ritual opens for 
new contexts and/or alignments, while in turn these new ritual alignments, which then have 
become incongruous to their former symbolic interpretation, provoke a new symbolic 
interpretation (2007, 180). For example, the similarity between wine and bread and blood and 
body presents a strong enough iconic relation to establish the Host as the body and blood of 
Christ in the Catholic Eucharist, but after the Reformation this coupling was no longer 
acceptable to Protestants as their doctrine emphasise symbolic properties in ritual.  
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Not everyone agrees with Sørensen‟s emphasis on indexical and iconic properties. Czachesz 
argues that frequently performed rituals will be subject to a „tedium effect‟ unless they are 
supported by “thematically arousing details” (2011, 9-10), which means a strong symbolic 
interpretation. Also Whitehouse holds that the symbolic interpretation of ritual is a key 
element in its transmission (2004a, 56). But this need for „thematically arousing details‟ is 
perhaps precisely what Sørensen means when he writes about the human need for also a 
symbolic interpretation. The difference then would be that while Czachesz understand this 
need as a conservative force emphasising symbolic properties, Sørensen sees this as part of an 
innovative dynamic. Another comment on Sørensen‟s work is that he bases his observations 
on a fairly limited empirical background, mainly using Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard‟s 
studies of the Trobriand Islanders and the Azande, respectively, and certain rites in the 
Catholic mass (Yelle 2008, 528 and Bever 2008, 271). As the presentation above shows, 
Sørensen‟s entire theory of „magic‟ is built on a somewhat unprecedented combination of 
theoretical frameworks, taken from as disparate fields as cognitive science, anthropology and 
semiotics. Drawing upon such different fields and approaches may very easily meet with 
scepticism, perhaps justifiably so. However, here, as I noted earlier, my assessment of his 
theory will be through application, and Sørensen‟s approach indeed produces some insights.  
6.3 Blending in P.Oslo. I V 
My discussion in section 5.2.0 already established that P.Oslo. I V contains two performative 
acts, and the analysis here will consequently, as the analysis in chapter 5, first look at both 
acts separately. Modelling them as blends, I will explore their network and continue by 
examining how the ritual space is formed as an emergent structure and elaborated on as such. 
Finally, in section 6.4 I will model and discuss how the two performative acts figure together, 
as they appear on the same papyrus and in a continuous text. 
6.3.1 ‘δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε’ as a Blend 
Beginning with the profane input space, the ritual action is the utterance δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε 
Ἀξηεκίζηε. I indicate it as an utterance in figure I by placing the words in inverted commas 
(please see figure I). As established already in chapter 5, the ritual agent is the user(s) or „I.‟ 
The model here shows that the user(s) is projected into the ritual/blended space only from the 
profane space, with no related event or being in the sacred space. Again, this was also 
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observed in the previous chapter, which showed that the CPS-agents in this ARS, and hence 
its ritual agency, are implicated in the action complex and the object. As no ritual agency is 
linked to the user(s), they are not connected to a counterpart in the sacred space. 
 
However, the action complex is connected to a counterpart. I have discussed how this 
utterance is perlocutionary, meaning that the action complex has a direct effect on its object. 
As this object is the Artemisian scorpion, a CPS-agent and thus in the sacred space, the action 
complex in the profane space must have a counterpart in the sacred space. I feel further 
justified in placing „being controlled‟ as a counterpart in the sacred space by the observation 
in section 2.1.5 that δέλλσ is a common ritual term for taking control over supernatural beings 
in Late Antiquity, and also by the analysis in section 5.2.1 indicating a divine hierarchy and 
that the Artemisian scorpion‟s position in this hierarchy is not leading. 
Figure I: δέννω ζε, Σκορπίε Ἀρηεμίζιε as a Blend. 
 
The utterance „bind‟ in the profane space is then iconically linked to „being controlled‟ in the 
sacred space. The type of ritual agency thus implicated is action-based agency, as reflected in 
the generic space, based on the conceptual similarity between controlling and binding. This 
model illustrates how the utterance is illocutionary, being an action, but also perlocutionary, 
since the action complex has a counterpart in and directly affects the sacred space. 
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Proceeding to the ritual‟s object, then, the Artemisian scorpion is a CPS-agent that originates 
from the sacred domain. It is implicated in the blend through the utterance of its name in the 
profane space. Remembering Peirce‟s definition that indexes are „factual connections,‟ a 
name is a typical indexical relation. The ritual importance of names in Late Antiquity has 
already been noted both in sections 2.2.2 and 5.2.1, and its use here connects the Artemisian 
scorpion with the profane space. Here, the relevant type of ritual agency mirrored in the 
generic space is agent-based agency. I have already elaborated some on the concept and 
importance of agency and CPS-agents in chapter 5. As an agent, the Artemisian scorpion is 
intuitively appreciated as acting and intentional. Furthermore, as section 5.2.1 showed, it is 
qualified as an appropriate object by the propositional act, being thought capable of protecting 
the house and its occupants. I first thought to place the utterance of the propositional act as 
part of the profane space, and have it projected into the ritual/blended space from there, but 
soon realised that, not being performative, it has no place in the blend. After all, it describes a 
future event, a proposition, and is therefore not a part of this ritual frame. Instead, it should be 
considered an indication of the Artemisian scorpion‟s agent properties. 
 
All this is then projected into the ritual or blended space, which produces the emergent 
structure wherein the user(s), as ritual agent, can exert power over the Artemisian scorpion. I 
noted already in chapter 5 that this ARS indicates a worldview in which people may, through 
ritual, engage with and even control CPS-agents. Here, the emergent structure in the blended 
space, establishing links and relations that are not originally present in the input spaces, 
demonstrates how this is possible. The conceptual integration network shows how P.Oslo. I V 
joins the user(s) and the Artemisian scorpion through the ritual text, making the utterance 
ritually efficacious. Then, by being used, a blend is „elaborated upon‟ (Lundhaug 2010, 33). 
As this blend is worked in human cognition, it confirms the validity of the user(s) as ritual 
agent, and by extension, or „elaboration,‟ humans‟ validity as ritual participants in general. 
The cultural presence and impact of this type of ritual blend is confirmed by the several 
parallel ritual texts in Appendix 2. 
 
The analysis so far has dealt with principles of ritual efficacy, which Sørensen has found from 
both cognitive theories and anthropology, and how these work together in P.Oslo. I V. Now I 
will turn to Fauconnier and Turner‟s „topology principle,‟ to examine what aspects of the 
profane and sacred domains that are too strong to be affected by the blending in this utterance. 
70 
 
Lawson and McCauley‟s theory has already established the basic topology of the profane 
space; the ARS. Their argument in section 5.1 detailed how an intuitively acceptable action, 
and by extension also a ritual action, representation needs an agent, an action complex and an 
object. Consequently, the profane space must include these three elements and they must be 
projected into the ritual/blended space, as shown in figure I. More interesting, however, for 
my study is the topology of the sacred space. This is, after all, what holds the user(s)‟ 
culturally postulated worldviews and ontological assumptions. Yet, here I cannot offer much 
more information. Chapter 5 already concluded that power and domination are important 
principles in the ontological assumptions of this ritual utterance. My analysis in figure I 
simply confirms these observations, showing that humans may acquire power over CPS-
agents in the sacred space, through both agent- and action-based agency.  
6.3.2  ‘I Ask/Order/Appeal to you Lord’ as a Blend 
Moving on, I proceed to the second performative act, which, as detailed in section 5.2.0, is 
implied by the imperative θχιαμνλ. This ritual utterance shares some traits with the first, but 
there are also differences between the two. Some of the differences are such that Lawson and 
McCauley would class it as a prayer, and not a ritual, but than I found other traits that are 
more ritual-like. Using blending theory, I hope to, in addition to the general analysis, be able 
to explore this question further. Now, Sørensen does not place a strict dividing line between 
different genres of religious activity, holding that all religious practice includes, to varying 
extents, some form of ritual agency (2007, 5). Still, he acknowledges various types of 
religious activity, by how ritual agency is implicated into the blend from the sacred space and 
this may help to further comprehend how this implicit performative act works. 
 
Starting, there is the profane space where the only recorded utterance is „Lord,‟ the ritual 
object. However, based on Lawson and McCauley‟s principle for action representation, I 
know that an intuitively acceptable action also needs an agent and an action complex. In 
section 5.2.2 I argued why I hold the agent to be the user(s) and the action complex to be 
„ask/order/appeal to,‟ so I will simply adopt this here. Suffice it to remind that while the 
imperative θχιαμνλ may imply a wide variety of illocutionary acts, a comparison with the 
first performative act suggested that this is a much milder imperative. All together, then, the 
implicit utterance in the profane space is „I ask/order/appeal to you Lord,‟ and this is what I 
will analyse (please see figure J).  
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Figure J: ‘I Ask/Order/Appeal to you Christ’ as a Blend 
 
 
Like in the first performative act, the ritual agent here is the user(s). As in the first 
performative act, he/she/they are projected from the profane space without a counterpart in 
the sacred space. However, differently from the first performative act, here also the action 
complex stands without a direct connection to the sacred space. Figure J thus demonstrates 
the difference between the perlocutionary force of „bind,‟ which by causing an immediate 
change in its audience (the Artemisian scorpion) establishes a direct connection with the 
sacred space, and the illocutionary force of ask/order/appeal. These, or any other of the 
potential operative words in the second utterance, are performative only as actions and not as 
actions that somehow changes the audience. Modelling the utterance as a blend, then, 
demonstrates the difference between the illocutionary and perlocutionary force, suggesting 
that the there indeed is a structural difference between a prayer and a ritual. 
 
Returning to this question later, I move on to the ritual object. The title „Lord‟ is uttered in the 
profane space, and then the description of his heritage and attributes in lines 8-9 quickly 
identifies as Christ. Christ is then the sacred space counterpart of „Lord,‟ and is of course a 
CPS-agent. This is an indexical relation, analogous to the connection between the name of the 
Artemisian scorpion and the CPS-agent itself in the first performative act. The generic space 
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here contains agent-based agency, as Christ is a CPS-agent and his implication into the blend 
provides it with agent-based agency. Again like the Artemisian scorpion, as an agent Christ 
holds intuitive properties like agency and intentionality, as well as the special property of 
being capable of effectuating the propositional act. For the same reasons as above, the 
propositional act here can also not be included in the ritual blend. 
 
All three elements are projected into the ritual/blended space to form an emergent structure. 
First of all, the ritual/blended space brings the user(s) and Christ together into one action 
structure, thereby becoming efficacious. This does not necessarily prove much about the 
nature of this performative act, as a prayer, also according to Christian tradition, is considered 
efficacious (Stewart 2008, 749). Irrespective of the act‟s nature, the emergent structure 
establishes the user(s), as ritual agent, with at least the ability to reach the sacred space. In 
fact, by the use and elaboration of this, the utterance here may very possibly be related to the 
wider Christian tradition for prayer and a belief in such efficacy can thus cement itself in the 
early Christian worldview in Late Antiquity. It is, after all, well known from a range of 
studies that Christ was considered a powerful apotropaic agent, and that he was popular as 
such (Hurtado 2003, 618, note 167).  
 
Here, I rather think the key lies in the action complex, having illocutionary, but 
perlocutionary, force. Being only illocutionary, this action complex shows a situation where 
Christ in the sacred space is not a CPS-agent to be controlled or gained authority over. This 
can be understood as the topology of the Christian sacred space, allowing no other deities. In 
fact, seeking out the topology principles of the sacred space here, these appear to have a lot in 
common with Christian teaching. First, Christ is not controlled or coerced by anyone. Second, 
Christ (of course extended to the Trinity) is the only active element in the sacred space; there 
is no other hierarchy or divine action indicated. In addition to this, the blend here also has one 
less connection between the profane and the sacred space. Again, this would compare well 
with a Christian idea of prayer as something less direct, less compulsory than a ritual, if still 
efficacious. This, then, appears to be a perfect example of what Fauconnier and Turner writes, 
namely that a blend develops in the dynamic between 1) the compressing tendencies of the 
emergent structure and 2) the topology principles, which here is 1) ritual efficacy and 2) 
Christian dogma on Christ and divinity.  
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6.4 Summarising Observations and Remarks 
I closed chapter 5 by pointing out three main questions that my analysis there had raised, but 
which I had been unable to address using Lawson and McCauley‟s theory. The first question 
concerned Lawson and McCauley‟s somewhat unilateral tracing of supernatural agency to an 
original CPS-agent, and, as I previewed in section 6.2, the analysis in section 6.3.1 shows 
how Sørensen use of blending theory, which implicates CPS-agency via one or more 
connections between the profane and sacred spaces in a ritual blend, facilitates multiple 
avenues of divine or ritual agency into a ritual. The second problem was assessing the 
intuitive role of signalling doctrine, which presented itself in the analysis of the second ARS. 
Here, it turns out, Sørensen‟s theory can be of little assistance. As in Lawson and McCauley‟s 
theory, questions of faith and doctrine are posited as constraining forces originating from the 
conceptual domains. They are then part of the vital topology of the input spaces, but any 
other, more explicit function doctrinal signalling may have had is difficult to incorporate into 
Sørensen‟s blending framework. 
 
Another aspect which Sørensen‟s theory of ritual blending does not include, but which 
Lawson and McCauley‟s theory is able to capture, is enabling acts and action conditioning. In 
both utterances, the action complex is enabled, or at the very least strengthened, by action 
conditioning. For the first performative act, this is the divine names and voces magicae in line 
2, while the second performative act is enabled by the string of symbols „α†σ  Α†Ω   ΙΦΘΥΣ‟ 
in line 10. Being unable to include these in the model, there is no possibility to assess the 
ritual according to the principles of superhuman agency and superhuman immediacy, as this 
would be based on observing the proximity of the CPS-agent to the ritual through the number 
of enabling acts. So, while representing ritual as a blend allows for greater detail in analysing 
the ritual action itself, Sørensen does not offer any specific framework to address the 
centrality or performance frequency of a ritual.  
 
Of course, it is possible to model the enabling acts as separate, independent blends, and then 
take these as implicit parts of the main blends in figures I and J. While loosing some 
precision, this approach does open for the possibility, which I found lacking in section 5.2.1, 
that the enabling act works upon more than one of the ritual elements. These would be very 
simple blends (please see figure K). The sign, be it a divine name or a symbol, in the profane 
space has an indexical relation to the CPS-agents the name/symbol refers to, providing the 
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blend with agent-based agency. In fact, this is exactly how the Artemisian scorpion is 
implicated into the ritual in figure I. I include Christ as the sacred space counterpart in the 
enabling act of the second performative act, since section 2.1.11 established that „α†σ   Α†Ω  
ΙΦΘΥΣ‟ are symbols referring explicitly to Christ.  
Figure K: The Enabling Acts of P.Oslo. I V 
 
While not having very elaborate networks, modelling these two enabling acts as blends 
further illustrates their similarity. As I argued in section 5.2.2, the enabling acts of the two 
utterances are so similar that it is difficult to categorise the one as substantively different from 
the other. Both the structure and the type of ritual agency is identical, the only difference is in 
the religious content. 
 
Finally, the third and largest question left from chapter 5 is how P.Oslo. I V as a whole, but 
also the second ARS more specifically, may display such different traits. Some are typical for 
the „generic‟ ritual tradition in Late Antiquity, while others appear distinctly Christian. To a 
certain extent, my analysis in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 has addressed this. However, to further 
facilitate this discussion I propose to combine the two performative acts of P.Oslo. I V 
together in one blending model (please see figure L). On the one hand, the performative acts 
are similar, with the basic representation structure agent – action complex – object in the 
profane space, and this important topology is projected into the ritual/blended space. Second, 
ritual agency is in both cases ascribed to the blend by the implication of a CPS-agent, from 
the sacred space, as the ritual object. On the other hand, the action complex in the second 
performative act is only illocutionary, not perlocutionary like „bind‟ in the first, meaning 1) 
that the user(s) here may not effect a direct change in the sacred space and 2) that there is one 
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less connection between the sacred and the profane spaces. Regarding the first point, the 
sacred space was found to have different topology principles, generally more in line with 
Christian teachings on the divine and divine agency. In addition to this model, there are the 
enabling acts in figure K, whose analysis in the previous paragraph show to be near-identical 
in structure. Hence, as I concluded in section 6.3.2, the ritual text appears to work in a 
dynamic between the compressing tendencies of the ritual‟s emergent structure and the 
restraining topology from the Christian sacred domain. 
 
Figure L: P.Oslo. I V as a Blend 
 
 
Another purpose of placing the two performative acts together in one model is to reflect that 
they appear together on one papyrus and in a continuous text. This is an important fact I fear 
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is easily forgotten in the separation of the text into two performative acts. I was initially 
hesitant to use the two performative acts as input spaces for a new blended space, which 
represents all of P.Oslo. I V. As the model shows, this new blend is quite weak, in that it 
rather reflects commonalities between the two performative acts, than a blending of the two 
input spaces. As such, the Artemisian scorpion and Christ are not blended into a new deity, 
but aligned as CPS-agents. Also the action complexes are projected into the blended space 
with a very general common denominator; „interacts.‟ Thus, one could argue that there is no 
blending taking place between the two performative acts.  
 
However, then there is the fact of them being together in a continuous text on the one 
papyrus, something which does relate the two acts. It also underlines their structural 
similarity, which may consequently provoke an iconic relation between the two spaces, 
thereby starting off a new conceptual integration network. Hence, I choose to project the two 
performative acts into a blended space for all of P.Oslo. I V, even if it is a weak blended space 
that includes the very broad terms „interacts‟ and „deities.‟ Clearly, a great deal of nuance is 
lost here, nuance which I have found to be very important in the understanding of, and also 
distinguishing between, the two performative acts. Yet, I think the weakness of this over-
arching blend is a good model for P.Oslo. I V, reflecting that there are also several aspects 
that the two performative acts do not share. The sacred space of the second act still adheres to 
Christian ideas of the divine, and its action complex has no counterpart in the sacred space, as 
opposed to the first blend. The difference found in the foregoing analysis is still present and 
must have an impact also on P.Oslo. I V as one blended space. All in all, then, I think the 
weak blended space reflects both how the two utterances‟ common ritual structure pulls 
toward blending, and how important topology principles from the input spaces work to 
constrain the degree of blending.  
 
There are, however, some questions that arise with this blend. Can I really place Christ and 
the Artemisian scorpion together, on the same level, as „deities‟? In fourth, and at least fifth 
century Egypt, one would think most people very well appreciated the difference between the 
two CPS-agents, irrespective of their faith, and my analysis in the foregoing paragraphs has 
demonstrated that they are even treated differently within P.Oslo. I V itself. Fauconnier and 
Turner note that blends may be internally contradictory in certain respects, in order to 
preserve the running of the entire network (2002, 85). Here, the alignment of Christ with the 
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Artemisian scorpion may be an example of this, a case where the CPS-agents are joined in a 
network aimed at ritual efficacy and therefore downplaying their differences. This falls in line 
with Sørensen‟s point that it is indexical and iconic interpretations, not symbolic ones, that 
guide ritual development (2007, 175). And when these interpretations dominate, a ritual like 
P.Oslo. I V, combining Christian ritual practice with other ritual traditions, is possible. After 
all, it is these clashes between different organising frames that provoke rich cultural blends 
(Lundhaug 2007, 33). However, Sørensen also notes that these new cultural blends will need 
to be symbolically reinterpreted in a manner that satisfies the common religious domain. If 
not, the ritual will be either rejected or renovated (Sørensen 2007, 187-189). It is tempting, 
then, to see P.Oslo. I V as an instance of combining Christian and non-Christian ritual forces, 
but then in a manner that would never be accepted in official Christianity.   
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7 Conclusion 
As my work draws to a close, I will begin by bringing together the observations and results 
from my analysis and propose a scenario for the making of P.Oslo. I V, followed by a short 
comment, on the cognitive theories I have used. Then, I will proceed to make a brief attempt 
at locating P.Oslo. I V in a wider context, looking first at cognitive approaches to religious 
transmission and then at historical studies of ritual practice in Egypt in Late Antiquity. 
Finally, I will close by pointing to possible future research that may help the understanding of 
both early Christianity and of ritual practices in Late Antiquity. 
7.1 Concluding Summary and Observations 
In the first of the three main chapters of this thesis, I presented P.Oslo. I V and the main 
outlines of the philological work that has been done on it specifically, and more generally on 
the contents of the ritual text. It established, in line with Eitrem and Fridrichsen‟s first 
publication of the papyrus (1921), that the text combines elements from both Christian and 
non-Christian ritual practice in Late Antiquity. Summarising my observations in section 2.2.6, 
I outlined two possible ways of understanding P.Oslo. I V. One possibility is that P.Oslo. I V 
was an instance of a well-established ritual practice, known from the parallel texts in 
Appendix 2, adopted and elaborated upon within a Christian context. The similarity with 
liturgical prayer of lines 7-10, and its doctrinally significant content, certainly suggests so. 
The second possibility is that the ritual text should be approached in terms of „genre.‟ 
Looking at papyrological evidence from the era, there appears to have been two main „types‟ 
of ritual texts, one which “conflates scores of divinities” (Graf 1991, 190) and another that 
keeps a narrative structure (Frankfurter 1995). P.Oslo. I V tends towards to former. This 
emphasis on genre, instead of religion, falls in line with several studies arguing that even if 
ritual texts contain Jewish and/or Christian elements, “they unashamedly lacked a full 
comprehension or appreciation of the inner integrity of the cults whose material they 
appropriated” (Betz 1991, 254, see also Bohak 2003, 73 and Kee 1989, 128). However, in 
both possibilities, Christian and non-Christian ritual elements are combined to form P.Oslo. I 
V. Yet, based on chapter 2 I was unable to say anything more about the nature and motivation 
of their combination, and this is why I turned to cognitive ritual theory.  
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The analysis in chapter 5 produced a somewhat puzzling result. On the one hand, the structure 
of the Christian and the non-Christian performative act is quite similar, suggesting the 
Christian elements were simply employed as ritually powerful elements and thus supporting 
an assessment of rituals in Late Antiquity according to genre. On the other hand, the action 
complexes of the two performative acts are different, which then indicates that the Christian 
part did keep its integrity and thereby implies a situation where religious tradition is 
important. The results from my analysis in chapter 6 confirm this situation. While the intuitive 
ritual structure of the two performative acts is similar, their action complexes, and also the 
appreciation of the their respective sacred spaces, are different. By combining the two 
performative acts in one blend in figure L, I try to catch how these differences and similarities 
may function together in one ritual text. Section 6.4 then concludes that ritual text appears to 
work in a dynamic between 1) the compressing tendencies of the ritual‟s emergent structure 
and 2) the restraining topology from the Christian sacred domain. I refer to Fauconnier and 
Turner‟s note that blends may have internal contradictions between certain elements to 
preserve the running of the entire network (2002, 85). In P.Oslo. I V, then, the contradiction 
between the Christian and the generic, pan-Mediterranean material is downplayed by the 
ritual structure, but this is not strong enough to remove the differences in topology between 
the Christian and the non-Christian sacred domains.  
 
Although I have been analysing the user(s)‟ appreciation of P.Oslo. I V, as the text‟s audience 
and not its author, I would still like to hazard an hypothesis regarding the formation of P.Oslo. 
I V. I propose its creator wanted to elaborate the ritual act in lines 1-6 with Christian material. 
She or he then did this by duplicating the ritual structure, creating another performative act in 
lines 7-10. I already discussed the possibility of the two acts having parallel structures in 
section 5.2.2, opening with an appeal to higher powers before moving on to the performative 
utterances. Most ritual studies agree that proper form and structure is important in ritual 
(Sørensen 2007, 175, MacMullen 2009, 101), and following this principle the creator of 
P.Oslo. I V would have wanted to expand the Christian material in a proper and correct 
format. This is easily achieved by paralleling the performative act in lines 1-6, which the other 
papyri in Appendix 2 show was a popular ritual form. The only difference, according to 
structural criteria, is that the content of lines 7-10 is Christian, following Christian teaching on 
divinity and quite possibly borrowed from liturgical practice or prayer-traditions. Well, 
almost. If the voces magicae in lines 6-7 are introductory appeals to the second performative 
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act, then it is not completely Christian. But then again, the first performative act is headed by 
the Christian ΦΜΓ, so the lines drawn between the two utterances and their religious tradition 
cannot be too sharp. As, indeed, the cognitive analysis in chapters 5 and 6 suggests. 
 
This scenario, with a ritual structure duplicated from the generic pan-Mediterranean ritual 
tradition, but built onto a ritual phrase that is Christian in content and doctrine, mirrors 
Lawson and McCauley‟s prediction that “the more rituals and personally active superhuman 
agents that a religion possesses [here, the pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition], the firmer is its 
basis for accommodating competing cognitive models [here, Christian belief]” (1990, 164). 
This opens for rituals like P.Oslo. I V, where the structural forces from the one tradition 
operates together with topology principles from the other. It furthermore helps to explain the 
contradicting observations on the ritual‟s „centrality‟ in chapter 5. As the object of the second 
ARS, Christ is qualified according to properties from the Christian domain or ACS, whereas 
his role as enabling agent for the action complex follows the generic, pan-Mediterranean ideas 
on ritual efficacy. Thus, Christ answers to two sets of ACSs; 1) the Christian religious 
tradition as ritual object and 2) the pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition as enabling agent. With 
such a mixed situation, it is reasonable that Lawson and McCauley‟s principles contradict. 
7.1.1 Observations and Comments on the Cognitive Theories Used 
I opened this thesis by quoting Eitrem and Fridrichsen‟s conclusion about P.Oslo. I V, saying 
that “Offenbar liegt hier der Fall vor, dass eine altbewährte heidnische Beschwörungsformel 
durch einen christlichen Zusatz erweitert worden ist” (1921, 23). After some fifty pages of 
cogntive theory and analysis, I have arrived at a conclusion, in section 7.1, that essentially 
says the same. However, in reaching this conclusion I have made some observations as to the 
hows and whys of P.Oslo. I V, thereby complementing Eitrem and Fridrichsen‟s 
understanding of the ritual text. The cognitive analysis has shown that P.Oslo. I V includes 
two performative acts, and it detailed how this structure makes the utterances be intuitively 
appreciated as ritually efficacious. Moreover, the structure of the two acts was found to be 
almost identical, which helps explain how two different religious traditions may fit together in 
one text. However, the cognitive analysis also detected differences between the two 
performative acts, notably in their action complexes and in their ACSs or sacred domains. 
Finally, placing the two acts together in section 6.4, I was able to illustrate how P.Oslo. I V is 
built around a dynamic between the Christian and the generic, pan-Mediterranean religious 
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traditions. Thus, my analysis has provided some further observations on how P.Oslo. I V 
works and the worldview(s) that lie behind it, as I set out to do. 
 
In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I already mention the many challenges to cognitive theory in religious 
and ritual studies, ranging from accusations of reductionism and opportunistic borrowing of 
theoretical frameworks, to calls for better empirical evidence or disagreement over premises. 
In response, cognitive scholars underline their field‟s young age and argue successful 
applications will validate the theories (McCauley and Lawson 2002, 5). My application here 
has indeed provided some interesting observations on P.Oslo. I V, but there were also aspects 
of the ritual text that my analysis was unable to address. Lawson and McCauley‟s theory was 
seen to be somewhat limited in its unilateral implication of CPS-agency, while Sørensen‟s 
blending did not initially include preceding or preparatory acts. I tried to amend this point by 
modelling the enabling acts as separate blends in figure K, but I would have preferred to be 
able to include everything in the ritual text in one model. Then another question arose, and for 
this I did not find any answer. I was unable to address the role and function of signalling 
doctrine both in chapter 5 and chapter 6. This theoretical lapse when it comes to doctrine can 
be a consequence of the general reliance on anthropological studies of foreign, „pre-modern‟ 
societies in cognitive ritual studies. While the cognitive scholars all make supporting 
references to Christian rituals, examples of which I have included in my presentation of their 
theories, typically “the language gets more vague, the use of terms looser” (Vial 2004b, 154) 
when they analyse these. At this observation, I cannot help but to return to Meyer, Smith and 
Kelsey in section 3.3, who ask for the relevance of ritual theories “derived from the 
observation of small-scale tribes, to the texts in this volume [ritual papyri], which were 
produced in a cosmopolitan urban setting” (1994, 4).  
7.2 Possible Contexts 
A part of my aim for this thesis has been to study P.Oslo. I V in and of itself, without relying 
on interpretative cues from a context that is largely unknown. While there is historical 
material on several groups of Christians and non-Christians in Egypt in Late Antiquity, 
locating P.Oslo. I V within any one of these contexts is difficult. However, having completed 
my analysis, I will make a short attempt at contextualising my observations and conclusions. 
First, I will briefly introduce the fourth branch of cognitive ritual studies, dealing with 
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religious transmission, and assess how these theories reflect on P.Oslo. I V and its context. 
Then, I shall compare my results to other historical work on religion and ritual practice in 
Egypt in Late Antiquity.  
7.2.1 Cognitive Theories of Religious Transmission 
Cognitive theory on religious transmission has developed in a discussion between Whitehouse 
(2000/2004a) and McCauley and Lawson (2002). From his studies religious groups in 
Melanesia, Whitehouse launched a theory saying that religions tend towards two opposite 
modes of religiosity (2000/2004a), which manifest themselves in different ritual experiences 
and how these trigger human memory (2004a, 64). Thence, he classifies ritual according to 
two attractor-points, two opposing modes of religiosity; a „doctrinal mode‟ that relies on 
rituals with low emotional arousal but a high performance frequency, and an „imagistic mode‟ 
whose rituals typically have high emotional arousal but lower frequency. The doctrinal mode 
results in the formation of a religious hierarchy to ensure the content and correct repetition of 
the rituals, which by their low emotional arousal are subject to a „tedium effect,‟ while 
imagistic, infrequent rituals favour smaller, more exclusive groups centred on the memory of 
rituals of high emotional arousal (Whitehouse 2004a, 65-74). While agreeing with 
Whitehouse‟s use of cognitive memory-studies, McCauley and Lawson argue that the degree 
of emotional arousal in a ritual, and consequently its memorability, does not originate with the 
frequency of ritual performance, but rather with the ritual‟s form (2002, 113). High emotional 
arousal, they argue, occurs in rituals where the CPS-agent acts as ritual agent, whether 
directly or through enabling acts, while high frequency rituals are typically those where the 
CPS-agent is implicated either in the action complex or the ritual object (McCauley and 
Lawson 2002, 118). They continue to argue that due to the „tedium effect,‟ religious traditions 
will evolve towards special agent rituals, but add that the most successful religions have a 
balance of both ritual forms (McCauley and Lawson 2002, 181). 
 
Both theories of religious transmission have already been applied to a number of historical 
cases. Some see great explanatory potential in them (Beck 2004, Gragg 2004, Leopold 2004, 
Ketola 2007, Martin 2003/04&2007 and Uro 2007), while others question the distinction of 
their attractor points (Clark 2004, Wiebe 2004) and the applicability to more complex 
historical situations (Vial 2004b). Concerning Late Antiquity, Douglas L. Gragg argues that 
traditional Roman religion relied on high frequency, low emotional arousal rituals, which 
83 
 
made it subject to the tedium effect and thus explains the rise of mystery religions in the high- 
and late empire (2004). Martin continues this argument by outlining how Christianity initially 
held many imagistic traits, but then developed, from the Pauline tradition, a growing doctrinal 
tendency (2007, 48-49). Anita Maria Leopold agrees with this scenario (2004, 109), and then 
both she (Leopold 2004, 117) and Uro (2007, 129) position different „gnostic‟ groups as 
imagistic reactions to the growing doctrinal importance in early Christianity. But then, fitting 
P.Oslo. I V into this scenario may present more of a challenge to the theories than these 
previous applications have foreseen. None of these address small, private ritual in Late 
Antiquity. Criticising the modal theory, Vial notes how apotropaic practices at the time of the 
Reformation, which without hierarchical control and being performed in local milieus one 
would expect to be imagistic, “on a second glance (…) seem to fit most of the criteria of the 
doctrinal mode” being repeatable, widespread and frequently sanctioned by the local clergy 
(2004b, 152). 
 
Assessing P.Oslo. I V directly is, again, difficult due to the lack of contextual information. 
The papyrus may have been taken out and read repeatedly, or it may have been hidden on the 
user(s)‟ person or somewhere else significant. It is equally impossible to say whether the 
user(s) experienced the ritual text as emotionally arousing or not. Intuitively, I would be 
inclined to link the many symbols and voces magicae in P.Oslo. I V to an imagistic mode, but 
Vial has already pointed out that the instinctive equation of the imagistic mode with the use of 
imagery does not square with the modal theory and is rather based on prejudice (2004b, 153). 
Hence, there is no information regarding P.Oslo. I V that is of use to Whitehouse‟s modal 
theory. However, the ritual form of P.Oslo. I V is known, so I can apply McCauley and 
Lawson‟s theory of form. According to this, with the CPS-agent being implicated with the 
action complex and the ritual object, P.Oslo. I V is a doctrinal ritual, meaning it has a high 
performance frequency and low emotional arousal. Still, this is difficult to support through 
other evidence. Moreover, McCauley and Lawson underline that not all rituals arrange 
themselves according to their two attractor points, some rituals will have low frequency and 
low emotional arousal and therefore need “cultural mechanisms for supporting memory” 
(2002, 191). Jan Assmann has pointed out how writing is an important such „cultural 
mechanism‟ (2006, 8), and as a ritual text perhaps P.Oslo. I V is such a ritual? Of course, it 
such an atypical form of ritual, but with the large amount of surviving examples of rituals 
similar to P.Oslo. I V (Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994), far exceeding the few rendered in 
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Appendix 2, the ritual form appears to have been common. I would then rather agree with 
Vial‟s comment that such apotropaic practices challenge these transmission theories, or at 
least beg further development. In fact, Whitehouse acknowledges Vial‟s observation, yet does 
not propose to answer it (2004b, 222). 
 
Finally, I should include Sørensen‟s ideas on religious transmission. Although careful not to 
give ritual any primacy in religious development, he does argue that „magic‟ “plays both a 
conservative and an innovative role in the development of cultural systems” (Sørensen 2007, 
180). “[M]agical actions and representations are often deeply embedded in cultural systems 
and function as a „conservative‟ force that supports already existing explanatory event-frames 
and systematised theologies” (Sørensen 2007, 176). Yet, as I mentioned briefly in section 
6.2.2, Sørensen then adds that this symbolic understanding of ritual elements will eventually 
be undermined, and indexical and iconic relations will dominate the interpretation. 
Consequently, one may have a ritual like P.Oslo. I V, where common ritual structure and 
relations unite two different theologies on one papyrus. Thus, this ritual can be said to 
innovate the pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition by including something like a Christian prayer 
or liturgical phrase. I already referred to early Christian assertions that prayer is efficacious 
(Stewart 2008, 749), and P.Oslo. I V may have been an expression of this idea, understood via 
the older traditions of ritual efficacy. Thus, one could even argue that P.Oslo. I V is wholly a 
Christian ritual text, using older structure to express a belief in the efficacy of appealing to the 
divine. Then, with time, such ritual efficacy requires a new symbolic understanding, as 
Sørensen notes (2007, 181), and other, Christian structural expressions of ritual efficacy are 
produced. 
7.2.2 Ritual Traditions and Early Christianity in Egypt 
I noted already in section 3.2 how discourses in Late Antiquity, both Christian and non-
Christian, placed „magic‟ at the fringes of society and generally included it in some processes 
of „Othering.‟ However, the efficacy of the ritual practices were never questioned (Collins 
2008, 1). According to Smith, the era saw a general trend in religious behaviour, displacing 
religion from public temples and sacrifice to private devotion, and amongst the private 
devotional practices written rituals were a large category (1995, 22-27). In what has long been 
the standard work on early Christian „magic,‟ Aune asserts that “[m]agic appears to be as 
universal a feature of religion as deviant behavior is of human societies” (1980, 1516), and 
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observes that early Christian literature, the Gospels included, could have functioned to 
sanction Christian „magic,‟ especially through the name of Christ (1980, 1546). This, of 
course, became an important invocation in the development of the baptismal and eucharistic 
sacraments (Weltin 1960, 83). Somewhat later, Augustine describes „magic‟ as 
communication with demons (Graf 2002, 96), and Caesarius, John Chrysostom and 
Athanasius all warn against using amulets and phylacteries, even if they refer to Christian 
scripture or are addressed to God (Dickie 2001, 281-283). However, in addition to the 
stereotypical ritual experts known also from non-Christian sources, their sermons also warn 
against the „magical‟ ministrations of Christian clergy (Dickie 2001, 273). In a more 
specifically Egyptian setting, a well-known anecdote about Shenoute describes his 
condemnation of another monk who gave a fox‟s claw to a sick official, and surviving letters 
to the monk Paphnutius ask for help in health, temptations, protection and other concerns 
(Brakke 2009, 4).  
 
While the historiographical sources from early Christianity do an effective work in distancing 
the religion from such common ritual practices, recent scholarship agrees that the situation 
must have been more nuanced (Choat 2006, 126). In early monastic literature, David Brakke 
finds many indications that monks, at least some, functioned as local ritual experts. “The 
picture of the monk as the impresario of the demonic placed him among other figures in 
Egyptian society who likewise offered themselves as specialists in dealing with the divine or 
demonic powers – specifically, pagan priests and pagan or Christian „magicians,‟ groups that 
in this period overlapped” (Brakke 2006, 227), with several stories of monks performing 
ritual services (Brakke 2006, 228). Moreover, in their interaction with the traditional priests 
there are not only stories of competition, but also of conversions (Brakke 2009, 9). These 
conversions may have caused the traditional priests‟ ritual knowledge and competence to 
enter Egyptian Christianity (Brakke 2006, 227). These tales also make Frankfurter suggest a 
„demographic continuity‟ from the Egyptian priestly class to the monastic communities, but 
he acknowledges there is no concrete evidence for this (1997, 129). 
 
Still, Frankfurter has developed an extensive argument for seeing a continuity from traditional 
Egyptian religious practice to local Christian ritual experts. First he points to the large amount 
of surviving ritual texts in Coptic from the fifth through tenth centuries, Coptic being, he 
adds, a language that originated from and thrived in Egypt‟s monasteries (Frankfurter 1997, 
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128). Then, Frankfurter places these ritual texts in a long line of texts of ritual expertise, with 
roots back to the temples of the New Kingdom (1997, 116). He proceeds to argue that religion 
in Roman Egypt functioned in local temple-village systems, centred on fertility, healing and 
safety (Frankfurter 1998, 7), and that, concurring with Smith‟s hypothesis, in Late Antiquity 
this religious system was displaced from the temples to more private settings and itinerant 
religious experts (Frankfurter 1998, 30). This, then, was the system that Christianity went into 
competition with and addressed, partially, by taking up the same functions (Frankfurter 1998, 
197). Robin Lane Fox (1986) and Ramsay MacMullen (1984) are two more controversial 
scholars arguing that Christianity spread through taking over the cultural niches of traditional 
religion, rather than displacing it. In Egypt, then, and for these ritual practices, Frankfurter 
holds that one should not think in terms of global religious systems like Christianity, but 
rather of local systems centred on practical concerns like health and safety. ”Local religion is 
personified in a variety of ritual experts, individuals in whom the community invests some 
degree of authority over ritual bricolage, intimacy with spirits, or efficacious technologies like 
writing” (Frankfurter 2005, 275). 
  
To me, this seems a very likely context for the production and use of P.Oslo. I V. My 
cognitive analysis of the ritual structure shows a combination of principles both from 
traditional ritual practice and from new, Christian teachings. Frankfurter refers to a similar 
process in the continued use, from pharaonic to Christian times, of amulets with a horse-rider 
spearing a demon: “[T]hus religion in its most basic and most traditional aspects, in its 
devotion to everyday safety and conservative allegiance to the image of divine victory, also 
continues by reasserting itself in ever new idioms and legends” (1998, 1-2). If P.Oslo. I V was 
produced by local, christianised ritual experts, who may even have been monks, it seems 
reasonable that it should have both its traditional form and elements from the new religion. 
This concept of local, contextualised religion would also explain why the ritual was found to 
be not very central to Christianity. Even though the ritual text includes distinctly Christian 
teachings, proposing a more than superficial knowledge of doctrine, the ritual structure is still 
alien to Christianity when manifest as global religious system. Instead, P.Oslo. I V will have 
been a local expression of Christian faith. Sørensen‟s argument on religious development 
supports this, as it is precisely in such a local, pragmatic ritual setting that the indexical and 
iconic properties of religious elements will rise to the fore. Through these, P.Oslo. I V may 
unite the conservative force of the ritual structure with the new content and worldview of 
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Christianity. Together, these demonstrate a common appreciation for ritual efficacy and use, 
but a also a divine world, a sacred domain if you will, that is changing.   
7.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
As all cognitive studies seem to do, I shall also join the general call for more work in this 
field. Although I have pointed to an increasing number of empirical studies and different 
applications of cognitive theories, there are still too few. Despite the relative success of the 
present application of cognitive theory to P.Oslo. I V, Lawson and McCauley‟s analogies to 
structural linguistics continue to be founded perhaps more in pragmatics than academic 
argument, and Sørensen‟s expansion of blending theory is done with a fairly random 
assortment of theoretical loans. Hence, further work, both on theory and application, would be 
welcome. A more specific point that was raised in my study is the question of doctrine and 
where this features in the cognitive representation of ritual. I found that neither Lawson and 
McCauley nor Sørensen captured this aspect in their models, which seems to underline 
Meyer, Smith and Kelsey‟s criticism of ritual theories that rely too much on anthropological 
observations of small-scale tribes (1994, 4). Hence, I think it is necessary to further explore 
cognitive theories within religious traditions with better known, if not stronger, doctrines, as 
for instance Vial (2004a) does. Connected to this is also the question of distinguishing 
between ritual and prayer, or perhaps more specifically between illocutionary and 
perlocutionary force in performative utterances. Although there are works like Sweetser‟s 
(2000), who looks at speech-act theory and its relation to ritual, a stronger theoretical base 
here would be of great help. Even if Smith thinks the distinction between illocutionary and 
perlocutionary force is merely a continuation of the preconceived duality between religion 
and „magic‟ (2002, 90).  
  
Another development for this type of research would be to expand the source material. 
Having P.Oslo. I V as a case study has allowed me to proceed in great detail, precisely the 
point of having a case study, but now our appreciation of the period and the subject would 
clearly benefit from extending the study to more examples of ritual texts from Late Antiquity. 
The close parallels to P.Oslo. I V listed in Appendix 2 are but a few of the large number of 
published ritual papyri, many of which include equally fascinating combinations and uses of 
different religious traditions. Hopefully, the conclusions arrived at here can be of help in 
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analysing also these other ritual texts. Another interesting aspect, which I also did not have 
time or space to go into in this study, is the materiality of the papyrus and its significance as 
an object. I did touch upon the question of having a performative utterance written down, 
what the significance of such vocal permanence would have been, in section 5.2.1, but very 
briefly. In cultural studies, there is an expanding field of research looking at the cultural 
participation of objects in actor-network-theory, led by scholars like Bruno Latour and 
Theodore Schatzki (Reckwitz 2002). Within religious studies, Marianne Schleicher has begun 
to explore the relation between Scripture, primarily in Judaism, and the material 
manifestations of the texts (2008, 50-51), and anthropologist Edwin Hutchins has presented 
an article incorporating materiality into blending theory, seeing objects as potential „material 
anchors‟ and as such possible input spaces in a conceptual blend (2005). Including such 
approaches in the study of ritual papyri, taking into account their role not only as text but also 
as an artifact, I think will provide further interesting insights into ritual practice and ideas in 
Late Antiquity and early Christianity. 
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Appendix 1 
P.Oslo. I V.  
Oslo Papyrus Electronical System (OPES): http://ub-
fmserver.uio.no/viewRecord.php?recid=44 
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ΦΜΓ. 
Ὡξ Ὡξ θσξ θσξ, Ἰαώ, Σαβαώζ, Ἀδσλαί, Ἐισέ, Σαιακάλ Ταξρ[εη] 
δέλλσ ζε, Σθνξπίε Ἀξηεκίζηε ηηε΄, δηαθύιαμνλ ηὸλ νἶθνλ ηνῦηνλ 
κεηὰ ηῶλ ἐλνηθνύλησλ ἀπὸ παληὸο θαθνῦ, ἀπὸ βαζθνζύλεο 
πάζεο ἀεξίλσλ πλεπκάησλ θαὶ ἀλζξσπίλνπ ὀθζαι[κνῦ 
θαὶ πόλνπ δεηλνῦ [θαὶ] δήγκαηνο ζθνξπίνπ θαί ὄθεσο δηὰ ηὸ  
ὄλνκα ηνῦ ὑςίζηνπ ζενῦ λαηαο κειη δ΄ μπξνπξν αααααα 
βατλρσσσρ καξηηη ηηη ι ελαγ θνξε. Φύιαμνλ, θύξηε, πἱὲ ηνῦ 
Γαπῒδ θαηὰ ζάξθα, ὁ ηερζείο ἐθ ηῆο ἁγίαο παξζέλνπ 
Μαξίαο, ἅγηε, ὕςηζηε ζεέ, ἐμ ἁγίνπ πλεύκαηνο. Γόμα ζνη, 
νὐξάληε βαζηιεῦ. ἀκήλ.  α†σ    Α†Ω   ΙΦΘΥΣ 
(Preisendanz 2001, 210-211) 
1 CH M G.  
2 Hor Hor Phor Phor, Yao Sabaoth Adonai, Eloe, Salaman,   Tarchei 
3 I bind you, artemisian scorpion, 315 times. Preserve this house 
4 With its occupants from all evil, from all bewitchment of spirits of the 
air and human (evil) eye 
5 And terrible pain [and] sting of scorpion and snake, through the 
6 Name of the highest god, Naias Meli, 7 (times) (?), XUROURO 
AAAAAA 
7 BAINCHOOOCH MARIII III L ENAG KORE. Be on guard, O Lord, 
son of 
8 David according to the flesh, the one born of the holy virgin  
9 Mary, O holy one, highest god, from the holy spirit. Glory to you, 
10 O heavenly king. Amen. (signs) 
(Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 49-50) 
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Appendix 2 
 
P.Oxy. VIII 1152  
4,2 x 6,1 cm, 5
th
/6
th
 century. 
 
Ὡξ Ὡξ θσξ Ἐισεί / Ἀδσλαί Ἰάσ Σα / βαώζ Μηραήι Ἰεζνῦ / Φξηζηέ βνήζη ἡκῖλ / 
θαὶ ηνύηῳ νἴθῳ α / κήλ 
 
Hôr. Hôr, phôr, Elôei, Adônai, Iaô, Sabaôth, Michaêl, Iesus Christus! Hilf uns und diesem 
Haus. Amen. 
(Preisendanz 2001, 214) 
Photo: Advanced Papyrological 
Information System (APIS) 
http://wwwapp.cc.columbia.edu/ldpd/apis
/item?mode=item&key=pts.apis.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P.Oxy. VII 1060 
9,2 x 6,3 cm, 6
th
 century.  
† Τὴλ ζύξαλ, ηὴλ Ἀθξνδίηελ 
         θξνδηηελ 
           ξνδηηελ 
            νδηηελ 
   δηηελ 
     ηηελ 
      ηελ 
         ελ 
       [λ] 
Ὡξ Ὡξ / θσξ θσξ, Ἰάσ Σαβαώζ, Ἀδνλέ / δέλν ζε, ζθνξπίε Ἀξηεξήζηε / ἀπάιιαμνλ ηὸλ νἶθνλ 
ηνῦηνλ / ἀπὸ παληὸζ θαθνῦ ἑξπεηνῦ / [θαὶ] πξάγκαηνο, ηαρύ, ηαρύ. / ὁ ἅγηνο Φσθᾶζ ὧδέ 
ἐζηηλ. / Φ[α]κελσζ ηγ΄, ἰλδ(ηθηηῶλνο ηξίηεο.  
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† Die Türe, die Aphroditê, phroditê, roditê, oditê, ditê, itê, tê, [ê] Hôr Hôr phôr phôr,  Iaô 
Sabaôth Adonai! Ich binde dich, arterêsischer (l. artemisischer) Skorpion. Befreie diese Haus 
vor allem üblen Reptil und Unheil, schnell, schnell. Der Heilige Phôkas wohnt hier. Am 13. 
Phamenôth, dritte Indiktion. 
(Preisendanz 2001, 209-210) 
P.Oxy. XVI 2061 
5,3 x 5,3 cm, 5
th
 century. 
Οξ Οξ θνξ θνξ Σαβ[α]ώζ, / Ἀδνλέ, Σαιακα, Ταξ / ρεη, Ἀβξα[ζ]αμ. δέλλσ ζέ, / ζθνξπίε 
Ἀξηεκηζίαο, / ηξηαθόζηα δεθάπελ / ηε. Παρσλ πεληεθαη / δεθάηῃ...... 
(zw) Sabaôth, Adônai (zw), Abrasax! Ich binde dich, Skorpion der Artemisia, 
dreihundertfünfzehnmal. Am 15. Pachôn. 
(Preisendanz 2001, 154) 
Photo: Oxyrhynchus Online 
http://163.1.169.40/cgi-
bin/library?e=q-000-00---0POxy--
00-0-0--0prompt-10---4----ded--0-
1l--1-en-50---20-about-2061--
00031-001-1-0utfZz-8-
00&a=d&c=POxy&cl=search&d=H
ASH01e56d56f2a0561449671b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P.Oxy. XVI 2062 
9,8 x 10,2 cm, 6
th
 century. 
Ὡξ Ὡξ / θσξ θσξ / Ἰάσ, / Ἀδνλαεί, / Σαβαώζ, / Σαιακαλ, Ταξρρεη. / δέλλεσ ζαί, / ζθνξπίε / 
Ἀξηεκίζνπ, ηγ΄. 
(zw) Iaô, Adônaei, Sabaôth (zw)! Ich binde dich, Skorpion des Artemisos. Am 13. (des 
Monats). 
(Preisendanz 2001, 155) 
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Photo: Oxyrhynchus Online 
http://163.1.169.40/cgi-
bin/library?e=q-000-00---0POxy--00-
0-0--0prompt-10---4----ded--0-1l--1-
en-50---20-about-2062--00031-001-1-
0utfZz-8-
00&a=d&c=POxy&cl=search&d=HA
SH13e57d56f3306614cc671b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P.Oxy. XVI 2063 
7,7 x 5,2 cm, 6th century. 
+ + + / + Ὡξ Ὡξ / [θ]σξ θσξ / [Ἀδσλαί, / Σαια]κα, ξζαρη. / [δ]έλλν ζε, / [ζ]θ[ν]ξπίε / 
Ἀξηεκίζηε. / Φακελσζ ηέζζαξν, / θσξ νξ νξ νζνα / δδδ   ξξξ. 
(+ + + + zw) Adônai, (zw)! Ich binde dich, artemisischer Skorpion. Am vierten Phamenôth 
(zw). 
(Preisendanz 2001, 155) 
 Photo: Oxyrhynchus Online http://163.1.169.40/cgi-
bin/library?e=q-000-00---0POxy--00-0-0--0prompt-10---
4----ded--0-1l--1-en-50---20-about-2063--00031-001-1-
0utfZz-8-
00&a=d&c=POxy&cl=search&d=HASH25e58d56f3c07
6154f671b 
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P.Rain. 3 
4,8 x 11,7 cm. 
Ἰεζνῦ]ζ, Ἰεζνῦζ, Ἰεζνῦζ, ΑΩ, Ἀδσλαί, Ἐισλαί, Ἐισέ 
       εεεεεεε    εεεεεεε     ηηηηηηη     ννννννν 
  (Z Charaktere) 
  ν ν α.α            αὔξα 
   ζ ε η .. ν α   Ἐ ι σ ν ζ    α η 
      ν ξ ξ   ξ α π σ ρ        . . . ε η α η    α η   α η   Α ἰ ώ λ 
(Preisendanz 2001, 219) 
 
P.Oxy. VI 924 
9 x 7,6 cm, 4th century. 
Ἠ κὴλ θζιάμῃζ θαὶ ζπληε/ξήοῃζ Ἀξίαο ἀπὸ ηνῦ ἐπηεκεξη/λνῦ θξηθὸζ θαὶ ἀπὸ ηνῦ 
θαζεκε/ξηλνῦ θξηθὸζ θαὶ ἀπὸ ηνῦ ιεπηνῦ / ππξε[ηνῦ ηνῦ ηῆζ θνξπ/θῆζ. ηαῦηα εὐ[κελῶ]ζ 
[π]ξά[μ]εηο ὅισο θαηὰ ηὸ ζέιεκά /ζνπ πξῶηνλ θαὶ θαηὰ ηὴλ πίο/ηηλ αὐηῆζ, ὅηη δνύιε ἐζηὶλ / 
ηνῦ ζ(εν)ῦ ηνῦ δῶληνο, θαὶ ἵλα / ηὸ ὄλνκά ζνπ ᾖ δηὰ παληὸζ / δεδνμακέλ[νλ. / 
  δύλακ]ηο  / α   Ἰ(εζν)ῦ    παηήξ, πἱόο, κήηεξ  Φ(ξηζην)ῦ   ν 
         ε              π 
         η               πλ(εῦκ)α  Α Ω  ἅγηνλ         σ 
       Ἀβξαζάμ 
 
Bewahre und schütze Aria vor dem Schüttelfrost, der einen Tag währt, und vor dem 
Schüttelfrost bei Tag und vor dem Schüttelfrost bei Nacht und vor der durchdringenden 
Fieberhitze [des Kopfes]. Das tu mir in Gnaden voll und ganz, einmal nach deinem Willen, 
und dann nach ihrem (der Trägerin) Glauben, weil sie Dienerin ist des lebendigen Gottes, und 
auf dass dein Namen immerdar gepriesen sei. [Wunderkraft] Iêsu Christi, Vater, Sohn, 
Mutter, heiliger Geist, A Ô, Abrasax. 
(Preisendanz 2001, 212) 
 
 
 
103 
 
P.Oxy. VIII 1151 
23,4 x 4,4 cm, 5th century. 
† Φεῦγε, πλεῦκα / κεκηζεκέλνλ. / Φ[ξηζηό]ζ ζε δηώθεη. / πξνέιαβέλ ζε / ὁ ὑηὸζ ηνῦ ζ[εν]ῦ θαὶ 
/ ηὸ πλ[εῦκ]α ηὸ ἅγηνλ. / ὁ ζ[εὸ]ζ ηῆζ πξνβαηη/θῆζ θνιπκβή/ζξαο, ἐμεινῦ ηὴλ / δνύιελ ζνπ / 
Ἰσαλλίαλ, ἣλ / ἔηεθελ Ἀλαζηαζία / ἡ θαὶ Δὐθεκία, / ἀπὸ παληὸζ θαθνῦ. /  † ἐλ ἀξρῇ ἦλ / ὁ 
ιόγνο, θαὶ ὁ ιόγνο / ἦλ πξὸζ ηὸλ ζ[εό]λ, θαὶ / ζ[εὸ]ζ ἦλ ὁ ινγνο. / πάληα δη‟ αὐηνῦ / ἐγέλεην, 
θαὶ / ιόγε ηνῦ ζ[εν]ῦ ηνῦ / δῶληνο, ὁ ἰαζάκε/λνο πᾶζαλ λόζνλ / θαὶ πᾶζαλ καιάθίαλ, / ἴαζαη 
θαὶ ἐπίζθεςαη / θαὶ ηὴλ δνύινλ ζνπ / Ἰσαλλίαλ, ἣλ ἔηεθελ / Ἀλαζηαζία ἡ θαὶ / Δὐθεκία, θαὶ 
ἀπν/δίσμνλ θαὶ θπγάδεπ/ζνλ ἀπ‟ αὐηῆζ πάληα / ππξεηὸλ θαὶ παληνῖνλ / ῥῖγνο, ἀκθεκεξηλόλ, / 
ηξηηενλ, ηεηαξηενλ, / θαὶ πᾶλ θαθόλ. εὔρεο/ζε πξεζβίαο ηῆζ / δεζπνίλεο ἡκῶλ, ηῆζ / 
ζενηόθνπ, θαὶ ηῶλ / ἐλδόμσλ ἀξραγγέ/ισλ θαὶ ηνῦ ἁγίνπ θαὶ ἐλ/δόμνπ ἀπνζηόινπ θαὶ / 
εὐαγγειηζηνῦ θαὶ ζεν/ιόγνζ Ἰσάλλνπ θαὶ ηνῦ / ἁγίνπ Σεξήλνπ θαὶ ηνῦ / ἁγίνπ Φηινμέλνπ θαὶ 
ηνῦ / ἁγίνπ Βίθησξνο θαὶ ηνῦ / ἁγίνπ Ἰνύζηνπ θαὶ πάλησλ / ηῶλ ἁγίσλ, ὅηη ηὸ ὄλνκά / ζνπ, 
θ[ύξη]ε ὁ ζ[εό]ζ, ἐπεθαεζά/κ]ελ, ηὸ ζαπκαζηὸλ / θαὶ ὑπεξέλδνμνλ θαὶ / θνβεξὸλ ηνῖζ 
ὑπε/λαληίνηο, ἀκήλ. †     
† Flieh, verhasster Geist, Christus verfolgt dich. Eingeholt hat dich der Sohn Gottes und der 
hl. Geist! Gott des Schafsteiches, erlös deine Dienerin Iôhannia, Tochter der Anastasia, die 
auch Euphêmia heisst, von jeglichem Übel. (Ev. Joh. 1,1-3.) Herr  † Christus, Sohn und Wort 
des lebendigen Gottes, der du heiltest alle Krankheit und alle Schwäche, heile du und 
beschütz auch deine Dienerin Iôhannia, Tochter der Anastasia, die auch Euphêmia heisst, und 
verjag und vertrieb von ihr alle Fieberhitze und allen Fieberfrost, täglichen, dreitägigen, 
viertägigen, und jegliches Übel. Betet um die Fürbitte unserer Herrin, der Gottgebärerin, und 
der preiswerten Erzengel und des heiligen und preiswerten Apostels und Evangelisten und 
Gottgelehrten Iôhannês und des hl. Serenus und des hl. Philoxenos und des hl. Viktor und des 
hl. Iustus und aller Heiligen, weil ich deinen Namen, Herr Gott, angerufen habe, den 
wunderbaren und über alles gepriesenen, der furchtbar ist den Widersachern. Amen. † 
(Preisendanz 2001, 212-213) 
P.Rain. 5 
13,4 x 19,6 cm, 6th/7th century.  
Γηὰ ηὸ ὄλνκα ηνῦ παηξὸζ] θαὶ πἱ[ν]ῦ, ηνῦ ἁγί[ν]π [πλεύκαηνο θα]ὶ ηῆζ δεζπνίλεο ἡκῶλ, / ηῆζ 
παλαγίαο ζενηόθνζ θαὶ ἀεηπαξζέλνπ Μαξίαο θαὶ ἁγηνηάηνπ / θαὶ πξνδνξόκνπ Ἰσαλλνπ ηνῦ 
βαπηηζ[η]νῦ, θαὶ ηνῦ ἁγίνπ θαὶ ζενιόγνπ / Ἰσαλλνπ ηνῦ εὐαγγειηζηῦ, θαὶ ηῶλ ἁγίσλ παηέξσλ 
ἡκῶλ / ἀπνζηόισλ θαὶ πάλησλ ηῶλ ἁγίσλ. ἐμνξθηδσ πᾶλ δῆγκα ηνῦ / δ]ηαβόινπ ζεξίσλ ηῶλ 
ἐπὶ ηῆζ γῆζ θαηὰ ηνῦ ζενῦ θαὶ ηνῦ ζσηῆξνο / ἡκῶλ Ἰεζνῦ Φξηζηνῦ δηὰ ηνῦ ἐιαίνπ / ηνῦ 
ἱ[εξνῦ β]απη[ηζκνῦ, εἰζ] ηὸλ ηόπνλ ηνῦηνλ, [ἰὸλ ὅπ]νπ ἔζεθαο. ἵλα / ζηάζεηη [ἐπί η]όπνπ θαὶ 
κὴ ἀλαδξά[κῃζ] ἢ ἐπὶ ηὴ(λ) θαξδίαλ / ἢ ἐπὶ ηὴλ θεθαιὴ(λ) ἢ ἐπὶ ηὴλ βόιβ[α]λα, ἀιιὰ / 
ζηάζεηη, ἐθ‟ ᾦ ηὸλ ἰόλ ζνπ (ἔζεθαο), θαὶ ἄπνλνο κείλῃ / ὁ ἄλζξσπνο δηὰ ηὸ παλάγηνλ θαὶ 
[ἔληηκνλ / ὄλνκα ηνῦ παλην[θξάηνξνο ζενῦ θαὶ / Ἰεζνῦ Φξηζηνῦ, ην[ῦ πἱνῦ ...  
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[Im Names des Vaters und Sohnes, des hl. Geistes und] unsrer Herrin, der hochheiligen 
Gottesgebärerin und ewigen Jungfrau Maria und des hochhl. Vorläufers Johannês, des 
Täufers, und des hl. Gottesgelehrten Johannês, des Evangelisten, und unsrer hl. Väter Apostel 
und aller Heiligen: ich beschwöre jeden Biss der Tiere des Teufels auf Erden bei Gott und 
Jesus Christus, unserm Retter, durch das Öl der hl. Taufe, an diesem Ort, wo du Gift abgelegt 
hast: bleib stehn an Ort und Stelle und lauf nicht vor ans Herz oder an den Kopf oder an die 
Schaden bleibe der Mensch durch den hochheiligen und geehrten Namen des allmächtigen 
Gottes und Jesus Christus des [Sohnes… 
(Preisendanz 2001, 219-220) 
”Bitte des Dichters von Aphroditê” 
49,6 x 28,5 cm 
[Φξ(ηζηόο). ἐμνξθίδσ] ζε, θ(ύξη)ε, π[αλ]ηνθξάησξ, πξσηνγελ[έησ]ξ, [α]ὐηνγελέησξ, 
ἀζπεξκνγόλεηε, / 7 Β.] ζηεθαλε ὁκνῦ παληεπόπηεο ζὺ θαὶ Δἰάσ, Σαβαώ, Βξηλζαώ, ἔρε κε 
πἰόλ, / παξ[α]θύιαμόλ κε ἀπὸ παληὸζ πνλεξνῦ πλ(εύκ)καηνο θαὶ ὑπόηαμόλ κνη πᾶλ / πλ(εῦκ)α 
δαηκνλίσλ θζεηξνπνηνύλησλ ἀθαζάξησλ, ἐπίγαηα, ὑπόγαηα, / ἔλπδξα θαὶ ρεξζαῖα, θαὶ πᾶζα(λ) 
ζθηά(λ) ζθηά(λ). Φξ(ηζηόο). 
[Christus! Ich beschwöre] dich, Herr, Allherrscher, Ersterzeuger, Selbsterzeuger, ohne Samen 
Erzeugter, [Lücke], Allseher zugleich (bist) du und Iaô, Sabaô, Brinthaô, nimm mich als 
Sohn, bewahr mich vor jeglichem bösen Geist und unterwirf mir jeglichen Geist Verderben 
schaffender, unreiner Dämonen, die auf der Erde, under der Erdem die des Wassers und 
Festlandes, und jedes Gespenst. Christus! 
(Preisendanz 2001, 221-222) 
P.719 SIP 
25 x 5,5 cm, 4th or 5th century. 
† Φ [.]εξ. Ἐλ ἀξρῇ ἦλ ὁ ιόγνο θαὶ ὁ ιόγνο ἦλ πξὸζ ηὸλ ζεόλ. θαὶ ζεὸζ ἦλ ὁ ιόγνο. βίβινο 
γελέζεσο Ἰεζνῦ Φξηζηνῦ, / πἱνῦ Γαπε[ί]η, πἱνῦ Ἀβξαάκ. θαζὼζ εἶπελ Ἠζαΐαο ὁ πξνθήηεο. 
[ἀξρὴ ηνῦ εὐα]γγειίνπ Ἰεζνῦ Φξηζηνῦ, / πἱνῦ ζενῦ, πἱνῦ Ἀβξαάκ. ἐπεηδήπεξ πνιινὶ 
ἐπερείξεζαλ ἀλ[αηάμα]ζζαη δηήγεζηλ πεξὶ ηῶλ / πεπιεξνθνξεκέλσλ ἐλ ἡκῖλ πξαγκάησλ. ὁ 
θαηνηθῶλ [ἐλ βνεζεί]ᾳ ηνῦ Ὑςίζηνπ θαὶ ηὰ ἑμῆζ.  πάηεξ ἡκῶλ, ὁ ἐλ ηνῖζ νύξαλνῖζ, 
ἁγηαζζήην ηὸ .νλνκα ζνπ θα[ὶ ηὰ ἑμῆζ]. δόμα παηξί θαὶ πἱῷ / θαὶ ἁγίῳ πλεύκαηη λῦλ θαὶ 
ἀεὶ θαὶ εἰζ ηνύο αἰῶλαο ηῶλ αἰώλσλ. ἀκήλ. Φ[(ξηζηό)ζ]. † † † 
(Preisendanz 2001, 227-228) 
 
